發(fā)布時間：2018-01-18 23:58

  本文關(guān)鍵詞： 非對稱信息 成本管理 激勵機(jī)制 房地產(chǎn) 目標(biāo)成本　出處：《華南理工大學(xué)》2013年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：受宏觀調(diào)控影響，項(xiàng)目成本領(lǐng)先已成為房地產(chǎn)企業(yè)的核心競爭力之一，一些房地產(chǎn)企業(yè)提出價值創(chuàng)造的理念，把成本管理的重心前移，進(jìn)行目標(biāo)成本管理，然而，國內(nèi)很多企業(yè)的“目標(biāo)成本”并非由價值工程分析，而是由造價指標(biāo)測算得來，實(shí)際上是“責(zé)任成本”，由于項(xiàng)目前期階段非對稱信息普遍存在，這種“目標(biāo)成本管理”不能滿足的成本管理的需要。本項(xiàng)研究以非對稱信息條件下的房地產(chǎn)企業(yè)成本管理為切入點(diǎn)，采用博弈、數(shù)學(xué)規(guī)劃及統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)值分析等方法，通過理論及實(shí)證分析發(fā)現(xiàn)，在非對稱信息下，采用目標(biāo)成本管理，會擴(kuò)大代理雙方的博弈，引發(fā)棘輪效應(yīng)，不利資源整合及價值創(chuàng)造，也會造成成本得到控制而品質(zhì)卻下降的局面，因此，房地產(chǎn)成本管理需要改變以“控”代“管”的現(xiàn)狀。 首先，總結(jié)歸納了國內(nèi)外成本管理及激勵理論的研究結(jié)果，論述了成本管理的發(fā)展歷程及相關(guān)方法，分析了我國的房地產(chǎn)成本管理現(xiàn)狀，闡述了激勵機(jī)制的理論分析及應(yīng)用型模型。其次，在理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上，針對項(xiàng)目開發(fā)的不同階段、不同代理事務(wù)、信息對稱與非對稱的不同情況，提出不同的成本管理策略，并對精細(xì)化成本管理作出新解，指出精細(xì)化成本管理的誤區(qū)，進(jìn)而增加成本動因分析，提倡目標(biāo)成本與作業(yè)成本管理相融合。然后，在非對稱信息下，引入激勵管理方法，以激勵替代責(zé)任成本的控制，減少博弈，鼓勵代理人整合資源及價值創(chuàng)造。最后，對當(dāng)前項(xiàng)目成本管理流程進(jìn)行了改善，提出新的管理流程，在可研策劃及方案設(shè)計(jì)階段引入激勵管理，以適應(yīng)項(xiàng)目前期成本的特點(diǎn)。 由于傳統(tǒng)的激勵機(jī)制存在參數(shù)過多、激勵力度不合理、不符合經(jīng)營習(xí)慣等局限性，阻礙了其推廣和應(yīng)用。因此，本論文構(gòu)建一種新型的應(yīng)用型主動激勵模型，改變傳統(tǒng)模型的線性激勵，加大激勵力度，使獎罰機(jī)制漸趨科學(xué)；解決傳統(tǒng)模型的局限性，可減少代理雙方的博弈風(fēng)險；能有效防止棘輪效應(yīng)，使得代理人保持努力工作成為常態(tài)，從而能更好適應(yīng)房地產(chǎn)前期非對稱信息條件下的成本管理。另外，采用主動激勵模型能夠有效的替代斯賓塞勞動力市場模型分析模型，降低信息傳遞的偏離，有利房地產(chǎn)企業(yè)甄別出能力強(qiáng)又愿意為代理事務(wù)付出較高努力水平的代理人。本研究對該模型下的逆向選擇及道德風(fēng)險問題分別建立最優(yōu)規(guī)劃問題模型進(jìn)行分析，并有以下發(fā)現(xiàn)： 1.逆向選擇的問題上，模型使得高專業(yè)水平代理人和低專業(yè)水平代理人的產(chǎn)出水平與信息完備時比均未發(fā)生扭曲，能有效避免高專業(yè)水平代理人模仿低專業(yè)水平代理人的傾向，而且使得低專業(yè)水平代理人的產(chǎn)出也保持在較優(yōu)水平，使得房地產(chǎn)企業(yè)不需抬高產(chǎn)出標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，因而，代理人會更愿意接受主動激勵機(jī)制所構(gòu)建的合同，能有效促使代理人加大人力及資源配置，使得代理人的工作效率得以改善。 2.道德風(fēng)險問題上，主動激勵機(jī)制可用較小的提成比例來激勵代理人達(dá)到信息對稱時同樣的努力水平，能夠引導(dǎo)代理人在合同初期勇敢地報出真實(shí)的產(chǎn)出水平，在代理事務(wù)實(shí)施時，理性的代理人會按自身的能力和資源采取真實(shí)的行為。同時本研究還指出了激勵效果及風(fēng)險的影響因素，這些因素包括：努力影響系數(shù)、外界不確因素、絕對風(fēng)險規(guī)避度量及提成比例等，并分析了各因素之間的相互作用關(guān)系。 針對施工單位可以把剩余價值全部占有，激勵機(jī)制對其可能會失去作用的情況，本論文又提出一體化和長期合作的策略，作為激勵機(jī)制的延伸和補(bǔ)充。經(jīng)建立模型分析表明一體化策略將外部代理轉(zhuǎn)為內(nèi)部代理，可擴(kuò)大激勵的力度，尤其能解決激勵機(jī)制對外部施工單位沒最優(yōu)解的問題。通過動態(tài)博弈分析表明長期合作中代理人為了將來獲取更多的收益，會保持更好的聲譽(yù)，保持努力工作的狀態(tài)。 最后，通過對廣州地區(qū)23個房地產(chǎn)開發(fā)工程成本數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行方差分析，發(fā)現(xiàn)各分項(xiàng)工程的系統(tǒng)誤差比較離散，最低的項(xiàng)目前期工程為14.9%，最高的的機(jī)電工程是81.8%，這表明不同項(xiàng)目的工程成本存在較大的不確定，導(dǎo)致項(xiàng)目開發(fā)前期非對稱信息普遍存在，證實(shí)傳統(tǒng)單一的責(zé)任成本管理存在一定的弊端。同時，通過算例分析證實(shí)主動激勵機(jī)制能很好地應(yīng)用于房地產(chǎn)企業(yè)的內(nèi)部及外部代理事務(wù)中，具有較好的實(shí)操性，可以取得良好的效果，能在一定程度上解決逆向選擇和道德風(fēng)險的問題。 綜合上述，現(xiàn)在房地產(chǎn)企業(yè)已把成本管理的重心移至項(xiàng)目開發(fā)前期，雖然把握好了成本控制的“時間”，卻忽略了成本控制的“空間”，，對非對稱信息的影響及成本成因考慮不足，本文分析了非對稱信息條件情況下成本管理的特點(diǎn)，提出以激勵代替控制的理念，以適應(yīng)新形勢下，房地地產(chǎn)企業(yè)成本管理的需求。宏觀上，有利于優(yōu)化資源配置，減少社會經(jīng)濟(jì)的浪費(fèi)。微觀上，有利于房地產(chǎn)企業(yè)進(jìn)行價值創(chuàng)造，增強(qiáng)競爭力。
[Abstract]:The impact of macro-control, the project cost has become one of the core competitiveness of real estate enterprises, put forward the concept of value creation of some real estate enterprises, the cost management of the center of gravity forward to target cost management, however, many domestic enterprises "target cost" and not by value engineering analysis, but by the cost index to measure in fact, is the "responsibility cost", because of the widespread non symmetric information the early stages of the project, the target cost management can not meet the needs of cost management. The research of cost management based on asymmetric information under the conditions of the real estate enterprises as the starting point, using game theory, mathematical programming and numerical statistical analysis methods, through theoretical and empirical analysis found that, under asymmetric information, the target cost management, expand the game, causing negative ratchet effect, resource integration and value Creation will also cause cost control and quality decline. Therefore, real estate cost management needs to change the status of "control" instead of "control".
Firstly, it summarizes the research results of domestic and foreign cost management and incentive theory, discusses the development process of cost management and related methods, analysis of China's real estate cost management present situation, elaborated the theoretical analysis and application of the incentive mechanism model. Secondly, on the basis of theoretical analysis, at different stages of project development the different agency affairs, different conditions of symmetric and asymmetric information, put forward different methods of cost management, and make a new explanation on the fine cost management, points out the misunderstanding of the fine cost management, thus increasing the cost driver analysis, advocate the integration of target cost and activity-based cost management. Then, under asymmetric information, the introduction of the incentive management method, reduce the game to encourage alternative control, responsibility cost, encourage agents to integrate resources and value creation. Finally, the current project cost management process has been improved, The new management process is put forward, and incentive management is introduced in the planning and design stage to adapt to the characteristics of the pre project cost.
Because of the traditional incentive mechanism has too many parameters, incentives are not reasonable, does not meet the operating habits and other limitations, hindered the popularization and application. Therefore, this paper constructs a new application of active incentive model, change the traditional linear incentive model, increase incentives, the reward and punishment mechanism to solve the limitations of science gradually; the traditional model, can reduce the risk of the game of both sides; can effectively prevent the ratchet effect, makes the agent keep working hard to become the norm, which can better adapt to the real estate under asymmetric information cost management. In addition, the active incentive model can replace the Spencer labor market model and effective analysis model, reduce the transmission of information the deviation from the favorable real estate enterprises identify ability and willing to pay higher effort level as the proxy agent in the transaction. The research on the model of the The reverse selection and moral hazard problems are analyzed by establishing the optimal planning model respectively, and the following findings are found:
1. the adverse selection problem. The model makes the level of output and high professional level and low professional level agent agent than complete were not distorted, can effectively avoid the tendency of high professional level and low professional level agents imitate the agent, but also makes the low level of professional agent output is maintained at the optimum level, making the real real estate enterprises do not need to raise output standards, therefore, the agent will be more willing to accept the initiative incentive mechanism can effectively promote the construction of the contract, the agent to increase manpower and resource allocation, makes the agent work efficiency can be improved.
2. the moral hazard problem, active incentive mechanism can use a smaller percentage to motivate agents to work hard to achieve similar levels of information symmetry, can guide the agent bravely to report actual output level in the early stages of the contract, in the implementation of agency affairs, rational agents will take real actions according to their ability and resources at the same time. The study also pointed out the influence factors of the incentive effect and risk, these factors include: to influence coefficient, external uncertainty, absolute risk aversion measure and percentage, and analyzes the interaction between various factors.
According to the construction unit can transfer the value of all of its possession, the incentive mechanism may lose the function of the situation, this thesis proposed the integration and long-term cooperation strategy, as the extension and supplement of the incentive mechanism. The model analysis shows that the integration strategy of external agent to the internal agent, can enlarge the incentive strength, especially to solve the incentive mechanism of the external construction unit is not the optimal solution of the problem. Through dynamic game analysis show that the agent for the future long-term cooperation gain more income, will maintain a better reputation, keep working hard.
Finally, through variance analysis of 23 real estate development project cost data in Guangzhou, found that the system error of each sub project is discrete, the lowest pre engineering project is 14.9%, the highest of the mechanical and electrical engineering is 81.8%, which indicates the existence of the engineering cost of different projects with large uncertainties, leading to widespread non pre project development asymmetric information, confirmed the responsibility cost management of traditional single has certain drawbacks. At the same time, through the example analysis confirmed that the internal and external affairs of active agent incentive mechanism can be applied to the real estate business, good practice, good results can be achieved, can solve the adverse selection and moral hazard in some degree on the problem.
Above all, now the real estate companies have cost management to move the center of gravity before project development, although a good grasp of the cost control of the "time", but ignore the cost control of the "space" of the asymmetric information and the cost of the causes of lack of consideration, this paper analyzes the characteristics of cost management under asymmetric information condition this, instead of the control to the idea of incentive, in order to adapt to the new situation, the real estate enterprise needs to cost management. On the macro level, is conducive to optimizing the allocation of resources, reduce the waste of social economy. Microscopically, conducive to the real estate enterprises to create value, enhance competitiveness.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：華南理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F275.3;F299.233.4;TU723.3

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