本文選題：會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性　切入點(diǎn)：信息不對(duì)稱　出處：《四川師范大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性是會(huì)計(jì)核算的重要原則,一直以來(lái)對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)實(shí)踐活動(dòng)有著深遠(yuǎn)影響。2006年企業(yè)新會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則和2008年金融危機(jī)爆發(fā),使得穩(wěn)健性的計(jì)量屬性得到廣泛關(guān)注。會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性延遲確認(rèn)“好消息”,及時(shí)確認(rèn)“壞消息”的要求,約束了管理層操縱公司盈余,減少管理者自利主義動(dòng)機(jī)下的非理性投資行為。會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性對(duì)兩種非效率投資的情形(過(guò)度投資和投資不足)的作用結(jié)果、影響方向是否一致,已有研究成果并未形成一致觀點(diǎn)。會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性究竟是如何影響非效率投資行為的,是直接影響還是間接影響,現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)未給出詳細(xì)解釋。本文從代理成本視角出發(fā),大膽設(shè)想,在會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性對(duì)非效率投資的作用下,代理成本是否可能發(fā)揮著中介效應(yīng)。本文依據(jù)委托代理沖突的類型,將代理成本細(xì)分為股東-經(jīng)理人、控股股東-中小股東以及股東-債權(quán)人三種類型。將會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性、代理成本和非效率投資三者納入同一研究框架中,找尋它們之間的內(nèi)在聯(lián)系。為規(guī)范信息披露、改善投資效率提供相關(guān)建議。本文選取2009-2015年A股上市企業(yè)數(shù)據(jù),建立數(shù)學(xué)檢驗(yàn)?zāi)Ｐ�。研究�?huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性分別對(duì)兩種非效率投資行為(過(guò)度投資和投資不足)的具體影響,會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性對(duì)代理成本的影響,以及代理成本在會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與非效率投資兩者之中發(fā)揮的作用。實(shí)證研究結(jié)果表明:過(guò)度投資方面,會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性有明顯抑制作用;投資不足方面,會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性則起到加劇效果。會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與股東-經(jīng)理人代理成本呈現(xiàn)U型曲線關(guān)系,與控股股東-中小股東呈現(xiàn)倒U型關(guān)系,與股東-債權(quán)人代理成本也呈現(xiàn)倒U型關(guān)系。表明會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性與企業(yè)代理成本之間存在一定的區(qū)間效應(yīng)。只有在某一區(qū)間內(nèi),會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性的治理效應(yīng)才能得到有效發(fā)揮。進(jìn)一步研究發(fā)現(xiàn)會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性、代理成本與非效率投資三者中間存在著傳導(dǎo)關(guān)系,代理成本在其中發(fā)揮著部分中介效應(yīng)。本文運(yùn)用文獻(xiàn)閱讀、理論推導(dǎo)和實(shí)證模型的方式集中關(guān)注會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性、代理成本與非效率投資三者之間的關(guān)系�？赡艿呢暙I(xiàn)體現(xiàn)為以下三點(diǎn):研究視角上本文選取代理成本的視角,并在委托代理理論的框架下,將代理成本分為三種類型,對(duì)這三類代理成本選取相應(yīng)變量,建立模型進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。研究?jī)?nèi)容上本文開(kāi)拓創(chuàng)新,在原有研究框架之中,加入代理成本,考察它們?nèi)叩膬?nèi)在聯(lián)系,代理成本的中介效應(yīng)得到證實(shí)。研究方法上本文運(yùn)用KW模型測(cè)算的C-Score指數(shù)度量會(huì)計(jì)穩(wěn)健性,它彌補(bǔ)了Basu(1997)模型無(wú)法計(jì)量某一特定企業(yè)在特定年度的穩(wěn)健性程度的缺陷。
[Abstract]:Accounting conservatism is an important principle of accounting accounting, which has always had a profound influence on accounting practice. In 2006, the new accounting standards for enterprises and the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, Accounting conservatism delay the recognition of "good news" and timely recognition of "bad news" requirements, which constrains the management to manipulate the company's earnings. Reducing the irrational investment behavior under the motivation of self-interest of managers. The effect of accounting conservatism on the two kinds of inefficient investment (overinvestment and underinvestment) results in the same direction. The existing literature has not given a detailed explanation on how accounting conservatism affects inefficient investment behavior, whether it affects directly or indirectly. This paper, from the perspective of agency cost, assumes that accounting conservatism affects the investment behavior directly or indirectly. Under the influence of accounting conservatism on inefficient investment, the agency cost can play an intermediary effect. According to the type of principal-agent conflict, the agency cost is subdivided into stockholders and managers. Three types of controlling shareholders-minority shareholders and shareholders-creditors. The accounting conservatism, agency cost and inefficient investment are brought into the same research framework to find the internal relationship between them, in order to regulate the disclosure of information, the three types of accounting conservatism, agency cost and inefficient investment are included in the same research framework. This paper selects the data of A-share listed enterprises from 2009-2015 to establish a mathematical test model to study the concrete influence of accounting conservatism on two kinds of inefficient investment behaviors (overinvestment and underinvestment). The influence of accounting conservatism on agency cost and the effect of agency cost on accounting conservatism and inefficient investment. In the aspect of insufficient investment, accounting conservatism plays a more important role. The relationship between accounting conservatism and stockholder-manager agency cost is U-shaped, and it is inversely U-shaped with controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. It shows that there is a certain interval effect between accounting conservatism and enterprise agency cost. The governance effect of accounting conservatism can be effectively brought into play. Further research shows that there is a conduction relationship among accounting conservatism, agency cost and inefficient investment. Agency cost plays a part of intermediary effect. This paper focuses on accounting conservatism by literature reading, theoretical derivation and empirical model. The possible contributions are as follows: from the perspective of the research, this paper selects the perspective of agency cost, and divides the agency cost into three types under the framework of principal-agent theory. Selecting the corresponding variables to these three kinds of agency cost, establishing the model to carry on the empirical test. In the research content, this article develops the innovation, in the original research frame, adds the agency cost, inspects their three internal relations, The intermediary effect of agency cost has been proved. In the research method, the C-Score index measured by KW model is used to measure accounting conservatism, which makes up for the defect that Basu 1997) model can not measure the degree of conservatism of a particular enterprise in a particular year.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：四川師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

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