本文選題：證券分析師跟進(jìn)行為　切入點(diǎn)：應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理　出處：《東北大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：作為上市公司和證券市場參與者之間的信息傳遞力量,證券分析師在資本市場上扮演著雙重角色的功能已然得到了眾多學(xué)者的認(rèn)可：一是解析上市公司財(cái)務(wù)信息的媒介力量；二是制約管理層行為的外部監(jiān)督者�；谟喙芾淼馁Y本市場動機(jī),Burgstahler(1997)研究表明美國上市公司具有為了減少盈余、避免虧損、迎合分析師盈利預(yù)測而進(jìn)行盈余管理的動機(jī)。此后學(xué)者陸續(xù)探究了分析師跟進(jìn)對盈余管理的影響,一方面,有學(xué)者研究證明分析師跟進(jìn)對盈余管理存在監(jiān)管效應(yīng)；另一方面,有學(xué)者研究表明分析師跟進(jìn)對盈余管理存在壓力效應(yīng),但是這些研究的視角還是聚焦于應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理。事實(shí)上,盈余管理行為還包括隱蔽性更強(qiáng)、對公司內(nèi)在價(jià)值危害更大的真實(shí)盈余管理行為。因此隨著我國監(jiān)管環(huán)境的不斷變化以及管理層對不同盈余管理下成本與收益的權(quán)衡,在我國證券市場中研究分析師跟進(jìn)行為對應(yīng)計(jì)與真實(shí)盈余管理的選擇具有重要意義。本文以2004-2011年間9193家A股上市公司為研究樣本,通過建立聯(lián)立方程組、使用兩階段最小二乘法來考察分析師跟進(jìn)行為與應(yīng)計(jì)和真實(shí)盈余管理之間的內(nèi)生性問題。對有保盈動機(jī)公司的子樣本進(jìn)行回歸檢驗(yàn)得到了與全樣本一致的結(jié)論,此外通過進(jìn)一步結(jié)合我國上市公司終極控制人性質(zhì)考察了分析師跟進(jìn)行為對應(yīng)計(jì)與真實(shí)盈余管理選擇的影響。通過對實(shí)證結(jié)果的分析,本文得出的結(jié)論有：(1)基于監(jiān)督效應(yīng),分析師跟進(jìn)人數(shù)越多,管理層的真實(shí)盈余管理行為越少；(2)基于壓力效應(yīng),分析師跟進(jìn)人數(shù)越多,管理層的應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理行為越多；即分析師跟進(jìn)人數(shù)越多,管理層更青睞使用應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理來代替真實(shí)盈余管理；(3)分析師跟進(jìn)人數(shù)越多,上市公司的整體盈余管理行為越少。(4)與國有控股公司相比,分析師跟進(jìn)人數(shù)越多對非國有控股公司的真實(shí)盈余管理抑制作用更強(qiáng),對應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理的替換作用更大。最后根據(jù)本文的結(jié)論提出針對性的建議,完善分析師跟進(jìn)的相關(guān)法律及加強(qiáng)政府部門對分析師的監(jiān)管,從而有助于分析師更有效地發(fā)揮其外部監(jiān)管作用、抑制上市公司盈余管理行為、促進(jìn)資本市場健康運(yùn)行。
[Abstract]:As a power of information transmission between listed companies and participants in the securities market, the function of securities analysts playing a dual role in the capital market has been recognized by many scholars: first, it is the media power to analyze the financial information of listed companies; The second is the external supervisor who restricts the behavior of the management. The capital market motive based on earnings management is Burgstahler1997.Research shows that the listed companies in the United States have the ability to avoid losses in order to reduce their earnings. Since then, scholars have explored the impact of analysts' follow-up on earnings management. On the one hand, some scholars have proved that analysts follow up on earnings management has regulatory effects; on the other hand, Some scholars have shown that there is a pressure effect on earnings management by analysts, but the perspective of these studies is still focused on accrual earnings management. In fact, earnings management behavior also includes more concealment. The real earnings management behavior is more harmful to the intrinsic value of the company. Therefore, with the constant change of the regulatory environment and the balance between cost and income under different earnings management in our country, It is of great significance to study the follow-up behavior of analysts in China's securities market for the choice of accrual and real earnings management. In this paper, 9193 A-share listed companies from 2004-2011 are taken as the research samples, and the simultaneous equations are established. The two-stage least square method is used to investigate the endogenous problem between the follow-up behavior of the analyst and the accrual and real earnings management. In addition, combined with the nature of ultimate controller of listed companies in China, this paper investigates the influence of the follow-up behavior of analysts on the choice of accrual and real earnings management. Through the analysis of empirical results, the conclusion of this paper is: 1) based on the supervision effect. Based on stress effect, the more analysts follow up, the more accrual earnings management behavior is; that is, the more analysts follow up, the more analysts follow up. Management prefers to use accrual earnings management instead of real earnings management.) the more analysts follow up, the less earnings management behavior of listed companies as a whole.) compared with state-owned holding companies, The more analysts follow up, the stronger the restraining effect of real earnings management of non-state-owned holding companies is, and the greater the substitution effect of accounting earnings management. Finally, according to the conclusion of this paper, the author puts forward some specific suggestions. Improving the laws followed by analysts and strengthening government regulation of analysts will help analysts to play their external regulatory role more effectively, curb earnings management of listed companies and promote the healthy operation of capital markets.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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