本文選題：成本控制　切入點(diǎn)：激勵(lì)機(jī)制　出處：《系統(tǒng)工程學(xué)報(bào)》2017年01期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：在企業(yè)成本控制活動(dòng)中,管理者和工人間產(chǎn)生了委托代理問(wèn)題,并由此簽訂雙標(biāo)準(zhǔn)成本控制契約.針對(duì)工人成本控制業(yè)績(jī)受到的較大干擾可能導(dǎo)致激勵(lì)契約失效的問(wèn)題,在成本管理系統(tǒng)框架下將三維度相對(duì)業(yè)績(jī)引入雙標(biāo)準(zhǔn)成本控制契約,研究了引入相對(duì)業(yè)績(jī)后,相關(guān)參數(shù)對(duì)契約中最優(yōu)激勵(lì)系數(shù)和最優(yōu)調(diào)節(jié)系數(shù)的作用方式,和成本控制激勵(lì)機(jī)制的改善機(jī)理.結(jié)果表明:最優(yōu)激勵(lì)系數(shù)與工人能力、相對(duì)業(yè)績(jī)協(xié)方差的平方呈正相關(guān),與工人努力成本系數(shù)、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避度、外界不確定因素方差和相對(duì)業(yè)績(jī)方差呈負(fù)相關(guān);任一維度相對(duì)業(yè)績(jī)的調(diào)節(jié)系數(shù)僅與該維度業(yè)績(jī)的協(xié)方差和方差相關(guān);引入相對(duì)業(yè)績(jī)可有效改善成本控制激勵(lì)機(jī)制,而工人成本控制方面的素質(zhì)、外部風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和被過(guò)濾風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因素所占總風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的地位均可影響激勵(lì)機(jī)制的改善效果.
[Abstract]:In the cost control activities of enterprises, the principal-agent problem arises between managers and workers, and a double standard cost control contract is signed, which may lead to the invalidation of incentive contracts due to the large interference in the performance of workers' cost control. In the framework of the cost management system, the three-dimension relative performance is introduced into the double-standard cost control contract, and the effect of the related parameters on the optimal incentive coefficient and the optimal adjustment coefficient is studied after the introduction of the relative performance. The results show that the optimal incentive coefficient is positively correlated with the square of worker's ability and relative performance covariance, and is related to worker's effort cost coefficient and risk aversion. The variance of external uncertain factors and relative performance variance are negatively correlated; the adjustment coefficient of relative performance of any dimension is only related to the covariance and variance of performance in that dimension; the introduction of relative performance can effectively improve the incentive mechanism of cost control. The quality of workers' cost control, the position of external risk and the total risk of filtered risk can affect the improvement effect of incentive mechanism.
【作者單位】： 哈爾濱工程大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金資助項(xiàng)目(71072075) 教育部博士點(diǎn)基金資助項(xiàng)目(20092304110017)
【分類號(hào)】：F275.3

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