本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì) + 公司績(jī)效��； 參考：《河南師范大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：根據(jù)現(xiàn)代管理理論,股權(quán)激勵(lì)作為一種長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)機(jī)制,意在降低代理成本,提高經(jīng)營(yíng)效率,以實(shí)現(xiàn)股東財(cái)富最大化,是一種符合現(xiàn)代企業(yè)長(zhǎng)期發(fā)展的激勵(lì)方式。股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)于經(jīng)營(yíng)效率的提高以及公司股東與企業(yè)管理者之間的委托代理問題的解決都有著很好的效果,激勵(lì)科學(xué)和合理的公司績(jī)效評(píng)價(jià)體系對(duì)于衡量股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制效應(yīng)有著關(guān)鍵性的作用。但是信息技術(shù)行業(yè)較相比于其他行業(yè)更具有高成長(zhǎng)性、高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、收益率強(qiáng)等特征,又讓信息技術(shù)行業(yè)成為了目前選擇實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制數(shù)量最多的行業(yè)之一。所以對(duì)于我國(guó)信息技術(shù)行業(yè)實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的現(xiàn)狀以及制度設(shè)計(jì)的研究具有很重要的實(shí)踐意義。正是以這樣的思考為出發(fā)點(diǎn),本文以信息技術(shù)行業(yè)上市公司在股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度下的公司績(jī)效進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究。本文通過對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)理論相關(guān)知識(shí)與國(guó)內(nèi)外文獻(xiàn)研究的基礎(chǔ)上,對(duì)我國(guó)股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制的實(shí)施現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行了探討,包括我國(guó)上市公司實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的制度背景以及自《上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)管理辦法》(試行)頒布后我國(guó)已推出股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案的上市公司的股權(quán)激勵(lì)模式、公司性質(zhì)、股票來源和行業(yè)分布,并且以2015年12月31日為橫截面我國(guó)已宣布實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃并在滬深兩市上市的信息技術(shù)企業(yè)作為研究樣本,對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)與公司績(jī)效的相關(guān)性進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析。本文選取了上市公司的償債、營(yíng)運(yùn)、獲利和發(fā)展等能力作為樣本指標(biāo),通過因子分析法來建立公司績(jī)效評(píng)價(jià)模型,計(jì)算得到公司績(jī)效評(píng)價(jià)綜合值,引入多個(gè)控制變量并以股權(quán)激勵(lì)比例作為自變量進(jìn)行多元回歸,驗(yàn)證上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制與公司績(jī)效之間的關(guān)系,希望對(duì)上市公司的股權(quán)激勵(lì)方案實(shí)施與設(shè)計(jì)提供借鑒。通過實(shí)證研究,本文得出以下主要結(jié)論:我國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)與公司績(jī)效之間具有顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系,管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)在上市公司中發(fā)揮著積極的作用,文章最后針對(duì)進(jìn)一步完善上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制提出了相關(guān)的對(duì)策建議。
[Abstract]:According to modern management theory, equity incentive, as a long-term incentive mechanism, aims to reduce agency cost, improve management efficiency and realize the maximization of shareholders' wealth, which is a kind of incentive mode in line with the long-term development of modern enterprises. Equity incentive has a good effect on the improvement of management efficiency and the solution of the principal-agent problem between shareholders and managers. Scientific and reasonable corporate performance evaluation system plays a key role in measuring the effect of equity incentive mechanism. However, the information technology industry has more characteristics of high growth, high risk and strong rate of return than other industries, which makes the information technology industry become one of the industries that choose to implement the stock right incentive mechanism. Therefore, it is of great practical significance to study the status quo and system design of equity incentive in information technology industry in China. With this thinking as the starting point, this paper makes an empirical study on the corporate performance of listed companies in the information technology industry under the equity incentive system. Based on the relevant knowledge of equity incentive theory and domestic and foreign literature, this paper discusses the current situation of the implementation of equity incentive mechanism in China. Including the institutional background of the implementation of equity incentive in listed companies in China and the stock incentive model of listed companies that have been launched since the promulgation of the "measures for Stock incentive Management of listed companies" (trial implementation), and the nature of the companies. The stock source and industry distribution, and taking December 31, 2015 as the cross section of China, has announced the implementation of the equity incentive plan and listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges as the research sample. The correlation between equity incentive and corporate performance is analyzed empirically. In this paper, the listed companies' solvency, operation, profit and development are selected as sample indicators, and the performance evaluation model is established by factor analysis, and the comprehensive value of corporate performance evaluation is calculated. This paper introduces multiple control variables and uses equity incentive ratio as independent variable to verify the relationship between equity incentive mechanism and corporate performance in order to provide reference for the implementation and design of equity incentive scheme of listed companies. Through empirical research, this paper draws the following main conclusions: there is a significant positive correlation between equity incentive and corporate performance of listed companies in China, and management equity incentive plays an active role in listed companies. Finally, the article puts forward the relevant countermeasures and suggestions to further improve the equity incentive mechanism of listed companies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：河南師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F49;F272.5

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