本文選題：供應(yīng)鏈金融　切入點(diǎn)：委托代理　出處：《東北大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：長久以來,供應(yīng)鏈管理主要針對供應(yīng)鏈中物流與信息流的管理。直到上世紀(jì)末,全球經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化進(jìn)程的加快,使得供應(yīng)鏈管理理念逐漸向財(cái)務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈管理轉(zhuǎn)變,供應(yīng)鏈金融概念應(yīng)運(yùn)而生。供應(yīng)鏈金融從整個(gè)產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈的角度出發(fā),將金融機(jī)構(gòu)、物流企業(yè)以及供應(yīng)鏈中上下游企業(yè)有機(jī)組合,在一定程度上緩解了中小企業(yè)融資難的問題,維護(hù)了核心企業(yè)和中小企業(yè)的合作關(guān)系,帶動(dòng)了金融機(jī)構(gòu)和物流企業(yè)的發(fā)展,提高了整個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈的效率,增強(qiáng)了競爭力。但是供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)作為獨(dú)立的經(jīng)濟(jì)體,在合作中,以追求自身利益最大化為目標(biāo),加劇了信息不對稱現(xiàn)象的產(chǎn)生,進(jìn)而出現(xiàn)各種委托代理關(guān)系,為了提高供應(yīng)鏈的績效,防范道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的產(chǎn)生,設(shè)計(jì)有效的激勵(lì)機(jī)制顯得尤為重要。供應(yīng)鏈金融三種基本的運(yùn)行模式為：應(yīng)收賬款融資模式,存貨質(zhì)押融資模式、預(yù)付賬款融資模式。本文在研究這三種基本運(yùn)行模式的前提下,引入委托—代理理論,通過把供應(yīng)鏈金融中各參與方(包括銀行、核心企業(yè)、中小企業(yè)、第三方物流等)之間的合約歸結(jié)為委托代理激勵(lì)合約,分別建立委托代理模型,研究信息對稱條件下和非信息對稱條件下的激勵(lì)機(jī)制,弱化道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn),以利益激勵(lì)代理人選擇最優(yōu)努力水平,從而使得委托人的收益效用達(dá)到最大化。
[Abstract]:For a long time, supply chain management has mainly focused on the management of logistics and information flow in the supply chain. Until the end of last century, with the acceleration of the process of global economic integration, the concept of supply chain management gradually changed to financial supply chain management. The concept of supply chain finance emerges as the times require. From the point of view of the whole industry chain, supply chain finance organically combines financial institutions, logistics enterprises and upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain. It maintains the cooperative relationship between core enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises, promotes the development of financial institutions and logistics enterprises, enhances the efficiency and competitiveness of the entire supply chain. In order to improve the performance of supply chain and guard against moral hazard, the goal of pursuing the maximization of self-interest intensifies the phenomenon of asymmetric information, which leads to the emergence of various principal-agent relationships, in order to improve the performance of the supply chain and prevent the emergence of moral hazard. It is very important to design an effective incentive mechanism. The three basic operating modes of supply chain finance are: accounts receivable financing mode, inventory pledge financing mode, inventory pledge financing mode, Based on the research of these three basic operating modes, this paper introduces the principal-agent theory, through the supply chain finance participants (including banks, core enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises, including banks, core enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises), The contract between the third party logistics (TPL) is reduced to the principal-agent incentive contract. The principal-agent model is established, the incentive mechanism under the condition of information symmetry and the condition of non-information symmetry is studied, and the moral hazard is weakened. The interest motivates the agent to choose the optimal level of effort, thus maximizing the profit utility of the principal.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F274;F832.4

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