本文關(guān)鍵詞：考慮渠道成本的雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈定價協(xié)調(diào)研究　出處：《山東大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 渠道成本 雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈 Stackelberg博弈 定價協(xié)調(diào)

【摘要】：近年來,電子商務(wù)由發(fā)展高速增長階段進(jìn)入成熟期,線上紅利邊際效應(yīng)減小,電商行業(yè)開始規(guī)范化,開啟收割流量紅利的運營模式。對企業(yè)聯(lián)盟來說,線上渠道成本的上漲開始成為權(quán)衡線上線下決策定價不可忽視的因素。合作與共贏是零售行業(yè)品牌商與零售商的主題,然而渠道主導(dǎo)控制權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)直接影響著上下游之間協(xié)調(diào)沖突的方式。本文綜合考慮上述兩個因素,從新的視角對雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈定價協(xié)調(diào)進(jìn)行分析,給出相應(yīng)的管理啟示。本文建立了由一個制造商一個零售商組成的單產(chǎn)品雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈,創(chuàng)新性的考慮了線上線下渠道成本,引入雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈中。并針對制造商和零售商對渠道的控制能力不同,分成三種不同主導(dǎo)控制結(jié)構(gòu)的雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈,系統(tǒng)的分析不同控制情形下制造商與零售商如何進(jìn)行定價決策,協(xié)調(diào)沖突。在大部分研究成果對渠道成本忽略不計,或模糊處理的情況下,本文理論聯(lián)系實際企業(yè)案例,將線上和線下渠道成本進(jìn)行分析,分類,建立考慮渠道成本的雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈模型。一種是制造商主導(dǎo)的雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈模型,制造商對渠道控制能力強(qiáng)于下游分銷商;一種是零售商主導(dǎo)的雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈模型,零售商在線上和線下都有豐富的運營經(jīng)驗,牢牢把控細(xì)分品類;第三種是商品流上下游企業(yè)均衡實力的情形下形成的雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈模型。分別考慮了三種控制結(jié)構(gòu)的雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈模型,探討了不同情形下的定價協(xié)調(diào)策略。本文的主要結(jié)論有:針對制造商主導(dǎo)的雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈,制造商在營銷渠道中有很強(qiáng)的話語權(quán),零售商作為跟從方,通過集中決策和分散式?jīng)Q策對比發(fā)現(xiàn),集中決策情形下,整體供應(yīng)鏈利潤最大。集中決策下的雙渠道售價作為供應(yīng)鏈定價并協(xié)調(diào)的目標(biāo),相關(guān)理論基礎(chǔ)和研究成果設(shè)計了考慮成本的價格折扣模型,并進(jìn)行Stackelberg博弈分析,得到符合制造商主導(dǎo)情形下的批發(fā)價格和最優(yōu)定價,線上渠道成本越低,則線上最優(yōu)定價和最優(yōu)批發(fā)價也越低。針對零售商主導(dǎo)的雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈,考慮到零售商在線上線下渠道都有較強(qiáng)的渠道控制能力,制造商只負(fù)責(zé)生產(chǎn)不直接面對消費者,結(jié)合已有集中決策優(yōu)于分散決策的研究成果,協(xié)調(diào)的關(guān)鍵在于制造商制定的批發(fā)價格,設(shè)計了一種批發(fā)價格策略。并通過數(shù)值驗證分析渠道成本和市場份額對最優(yōu)批發(fā)價格的影響,對零售商線上線下渠道成本進(jìn)行分析對比,根據(jù)渠道成本和市場分配情況給零售商定價提供決策依據(jù)。針對雙方均衡控制的雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈,采用了對雙方都有公平性的收益共享協(xié)調(diào)策略,在保證協(xié)調(diào)后雙方利潤都有增加的約束條件下,通過博弈分析找出共享因子的取值范圍,最后通過數(shù)值驗證該策略的有效性。
[Abstract]:In recent years, e-commerce from the development stage of rapid growth into a mature period, the marginal effect of online dividends reduced, e-commerce industry began to standardize, open the harvest flow dividend operation model. For the enterprise alliance. The rising of online channel cost has become the factor that can not be ignored in weighing the online and offline decision pricing. Cooperation and win-win is the theme of brand and retailer in retail industry. However, the structure of channel dominant control directly affects the way of coordination conflict between upstream and downstream. This paper synthetically considers the above two factors and analyzes the pricing coordination of dual-channel supply chain from a new perspective. In this paper, a single-product double-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer is established, and the cost of online and off-line channels is considered innovatively. According to the different control ability of manufacturers and retailers, it is divided into three different dominant control structures of dual-channel supply chain. Systematically analyze how manufacturers and retailers make pricing decisions and coordinate conflicts under different control situations. In the case of most of the research results ignore the channel cost or fuzzy processing. In this paper, combined with practical enterprise cases, the online and offline channel costs are analyzed, classified, and a dual-channel supply chain model considering channel cost is established. One is the manufacturer led double-channel supply chain model. The manufacturer's ability to control the channel is stronger than that of the downstream distributor. One is the retailer led by the two-channel supply chain model, retailers online and offline have a wealth of operational experience, firmly control the subdivision category; The third is the two-channel supply chain model which is formed under the condition of the equilibrium strength of the upstream and downstream enterprises. The model of the double-channel supply chain with three control structures is considered respectively. This paper discusses the pricing coordination strategy under different circumstances. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: the manufacturer has a strong voice in the marketing channel, and the retailer is the follower. Through the contrast of centralized decision and decentralized decision, it is found that the profit of the whole supply chain is the largest in the case of centralized decision, and the price of two channels under centralized decision is the goal of supply chain pricing and coordination. On the basis of relevant theories and research results, a price discount model considering cost is designed, and the Stackelberg game analysis is carried out to get the wholesale price and the optimal price in accordance with the manufacturer's leading situation. The lower the online channel cost, the lower the online optimal pricing and the optimal wholesale price. Manufacturers are only responsible for production not directly facing consumers, combined with the existing research results that centralized decision-making is better than decentralized decisions, the key to coordination lies in the wholesale prices set by manufacturers. A wholesale price strategy is designed, and the influence of channel cost and market share on the optimal wholesale price is analyzed through numerical verification, and the retailers' online and offline channel costs are analyzed and compared. According to the channel cost and market distribution, the retailer pricing decision basis is provided. For the two-channel supply chain controlled by both sides, a revenue sharing coordination strategy which is fair to both parties is adopted. Under the constraint condition that the profits of both sides increase after the coordination, the range of the shared factors is found out by game analysis, and the validity of the strategy is verified by numerical results.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F274

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