本文選題：電信運營商 + 合謀��； 參考：《吉林大學》2012年博士論文

【摘要】：中國電信產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)過三十幾年的發(fā)展，已經(jīng)取得了長足的進步。但是在管制過程中，監(jiān)管部門更多的強調(diào)人為創(chuàng)造和實現(xiàn)均衡的市場份額，而忽略了企業(yè)的策略性行為對產(chǎn)業(yè)市場結(jié)構(gòu)的影響作用。企業(yè)選擇什么樣的策略性行為是企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略決策的重要內(nèi)容之一，它可以反應出該企業(yè)所秉持的管理思想與管理理念，也會對企業(yè)的經(jīng)營效率產(chǎn)生直接而深刻的影響，進而影響產(chǎn)業(yè)的市場結(jié)構(gòu)。合謀是企業(yè)策略性行為的重要組成部分。所謂合謀就是指企業(yè)之間旨在避免競爭而采取的彼此協(xié)調(diào)行動的一種行為，它極易出現(xiàn)在寡頭壟斷的市場結(jié)構(gòu)中。電信產(chǎn)業(yè)是一個典型的寡頭壟斷產(chǎn)業(yè)，已經(jīng)有足夠的證據(jù)證明電信運營商之間確實存在合謀行為。電信運營商的合謀行為一方面會對企業(yè)自身的經(jīng)營效率產(chǎn)生影響，另一方面也會影響電信產(chǎn)業(yè)的有效競爭和良性發(fā)展。 本文應用產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論、博弈論、合謀理論、企業(yè)績效決定理論等對電信運營商之間合謀行為的機理以及合謀行為對電信運營商的企業(yè)績效的影響進行了研究。主要解決了四方面的問題：1、電信運營商之間為什么會產(chǎn)生合謀？電信運營商之間的合謀有怎樣的特征？電信運營商之間的合謀會產(chǎn)生怎樣的結(jié)果？2、電信運營商之間的合謀會受哪些因素的影響？3、產(chǎn)品差異化下運營商之間的合謀行為會發(fā)生怎樣的變化？4、合謀行為對電信運營商企業(yè)績效會產(chǎn)生怎樣的影響作用？ 證明電信運營商之間有合謀行為存在的市場事實主要有四項：電信運營商之間簽署的具有合謀性質(zhì)的“合作協(xié)議”；電信運營商收取高額的壟斷價格，獲得高額的壟斷利潤；移動通信中的漫游費問題；電信運營商的高管互換。這些事實一定程度上證明了電信運營商之間的確存在合謀行為。而合謀行為與運營商之間的價格戰(zhàn)有密切的聯(lián)系，合謀一旦破裂很容易轉(zhuǎn)換為彼此之間的價格戰(zhàn)；反過來為了避免運營商之間的惡性價格競爭，電信主管部門也積極提倡運營商之間進行“合作”。 電信運營商之間之所以會出現(xiàn)合謀行為源于企業(yè)內(nèi)部與管理部門兩方面激勵。一是兩運營商合謀下的利潤要高于競爭下的利潤，出于利潤最大化的目的，運營商有合謀的意愿。二是工信部（原信息產(chǎn)業(yè)部）以及各地電信管理局出于對國有資產(chǎn)保值、增值的考慮，不愿意看到同為國有企業(yè)的電信運營商之間進行低價競爭，因此倡導運營商之間簽署合謀協(xié)議。電信運營商之間的合謀行為的根本特征是不穩(wěn)定。首先，在兩運營商彼此合謀下，如果有一方堅持合謀價格（產(chǎn)量），而另一方背叛合謀（降低價格或提高產(chǎn)量），則背叛方所獲得的利潤要高于其在合謀下的利潤，而對于堅持合謀的一方，其所獲得的利潤要比在獨立競爭時所獲得的利潤還要少。因此，運營商都有背叛合謀的激勵，合謀本身是不穩(wěn)定的。其次，根據(jù)“冷酷策略”，要使兩個運營商都能長期維持合謀而不發(fā)生背叛行為，就要求兩個運營商所確定的貼現(xiàn)因子大于0.5294，此為維持合謀穩(wěn)定的條件。但是現(xiàn)實中運營商的貼現(xiàn)因子水平會隨時間、環(huán)境變化而變化，也會出現(xiàn)更加重視短期利益的情況。維持合謀穩(wěn)定的條件的嚴苛性也導致運營商的合謀行為不能長期、穩(wěn)定持續(xù)。電信運營商之間的合謀與競爭的常態(tài)表現(xiàn)為合謀與價格競爭交替出現(xiàn)�！袄淇岵呗浴彼玫降慕Y(jié)論是一種理想狀態(tài)，在現(xiàn)實中很難實現(xiàn)。因此，電信運營商之間進行長期的、穩(wěn)定的合謀是很難出現(xiàn)的。但是，出于自身利益的考慮，彼此又有進行合謀的意愿。因此，在現(xiàn)實中更容易出現(xiàn)的情況是：在一段時間內(nèi)，運營商展開激烈的價格競爭；然后出于自身利益考慮，彼此又會積極尋求合作與合謀；經(jīng)過了一段相對穩(wěn)定的市場運行期后，價格競爭又會出現(xiàn)�，F(xiàn)實中運營商之間的合謀行為都是短期的、小范圍的和不穩(wěn)定的。電信運營商的貼現(xiàn)因子水平低、成本和市場份額的不對稱、產(chǎn)品的同質(zhì)性競爭，以及合謀成本、監(jiān)督成本的客觀存在，對背叛合謀行為的懲罰威脅小都導致合謀很難長期存在。 產(chǎn)品差異化可以分為垂直差異化和水平差異化。垂直差異是指所有消費者都認可的質(zhì)量差異，即廠商在追求更好產(chǎn)品的過程中設計出的相同價格而不同質(zhì)量水平的產(chǎn)品。水平差異是指不同特性的商品在制造過程中所需要的資源數(shù)量一樣，但產(chǎn)品在設計中卻存在明顯差異，如品種、花色、樣式等。垂直產(chǎn)品差異化對限制運營商的價格戰(zhàn)和合謀都有作用。首先，在垂直產(chǎn)品差異化下，只有當兩運營商的產(chǎn)品的垂直差異程度控制在一定范圍內(nèi)（運營商產(chǎn)品的替代系數(shù)b≥2.32288），合謀才有發(fā)生的可能性和意義。如果兩運營商產(chǎn)品垂直差異程度過大，合謀下的利潤反而比獨立競爭下的利潤更少，則合謀不會發(fā)生，故較大程度的垂直產(chǎn)品差異可以限制合謀發(fā)生。其次，如果兩個運營商在垂直產(chǎn)品差異下發(fā)生合謀，則隨著垂直產(chǎn)品差異化的程度不斷增大（但始終滿足b≥2.32288），兩個運營商維持合謀穩(wěn)定所需要的貼現(xiàn)因子的數(shù)值逐漸減小，說明一定程度的垂直產(chǎn)品差異化有助于合謀的穩(wěn)定，從而減少運營商之間價格戰(zhàn)的發(fā)生。當兩個運營商合謀時，要使生產(chǎn)高質(zhì)量產(chǎn)品的運營商維持合謀而不背叛，其所需要的臨界貼現(xiàn)因子水平明顯高于生產(chǎn)低質(zhì)量產(chǎn)品的運營商維持合謀所需要的臨界貼現(xiàn)因子水平。說明提供高質(zhì)量產(chǎn)品的運營商在背叛合謀時所獲得的利潤更大，更容易背叛合謀而發(fā)動價格戰(zhàn)。這一結(jié)論與現(xiàn)實中中國移動與中國聯(lián)通的價格戰(zhàn)情況相吻合。 合謀行為會導致運營商產(chǎn)品差異化水平降低，無論是垂直差異化還是水平差異化。在垂直產(chǎn)品差異化下，要使合謀利潤達到最大化，則生產(chǎn)高質(zhì)量產(chǎn)品的運營商的質(zhì)量水平要比彼此獨立開展競爭時的質(zhì)量水平降低，即兩運營商的產(chǎn)品差異程度降低。在水平產(chǎn)品差異化下，彼此獨立競爭下兩運營商的產(chǎn)品只有在水平差異達到最大化時才會實現(xiàn)利潤最大化。但是，在合謀下，要實現(xiàn)利潤最大化則要求兩運營商的產(chǎn)品差異程度是中等水平，即合謀降低了產(chǎn)品差異化程度。而一旦合謀破裂，，勢必導致市場中產(chǎn)品同質(zhì)競爭激烈。水平產(chǎn)品差異化不利于合謀的穩(wěn)定，但此結(jié)論的適用性有限。因為這一結(jié)論的獲得是在假設運營商保持所處地理位置不變時降低產(chǎn)品價格，這樣背叛合謀的利潤自然變大，維持合謀自然困難。但在現(xiàn)實中，運營商不僅會降低產(chǎn)品的價格，還可以改變其所處的地理位置。因此，現(xiàn)實中的背叛行為更加復雜，理論分析也更加困難。 本文從企業(yè)的經(jīng)濟利潤、成本效率、消費者滿意度和創(chuàng)新活動四個方面分析了合謀行為對電信運營商企業(yè)績效的影響作用。合謀行為雖然短期內(nèi)可以提高電信運營商的企業(yè)利潤，但是，從長期來看，合謀行為會大大降低企業(yè)的成本效率和消費者對企業(yè)服務的滿意度，同時，合謀行為導致的壟斷會嚴重影響電信運營商的創(chuàng)新動力，對運營商的技術創(chuàng)新產(chǎn)生嚴重的負面影響作用，甚至會打擊運營商長期的競爭力。合謀也會導致運營商產(chǎn)品差異化水平降低，從而遏制運營商產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新動力，降低企業(yè)的競爭優(yōu)勢。因此，從綜合、全面的角度分析，合謀行為對電信運營商企業(yè)績效有負面的影響作用，應該盡量去除。文章最后從電信運營商自身競爭行為、立法和法律監(jiān)督、政府部門的規(guī)制政策等方面提出了去除合謀行為的策略。并基于可競爭市場理論提出了一個放松電信運營產(chǎn)業(yè)準入，引入多個競爭主體的假說。
[Abstract]:After more than thirty years of development, the China Telecom industry has made great progress. But in the process of regulation, the regulatory department emphasizes more people to create and realize a balanced market share, but neglects the influence of the strategic behavior of the enterprise on the industrial market structure. One of the important contents of the decision is that it can reflect the management ideas and management ideas held by the enterprise. It also has a direct and profound influence on the business efficiency of the enterprise, and then affects the market structure of the industry. Conspiracy is an important part of the strategic behavior of the enterprise. The so-called collusion means that the enterprise is designed to avoid competition. The behavior of the coordinated action of each other, which is very easy to appear in the oligopoly market structure. The telecom industry is a typical oligopoly industry, and there is enough evidence to prove that there is a conspiracy between the telecom operators. The conspiracy of the telecom operators will have an impact on the business efficiency of the enterprise itself. On the other hand, it will also affect the effective competition and benign development of the telecommunications industry.
This paper applies industrial organization theory, game theory, conspiracy theory and enterprise performance determination theory to study the mechanism of collusion between telecom operators and the effect of conspiracy behavior on the enterprise performance of telecom operators. The main problems are as follows: 1, why will the telecom operators conspire? Telecom operation between telecom operators and telecom operators? What are the characteristics of the collusion between business operators? What are the results of the collusion between telecom operators? 2, what factors will be affected by the conspiracy of telecom operators? 3, how will the conspiracy of operators change under the product differentiation? 4, how does the conspiracy effect on the performance of telecom operators Use?
There are four main market facts that show conspiracy between telecom operators: the conspiracy "cooperation agreement" signed by telecom operators; the telecom operators collect high monopoly prices, obtain high monopoly profits; the problem of roaming fees in mobile communications; and the exchange of executives of telecom operators. The facts prove to some extent that there is a conspiracy between the telecom operators, and the collusion is closely related to the price war between the operators, and the conspiracy is easily converted into a price war between each other; in turn, in order to avoid the vicious price competition between the operators, the telecommunications authorities also actively advocate transportation. "Cooperation" between the battalions.
The reason why the conspiracy between telecom operators is motivated by two aspects of enterprise and management. First, the profits of the two operators conspire higher than the profit under competition. The operators have conspiracy intention for the purpose of maximizing profit. Two is the Ministry of industry and information (Ministry of information industry) and the local telecommunication Administration for the country. With the consideration of asset preservation and value added, it is not willing to see the low price competition between the telecom operators with the state-owned enterprises and therefore the conspiracy agreement between the operators. The fundamental characteristic of the conspiracy between the telecom operators is unstable. First, if the two operators conspire with each other, if one adheres to the conspiracy price (production), While the other side betrays the conspiracy (reducing the price or increasing the output), the betrayal gains more profit than its conspiracy, and for the conspiracy, the profit is less than the profit gained in the independent competition. Therefore, the operator has a betrayal of the incentives, and the conspiracy itself is unstable. In order to keep the two operators conspire for a long time without betrayal, the discount factor determined by the two operators is more than 0.5294, which is the condition to maintain the conspiracy. However, in reality, the level of the discount factor of the operators will change with time and environment, and more attention will be paid. The conditions of short-term interests. The harsh conditions of maintaining the stability of the conspiracy also lead to the conspiracy of the operators. The conspiracy and competition between the operators of telecom operators appears to appear alternately between the conspiracy and the price competition. The conclusion of "cool strategy" is an ideal state and is difficult to realize in reality. It is hard to make a long-term, stable conspiracy among telecom operators. But, for the sake of their own interests, there is a willingness to conspire each other. So, in reality, it is easier for the operators to compete for a period of time; then, for their own interests, they will accumulate again. They seek cooperation and conspiracy; after a relatively stable period of market operation, price competition will emerge. In reality, the conspiracy between the operators is short, small and unstable. The low level of the discount factor of the telecom operators, the asymmetry of the cost and market share, the homogeneous competition of the products, and the conspiracy The objective existence of supervision costs and the threat of punishment for treason collusion are difficult to cause collusion.
Product differentiation can be divided into vertical differentiation and horizontal differentiation. Vertical difference refers to the quality differences recognized by all consumers, that is, the same price and different quality products designed by the manufacturer in the process of pursuing better products. The level difference refers to the amount of resources required by different characteristics in the manufacturing process. However, there are obvious differences in product design, such as variety, color, style, etc.. Vertical product differentiation plays a role in limiting the price war and conspiracy of the operators. First, under the vertical product differentiation, only when the vertical difference degree of the two operators is controlled within a certain range (the substitution coefficient of operator products b > 2.32) 288), conspiracy has the possibility and significance. If the vertical difference between the two operators is too large and the profit of the conspiracy is less than that of the independent competition, the conspiracy will not happen, so the larger vertical product difference can limit the conspiracy. Secondly, if the two operators conspire under the vertical product difference. As the degree of vertical product differentiation increases (but always meets b > 2.32288), the number of discount factors that the two operators need to maintain conspiracy is gradually reduced, indicating that a certain degree of vertical product differentiation contributes to the stability of collusion, thus reducing the price war between the operators. When two operators conspire In order to make the operators of high quality products conspire rather than betrayal, the critical discount factor is significantly higher than the critical discount factor required by operators producing low quality products to maintain conspiracy. It shows that the operators providing high quality products are more profitable and easier to betray when they are betraying the conspiracy. Conspiracy to launch price war. This conclusion is consistent with the reality of the price war between China Mobile and China Unicom.
Conspiracy behavior will lead to lower level of operator product differentiation, whether vertical differentiation or level difference. Under vertical product differentiation, to maximize the conspiracy profit, the quality level of the operators producing high quality products is lower than that of each other when they compete independently, that is, the poor product of the two operators. Under the horizontal product differentiation, the two operators' products will maximize the profit maximization only when the level difference is maximized. However, under the conspiracy, to maximize the profit, the product difference degree of the two operators is moderate, that is, conspiring to reduce the degree of product differentiation. Once the conspiracy is broken, it is bound to lead to a fierce competition in the market. The difference in horizontal products is not conducive to the stability of the conspiracy, but the applicability of the conclusion is limited, because the conclusion is obtained by reducing the price of the product when the operator maintains its geographical position, so that the conspiracy of profit will become larger, and the conspiracy to conspire is maintained. But in reality, the operator can not only reduce the price of the product, but also change its location. Therefore, the betrayal in the reality is more complex and the theoretical analysis is more difficult.
This paper analyzes the effect of conspiracy on the enterprise performance of telecom operators from four aspects: economic profit, cost efficiency, consumer satisfaction and innovation activities. The conspiracy behavior can improve the profit of the telecom operators in the short term, but in the long run, the conspiracy will greatly reduce the cost efficiency of the enterprise. And the satisfaction of consumers to business services, and the monopoly caused by collusion will seriously affect the innovation power of the telecom operators, have a serious negative impact on the technological innovation of the operators and even combat the long-term competitiveness of the operators. The conspiracy will also lead to the reduction of the level of the operators' difference in the operation of the operators, thus preventing the operation of the operators. Therefore, from a comprehensive and comprehensive perspective, the conspiracy behavior has a negative impact on the performance of the telecom operators from a comprehensive and comprehensive perspective. The article finally puts forward the removal of the competitive behavior of the telecom operators themselves, the legislative and legal supervision, the government regulation and other aspects. Based on the theory of contestable markets, a hypothesis of loosening the access of telecom operators and introducing multiple competitive entities is proposed.

【學位授予單位】：吉林大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F626

【引證文獻】

相關碩士學位論文 前1條

1 陳影;基于演化博弈和多主體建模視角的集群企業(yè)多元創(chuàng)新策略行為研究[D];杭州電子科技大學;2014年

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