本文關(guān)鍵詞：股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)特征對(duì)高管薪酬—績(jī)效敏感度的影響　出處：《暨南大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu) 高管薪酬 薪酬-績(jī)效敏感度

【摘要】：隨著我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)的壯大和發(fā)展，我國(guó)上市公司的隊(duì)伍日益龐大，投資者對(duì)公司績(jī)效的關(guān)注也引致其對(duì)公司高管薪酬激勵(lì)制度的關(guān)注，如何建立科學(xué)有效合理的高管薪酬激勵(lì)和監(jiān)督制度，如何通過薪酬更好地體現(xiàn)高管的價(jià)值，如何根據(jù)公司的特點(diǎn)因地制宜地制定高管薪酬制度，都是目前我國(guó)上市公司高管薪酬制度建設(shè)中的突出問題，也是歷來(lái)是國(guó)內(nèi)外廣大學(xué)者研究高管薪酬問題的熱點(diǎn)和重點(diǎn)。國(guó)外大多數(shù)文獻(xiàn)表明，高管薪酬與公司績(jī)效之間存在顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系，且國(guó)外學(xué)者目前的研究也基本支持了股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)特征變量會(huì)影響高管的薪酬-績(jī)效敏感度這一論點(diǎn)。但考慮到國(guó)外的研究多以發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的資本市場(chǎng)為研究對(duì)象，而我國(guó)是一個(gè)正處于經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)型期的發(fā)展中國(guó)家，市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)體系在建立過程中，并不完善，因此國(guó)外研究結(jié)果對(duì)我國(guó)具有參考意義，但借鑒作用有待考察。而國(guó)內(nèi)學(xué)者關(guān)于股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、高管薪酬、公司業(yè)績(jī)的研究多是針對(duì)其中兩兩之間的相關(guān)性，將三者結(jié)合在一起進(jìn)行相關(guān)性分析的研究并不多見。本文將在此基礎(chǔ)上結(jié)合我國(guó)上市公司的實(shí)際情況，著重探討公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)特征對(duì)高管薪酬-績(jī)效敏感度的影響。 本文在梳理總結(jié)有關(guān)理論和國(guó)內(nèi)國(guó)外相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上，搜集了我國(guó)滬深兩市所有的A股上市公司2010至2011年的年度數(shù)據(jù)作為樣本，通過描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)、多元線性回歸模型，研究探討股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)中第一大股東持股比例、前五大股東持股比例平方和、股權(quán)制衡指數(shù)等特征變量對(duì)高管薪酬-績(jī)效敏感度的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，第一大股東持股比例越高將提高公司的高管薪酬-績(jī)效敏感度；前五大股東持股比例平方和越高將提高公司的高管薪酬-績(jī)效敏感度；第一大股東持股比例超過50%時(shí)會(huì)在一定程度削弱公司的高管薪酬-績(jī)效敏感度；股權(quán)制衡指數(shù)升高將減少高管的薪酬水平。同時(shí)本文也對(duì)比研究了國(guó)有上市公司和非國(guó)有上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)特征變量對(duì)其高管薪酬-績(jī)效敏感度的影響，但并未發(fā)現(xiàn)實(shí)際控制人性質(zhì)會(huì)造成這種影響的區(qū)別。 根據(jù)研究結(jié)論，本文提出了以下幾點(diǎn)建議：一是尋求有效的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)，在我國(guó)目前的市場(chǎng)環(huán)境和經(jīng)濟(jì)體制下，相對(duì)集中的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)是更為有效的公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)，保持股權(quán)的集中度是必要的。二是繼續(xù)推進(jìn)國(guó)有企業(yè)產(chǎn)權(quán)改革，，促進(jìn)其產(chǎn)權(quán)多元化。三是促進(jìn)高管激勵(lì)方式多元化發(fā)展，引進(jìn)并創(chuàng)新高管激勵(lì)機(jī)制，同時(shí)提高高管薪酬透明度，不僅在額度的披露上作出硬性規(guī)定，也應(yīng)要求上市公司對(duì)高管薪酬的結(jié)構(gòu)等其他方面進(jìn)行披露。
[Abstract]:With the growth and development of China's securities market, listed companies in China's increasingly large contingent of investors, the performance of the company also caused the attention of the executive compensation incentive system, how to establish a scientific and effective and reasonable incentive and supervision system, how to better reflect the executive compensation through the value of the company, how to the characteristics of executive compensation system according to local conditions to develop, is the current outstanding problems in the construction of executive compensation in Listed Companies in China, and has always been a hot point and focus of the research of executive compensation at home and abroad. Most of the foreign literature shows that there is a significant positive correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance, and the current research abroad scholars also support the basic characteristics of the ownership structure variables will affect the executive compensation performance sensitivity of this argument. But considering the foreign research Study on the capital market of developed countries as the research object, while China is a developing country is in the period of economic transition, the market economy system is not perfect in the process of establishment, therefore, foreign research results have reference significance to our country, but the reference to be investigated. While the domestic scholars on the ownership structure, executive compensation. Study on the performance of the company is to which the correlation between the 22, the three together are correlation analysis are rare. In this paper, on the basis of the actual situation of Chinese listed companies, with characteristics of the ownership structure affect the sensitivity of executive compensation performance.
This paper summarizes relevant theories and the domestic and foreign literature, the annual data collected in Shanghai and Shenzhen two of all A shares of listed companies from 2010 to 2011 as samples, through descriptive statistics, multivariate linear regression model, study the largest shareholder shareholding structure, the proportion of top five shareholders square and the impact of equity balance index and other variables sensitivity to executive compensation performance. The study found that the higher the proportion of the first shareholder will improve the company's executive compensation performance sensitivity; the proportion of top five shareholders and the higher the square will improve the company's executive compensation performance sensitivity; the first big shareholder the proportion of more than 50% will weaken the company's executive compensation performance sensitivity to a certain degree; equity balance index increased will reduce the level of executive compensation. At the same time, comparative research The influence of ownership structure variables on the executive pay performance sensitivity of state-owned and non-state-owned listed companies is studied. However, the difference between the actual controller nature and the executive pay performance is not found.
According to the research conclusion, this paper puts forward the following suggestions: one is to seek effective equity structure, in the current market environment and the economy, the relative concentration of ownership structure is a more effective corporate governance, maintaining equity concentration is necessary. The two is to continue to promote the reform of property rights of state-owned enterprises. To promote the diversification of property rights. The three is to promote diversification of executive incentives, the introduction and innovation of executive incentive mechanism, and improve the transparency of executive compensation, not only made in the amount of mandatory disclosure, should also require listed companies on executive compensation structure and other aspects of the disclosure.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：暨南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F272.92;F275

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