信用保證的制度設(shè)計(jì)與交易成本研究
[Abstract]:At present, credit guarantee system is widely used in the world to solve the financing dilemma of SMEs, especially the failure of SME financing market. In the past, most studies have analyzed the operating characteristics, operating performance or risks of credit guarantee agencies from a micro perspective, while from a macro perspective, they have been discussed from the perspective of government industry or bank credit policies. Some transnational studies illustrate and compare the functions or characteristics of national institutions. Although most of the conclusions also illustrate the necessity of government intervention and the specific benefits of the information and insurance system, there are often positive and negative views. There is a lack of comprehensive theoretical framework and analytical tools for how or how to solve the financing problems of SMEs in the credit guarantee system. Based on the view of transaction cost of institutional economics, this paper analyzes the market failure of SMEs' financing problems from the angles of information asymmetry, monopoly, externality and public finance respectively. This paper sums up the relationship between transaction cost and transaction cost, and takes "transaction cost is the cost of institutional operation" as the core idea, discusses the definition of institution and its constituent elements from institutional theory, and links it with relevant transaction cost. To form an analysis table of system elements and transaction costs, which can be used as an analytical framework to examine credit guarantee systems such as the United States, mainland China and Taiwan. Secondly, the background factors of various institutional arrangements are analyzed through institutional change theory to understand the space-time background and influence of their development. The research results show that in the analysis of institutional arrangements, "decree clearly defined trading object" and "government-led" are the common elements of arrangement in the world, the former helps participants to reduce transaction costs in the market. The latter will help reduce the high monopoly problem of financial institutions such as banks and solve the problem of "credit guarantee" shortage of public goods. In addition, government policy integration and resource allocation will effectively reduce the cost of political transactions. As for the other design elements of the system, it is difficult to judge the merits and demerits of different countries because of their different environments and policies, which also shows that the design of the system should be considered as a whole. In the case study, the United States and Taiwan have more institutional arrangements to deal with the transaction costs in the small business financing market, so they can effectively reduce the market failure, while the Chinese mainland cases show that the institutional arrangements are insufficient. From the point of view of institutional change, the institutional arrangements of the former two are related to the critical economic environment, while the latter only attaches importance to the arrangement of supervision because of the function complement as the starting point. The analytical framework tools developed in this paper can help to quickly examine the full picture of the current information and insurance system, and can also clearly grasp the deficiencies of the system and the correlation between the various factors, so as to serve as the basis for comprehensive consideration in the review or revision of the system. Through the analysis of institutional changes, it can be explained that the space-time background of the inducement of the trust and insurance system in various countries can be explained to reduce the bias of improper simulation. This paper mainly includes the following contents: the financing problem of small and medium-sized enterprises is analyzed theoretically and practically, and it is summarized into four factors of transaction cost. The institutional definition of institutional theory is deeply discussed and combined with transaction cost theory. For the past many studies of information and insurance system for the above-mentioned theoretical classification and explanation. To develop a framework for examining the information and insurance system. In this paper, three cases of China and Taiwan are examined, and the differences between them are compared in detail. Finally, the conclusions and recommendations are given.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:南開大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2013
【分類號(hào)】:F830.5
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