本文選題：演化博弈均衡 + 全壽命周期成本管理��； 參考：《重慶大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：采購(gòu)是供電企業(yè)十分重要的環(huán)節(jié)，它關(guān)系到企業(yè)的成本管理和質(zhì)量管理。傳統(tǒng)意義上的電力設(shè)備采購(gòu)就是簡(jiǎn)單的商品買(mǎi)賣(mài)，以實(shí)現(xiàn)用最少的資金買(mǎi)到最優(yōu)質(zhì)的設(shè)備為采購(gòu)目標(biāo)。近幾年，隨著電力市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展迅猛和科學(xué)技術(shù)的不斷更新與進(jìn)步，市場(chǎng)對(duì)電力的需求持續(xù)上升，供電企業(yè)之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)也隨之越來(lái)越激烈，人們逐漸把電力設(shè)備采購(gòu)不僅簡(jiǎn)單的看成一種商品買(mǎi)賣(mài)行為，而把其視為一種為企業(yè)節(jié)約成本、實(shí)現(xiàn)利潤(rùn)的增加的職能。因此，科學(xué)的采購(gòu)是供電企業(yè)持續(xù)健康發(fā)展的必然要求，也是供電企業(yè)利益最大化和LCC最優(yōu)的源泉。 目前看來(lái)，從供電企業(yè)的發(fā)展速度、結(jié)構(gòu)、質(zhì)量、效益統(tǒng)一等方面可以看出，供電企業(yè)設(shè)備采購(gòu)管理中還存在一些不足，比如采購(gòu)管理系統(tǒng)模糊，設(shè)備招標(biāo)重程序輕實(shí)質(zhì)，，采購(gòu)監(jiān)管不足等。鑒于此，本文嘗試以演化博弈論為分析工具，在全壽命周期成本（Life Cycle Cost，縮寫(xiě)為L(zhǎng)CC）趨于最優(yōu)的基礎(chǔ)上采用演化博弈方法分析設(shè)備采購(gòu)中供電企業(yè)、設(shè)備供應(yīng)商和監(jiān)管部門(mén)的行為選擇，分別進(jìn)行了供電企業(yè)和設(shè)備供應(yīng)商的委托代理關(guān)系演化博弈模型分析和考慮監(jiān)管部門(mén)的供電企業(yè)采購(gòu)演化博弈模型分析。 供電企業(yè)采購(gòu)中的委托代理關(guān)系研究及演化博弈分析結(jié)果表明：當(dāng)供電企業(yè)和設(shè)備供應(yīng)商通過(guò)采取積極策略而獲得的回報(bào)大于付出的成本時(shí)，供電企業(yè)和設(shè)備供應(yīng)商會(huì)有更動(dòng)機(jī)采取積極的行為策略，逐漸減少設(shè)備采購(gòu)中的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)；當(dāng)盈利增值的參數(shù)越大時(shí)，供電企業(yè)和設(shè)備供應(yīng)商進(jìn)行積極行為策略的動(dòng)機(jī)越強(qiáng)烈，從而可以有效地消除道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)現(xiàn)象；考慮監(jiān)管部門(mén)的供電企業(yè)采購(gòu)演化博弈模型分析研究結(jié)果表明：供電企業(yè)的規(guī)范評(píng)標(biāo)比例和監(jiān)管部門(mén)稽查比例受懲罰系數(shù)的影響；當(dāng)監(jiān)管部門(mén)稽查成功比例較大，即使稽查成本較小，但如果只嚴(yán)懲設(shè)備供應(yīng)商，而對(duì)供電企業(yè)的懲罰力度不夠時(shí)，經(jīng)過(guò)多次博弈，監(jiān)管部門(mén)會(huì)選擇稽查行為，供電企業(yè)會(huì)選擇不規(guī)范評(píng)標(biāo)行為；當(dāng)監(jiān)管部門(mén)稽查成功比例較小，尤其是在稽查成本較大，對(duì)供電企業(yè)和設(shè)備供應(yīng)商的處罰力度較小時(shí)，經(jīng)過(guò)多次博弈，監(jiān)管部門(mén)會(huì)放棄稽查，供電企業(yè)會(huì)選擇不規(guī)范評(píng)標(biāo)行為。 本文通過(guò)演化博弈分析供電企業(yè)設(shè)備采購(gòu)的問(wèn)題，并在加強(qiáng)監(jiān)管制度和激勵(lì)制度等方面提出一些建議，希望能為供電企業(yè)設(shè)備采購(gòu)的良性發(fā)展提供參考依據(jù)。
[Abstract]:Procurement is a very important link in power supply enterprises, which is related to cost management and quality management. The traditional purchasing of electric power equipment is a simple purchase and sale of goods, and the goal is to buy the best equipment with the least money. In recent years, with the rapid development of the electricity market and the continuous updating and progress of science and technology, the demand for electricity in the market continues to rise, and the competition among power supply enterprises becomes more and more fierce. People gradually regard the purchase of electric power equipment not only as a kind of commodity trading behavior, but also as a function of saving cost and realizing the increase of profit for the enterprise. Therefore, scientific procurement is an inevitable requirement for the sustainable and healthy development of power supply enterprises, and is also the source of maximum benefit and LCC optimization for power supply enterprises. At present, it can be seen from the development speed, structure, quality and benefit of power supply enterprises that there are still some shortcomings in the equipment procurement management of power supply enterprises, such as the fuzzy procurement management system, the heavy procedures of equipment bidding and the light of essence. Inadequate procurement supervision, etc. In view of this, this paper attempts to use the evolutionary game theory as an analysis tool, and on the basis of the life cycle cost (LCC) tends to be optimal, uses the evolutionary game method to analyze the power supply enterprises in equipment procurement. The behavior choice of equipment supplier and supervision department is analyzed by the evolution game model of power supply enterprise and equipment supplier's principal-agent relationship and the purchasing evolution game model of power supply enterprise considering supervision department. The research of principal-agent relationship and evolutionary game analysis in power supply enterprise procurement shows that when the power supply enterprise and equipment supplier obtain more returns than the cost by adopting positive strategy. Power supply enterprises and equipment suppliers will have more incentive to adopt positive behavior strategies and gradually reduce the moral hazard in equipment procurement. When the parameters of profit increment are larger, the motivation of power supply enterprises and equipment suppliers to carry out positive behavior strategies is stronger. Therefore, the moral hazard phenomenon can be eliminated effectively, and the analysis results of the evolutionary game model of power supply enterprise procurement considering the supervision department show that the proportion of standard bid evaluation and the proportion of supervision department of power supply enterprise are affected by the penalty coefficient. When the supervision department has a large proportion of successful inspection, even though the audit cost is small, but if only the equipment supplier is severely punished, and the punishment of the power supply enterprise is not strong enough, after many games, the supervision department will choose the audit behavior. Power supply enterprises will choose non-standard bidding evaluation behavior; when the proportion of successful inspection by the supervisory authorities is relatively small, especially when the audit costs are high and the penalties imposed on the power supply enterprises and equipment suppliers are relatively small, after many games, the regulatory authorities will give up the inspections. Power supply enterprises will choose non-standard bidding evaluation behavior. This paper analyzes the problems of equipment procurement in power supply enterprises by evolutionary game theory, and puts forward some suggestions on strengthening supervision system and incentive system, hoping to provide a reference for the benign development of equipment procurement in power supply enterprises.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F274;F426.61

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