公司治理、經理人動機與費用粘性關系研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-08-05 10:58
【摘要】：費用（成本）管理是企業(yè)管理的重要內容，對費用（成本）習性（cost behavior）的研究有助于企業(yè)內部經理人進行成本費用決策、外部投資者及相關機構進行企業(yè)績效預測。費用粘性（cost stickiness）作為費用習性的一種表現(xiàn)，其研究根源在于對經理人以傳統(tǒng)成本習性模型為基礎所作決策是否足夠準確的考慮。本文研究的出發(fā)點正是基于經理人對費用粘性的影響，如何激勵經理人更多地進行積極的成本管理，，制約其消極的成本決策。 經理人的費用決策關乎企業(yè)的成敗興衰，然而，經理人的動機才是其費用決策背后的真正推動力，經理人的不同動機與費用習性之間有著必然的聯(lián)系，而公司治理設計的初衷正是想實現(xiàn)股東對經理人的監(jiān)督與制衡。因此，本文針對公司治理、經理人動機與費用粘性的關系進行研究，厘清了不同經理人動機對費用習性的影響路徑，為企業(yè)通過費用比率進行經理人績效考核提供了更為全面的理論指導，對如何加強公司治理以制約經理人自利動機從而減輕代理問題，如何加強費用控制以提高公司價值具有現(xiàn)實指導意義。 在對本研究涉及的理論基礎和國內外關于費用粘性特征、成因、影響因素及其經濟后果的文獻進行回顧和述評的基礎上，本文從對費用粘性產生的成因和影響因素進行理論分析入手，首先研究了經理人最優(yōu)決策動機、盈余管理動機、自利動機三種不同動機對費用粘性的影響，研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，經理人最優(yōu)決策動機會導致較高水平的費用粘性；具有保盈動機的樣本公司，費用的對稱性表現(xiàn)得更明顯；而具有新股發(fā)行動機的公司，費用表現(xiàn)出反粘性的特征；經理人自利動機對費用粘性水平有積極的影響，具體而言，并購重組事件是經理人自利動機付諸實施的前提條件，充足的自由現(xiàn)金流和較長的經理人任期是經理人自利動機實施的必備條件，而經理人薪酬結構中變動性比例的增加會刺激經理人自利動機的實施，這些因素均對費用粘性產生顯著的正向影響。其次本文考察了公司治理對經理人自利動機的制約作用，研究表明，較高的公司治理強度有利于抑制經理人的自利動機，從而降低經理人自利動機下形成的費用粘性，提高公司價值；而公司治理水平低的公司，經理人自利動機比較明顯，費用粘性也相對較高。進一步，經理人在最優(yōu)決策動機下形成的費用粘性將對公司價值的增長傳遞積極的信號；而在自利動機下形成的費用粘性，表明費用管理的低效率，將對公司價值的增長傳遞消極的信號。最后是本文的研究結論，并為我國企業(yè)經理人能科學合理進行成本管理決策給出了政策建議。
[Abstract]:Cost (cost) management is an important part of enterprise management. The study of (cost behavior) habit of cost (cost) is helpful for internal managers to make cost-cost decisions and external investors and related institutions for enterprise performance prediction. As a manifestation of cost habit, the study of fee stickiness (cost stickiness) is rooted in the consideration of whether the decision made by managers based on traditional cost habit model is sufficiently accurate. The starting point of this paper is based on the influence of managers on the cost stickiness, how to motivate managers to carry out more active cost management and restrict their negative cost decisions. The manager's expense decision is related to the success or failure of the enterprise. However, the manager's motivation is the real driving force behind the cost decision, and there is an inevitable relationship between the manager's different motivation and the expense habit. The original intention of corporate governance design is to realize shareholders' supervision and balance to managers. Therefore, this paper studies the relationship between corporate governance, manager motivation and expense stickiness, and clarifies the influence path of different managers' motivation on expense behavior. It provides a more comprehensive theoretical guidance for the performance appraisal of managers through the expense ratio, and it also provides a more comprehensive theoretical guidance on how to strengthen corporate governance to restrict managers' self-interest motivation and thus alleviate the agency problem. How to strengthen the cost control to improve the value of the company has practical significance. On the basis of reviewing and reviewing the theoretical basis of this study and the domestic and foreign literatures on the characteristics of fee viscosity, causes, influencing factors and its economic consequences, Based on the theoretical analysis of the causes and influencing factors of the cost stickiness, this paper first studies the influence of three different motivations on the cost stickiness: the managers' optimal decision motive, the earnings management motivation and the self-interest motive. The optimal decision motivation of managers will lead to a higher level of cost stickiness; the cost symmetry of the sample company with earnings protection motivation is more obvious, while that of the company with new stock issuing motivation shows the characteristics of anti-stickiness. Managers' self-interest motivation has a positive effect on the level of expense stickiness. Specifically, M & A is the prerequisite for the implementation of managers' self-interest motivation. Sufficient free cash flow and long tenure of manager are the necessary conditions for managers' self-interest motivation, and the increase of variable proportion in manager's salary structure will stimulate the implementation of manager's self-interest motivation. These factors have a significant positive effect on the cost viscosity. Secondly, this paper examines the restriction effect of corporate governance on managers' self-interest motivation. The research shows that higher corporate governance intensity is beneficial to restrain managers' self-interest motivation, thus reducing the expense stickiness formed by managers' self-interest motivation. Improve the value of the company, and the low level of corporate governance companies, managers more obvious self-interest motivation, relatively high cost stickiness. Furthermore, the cost stickiness formed by the manager under the optimal decision motive will send a positive signal to the growth of the company's value, while the expense stickiness formed under the self-interest motive shows the low efficiency of the expense management. Will send a negative signal to the growth of the company's value. Finally, the conclusion of this paper is given, and some policy suggestions are given for Chinese enterprise managers to make scientific and reasonable cost management decisions.
【學位授予單位】：天津大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F271;F275
本文編號：2165585
[Abstract]:Cost (cost) management is an important part of enterprise management. The study of (cost behavior) habit of cost (cost) is helpful for internal managers to make cost-cost decisions and external investors and related institutions for enterprise performance prediction. As a manifestation of cost habit, the study of fee stickiness (cost stickiness) is rooted in the consideration of whether the decision made by managers based on traditional cost habit model is sufficiently accurate. The starting point of this paper is based on the influence of managers on the cost stickiness, how to motivate managers to carry out more active cost management and restrict their negative cost decisions. The manager's expense decision is related to the success or failure of the enterprise. However, the manager's motivation is the real driving force behind the cost decision, and there is an inevitable relationship between the manager's different motivation and the expense habit. The original intention of corporate governance design is to realize shareholders' supervision and balance to managers. Therefore, this paper studies the relationship between corporate governance, manager motivation and expense stickiness, and clarifies the influence path of different managers' motivation on expense behavior. It provides a more comprehensive theoretical guidance for the performance appraisal of managers through the expense ratio, and it also provides a more comprehensive theoretical guidance on how to strengthen corporate governance to restrict managers' self-interest motivation and thus alleviate the agency problem. How to strengthen the cost control to improve the value of the company has practical significance. On the basis of reviewing and reviewing the theoretical basis of this study and the domestic and foreign literatures on the characteristics of fee viscosity, causes, influencing factors and its economic consequences, Based on the theoretical analysis of the causes and influencing factors of the cost stickiness, this paper first studies the influence of three different motivations on the cost stickiness: the managers' optimal decision motive, the earnings management motivation and the self-interest motive. The optimal decision motivation of managers will lead to a higher level of cost stickiness; the cost symmetry of the sample company with earnings protection motivation is more obvious, while that of the company with new stock issuing motivation shows the characteristics of anti-stickiness. Managers' self-interest motivation has a positive effect on the level of expense stickiness. Specifically, M & A is the prerequisite for the implementation of managers' self-interest motivation. Sufficient free cash flow and long tenure of manager are the necessary conditions for managers' self-interest motivation, and the increase of variable proportion in manager's salary structure will stimulate the implementation of manager's self-interest motivation. These factors have a significant positive effect on the cost viscosity. Secondly, this paper examines the restriction effect of corporate governance on managers' self-interest motivation. The research shows that higher corporate governance intensity is beneficial to restrain managers' self-interest motivation, thus reducing the expense stickiness formed by managers' self-interest motivation. Improve the value of the company, and the low level of corporate governance companies, managers more obvious self-interest motivation, relatively high cost stickiness. Furthermore, the cost stickiness formed by the manager under the optimal decision motive will send a positive signal to the growth of the company's value, while the expense stickiness formed under the self-interest motive shows the low efficiency of the expense management. Will send a negative signal to the growth of the company's value. Finally, the conclusion of this paper is given, and some policy suggestions are given for Chinese enterprise managers to make scientific and reasonable cost management decisions.
【學位授予單位】：天津大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F271;F275
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