【摘要】：情理法作為傳統(tǒng)的法文化與古人對于法律生活的認(rèn)識是息息相關(guān)的。一方面,在立法上要“上稽天理、下揆人情”;另一方面,在司法上要“準(zhǔn)情酌理”、“處斷平允”。可以說,“合情合理”在傳統(tǒng)的觀念中,不僅是一種行為模式的合理性,而且還可以表征為一種價值評判標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和社會正義觀。實證研究表明,情理法不僅僅存在于“歷史”的文本中,同時也作為歷史的積淀潛在地影響著當(dāng)下人們的觀念以及對司法審判結(jié)果的接受。因而,情理法的研究既具有挖掘傳統(tǒng)法文化精髓的意義,同時又可為時下的司法實踐尋找一條具有“知識論”意義的經(jīng)驗。 對于情理法的研究,國內(nèi)與國外的學(xué)者均投入了很多的精力。國外學(xué)者以滋賀秀三和黃宗智為代表。前者認(rèn)為,人情、事理和國家的實定法一樣,在民事審判中充當(dāng)著“法源”的地位,情理作為一種“常識性的衡平感覺”,起到修正“法”的作用,因此,法官在司法中經(jīng)常是用人情和情理斷案的。而黃宗智與滋賀氏的觀點截然相反。黃氏認(rèn)為,對于傳統(tǒng)司法的認(rèn)識應(yīng)該區(qū)分表達和實踐,滋賀之所以得出上述結(jié)論是受到官方表達的影響,而在實踐中州縣官員基本是依法斷案的;在調(diào)解的領(lǐng)域里,情就是人情或人際關(guān)系,理就是道理。從兩位學(xué)者的理論交鋒來看,滋賀氏和黃氏雖然均注意到了在理論的闡釋中回避“西方中心主義”的局限,但無疑是不成功的。同時,黃氏也人為地擴大了表達和實踐之間的區(qū)別,且忽略了二者之間的互融性。 國內(nèi)學(xué)者立足于本土性,在認(rèn)識到情理法與中國人的內(nèi)在聯(lián)系的基礎(chǔ)上,開始關(guān)注情理法的語義,闡釋情理法的合理性,并將情理法提升為中國傳統(tǒng)法律文化的“性狀”或“品格”。但就情理法這一具有“長時段”和“宏大敘事”的文化現(xiàn)象而言,上述研究成果僅僅是從“問題”的某個方面為切入點而取得的,缺少對于“情理法”文化的整體性認(rèn)識,這無疑是“理論”研究的一個缺憾。 本文即是出于前述“問題意識”而從文化角度對傳統(tǒng)情理法展開研究的。首先,將“情理”作為傳統(tǒng)法文化中的一個話語“符號”,其目的是在“知識考古”的意義上,挖掘情理的“話語—知識—權(quán)力”之間的內(nèi)在聯(lián)系,闡釋其“共時性”意義。其次,將歷史中的涉關(guān)“情理”的立法、司法和筆記故事的文本,作為古人的一種“敘事”類型,在古人的經(jīng)驗嬗變中厘清其生產(chǎn)和再生產(chǎn)的過程,以闡釋其“歷時性”意義。 對于上述立意的闡釋,本文是從以下三個方面展開的。 其一,從本體論的角度,梳理了情和理在傳統(tǒng)觀念中的意義�！扒椤卑l(fā)自于心,具有情感的涵義,同時還具有案情、情節(jié)、情況等客觀實際的涵義。而“理”由于宋明理學(xué)的原因,不僅指事物的規(guī)定性,同時還具有道德的規(guī)范性的涵義。正是情和理對古人觀念的建構(gòu)作用,使得傳統(tǒng)的司法實踐帶有情理法的特征。通過以《名公書判清明集》為考察對象,我們可以發(fā)現(xiàn),“情”在判詞中的意義是多元的,可以分為人際關(guān)系(人倫)、公序良俗、事實情節(jié)和人之常情等四個方面的涵義。而“理”更多的是對于保證判決的合理性而言的。當(dāng)然,在司法的語境下,“人情”其實具有常識的意義,而“天理”則指明了審斷的正當(dāng)性。 其二,從敘事的角度,闡釋情理法在歷史中的發(fā)展。就敘事的主體以及傳統(tǒng)社會的結(jié)構(gòu)而言,敘事具有兩個面向:官和民。官方敘事是以官方記錄的歷史和判詞為表現(xiàn)形式,反映了主流的文化和價值觀。在官方敘事中,本文首先從立法的角度闡釋了法律合于情理,其實是將法律和道德融會在一起,即學(xué)者們所謂的“法律的道德化”和“道德的法律化”。其次,在司法領(lǐng)域,為了使司法的結(jié)果合情合理,法官需要結(jié)合儒家思想中“忠和恕”、“經(jīng)和權(quán)”的觀念來審理案件。這即是情理法中所蘊含的人文精神和人文情懷。當(dāng)然,在立法和司法中盡“情理”,其實是與古人的治世理念和舉措有著直接聯(lián)系的。民間敘事是一種“無文字”或口頭形式流傳下來的情理法的敘事。當(dāng)然,我們也可以從官方的文本中窺得一二。民間敘事作為官方敘事的參照,對于整體理解傳統(tǒng)的法文化具有根本意義。通過對《閱微草堂筆記》的實證研究,我們可以發(fā)現(xiàn),在鄉(xiāng)下小民的訴訟中,其訴訟請求是多元的,有的為“申冤”、有的為“盡孝”,有的為“爭利”等等,這是法官在司法中應(yīng)該注意的問題。在生活世界中,一些糾紛是通過調(diào)解的形式了結(jié)的,這是考察普通小民的情理觀念的一個重要面向。在家庭糾紛中,糾紛解決的一個重要依據(jù)是家庭的倫理道德;而在與其他人的糾紛調(diào)解中,則更多的是由經(jīng)濟考量決定的。另外,復(fù)仇也是民間一個具有代表性的現(xiàn)象。復(fù)仇,一方面因國家法的規(guī)定,而受到禁止;另一方面又因與儒家的倫理道德相一致,而受到“禮”的鼓勵。 其三,情理的官方話語和民間話語集中交匯在傳統(tǒng)的司法環(huán)節(jié),表現(xiàn)為用“人情”來折中“法意”。這雖然是傳統(tǒng)行政權(quán)威有限性的必然要求,但我們可以從中深刻體會到情理中“話語—知識—權(quán)力”的內(nèi)在意義。其實,情理司法就是通常意義上的衡平司法,以情理司法即意味著,一方面從案件的特殊性出發(fā),尋找與特定的“情”相一致的法律懲罰措施;另一方面也通過法律精神來緩解法律的僵化性。這兩點無疑對今天的司法具有重要的借鑒意義。 可以說,上述三個方面從整體上有針對性地闡釋了情理的在歷史中的表象及其深層次的結(jié)構(gòu),這不僅還原了情理法的生成空間和實踐方式,而且指出了其局限性和借鑒意義。認(rèn)識歷史是為了給傳統(tǒng)尋根,而反思?xì)v史則是為了使傳統(tǒng)更好的為我們這個時代提供助力。
[Abstract]:Reason law, as a traditional legal culture, is closely related to the ancients'understanding of legal life. On the one hand, it is necessary to "inspect heaven's principles and degrade human feelings" in legislation; on the other hand, it is necessary to "allow reason to be reasoned" in judicature and "judge fairly and justly". Empirical studies show that rational law not only exists in "historical" texts, but also, as a historical accumulation, potentially influences people's concepts and their acceptance of judicial results. Meanwhile, the significance of cultural essence can also provide an experience with the meaning of "epistemology" for the judicial practice at present.
Scholars both at home and abroad have devoted a lot of energy to the study of the law of reason. Foreign scholars take Shiga Xiusan and Huang Zongzhi as representatives. The former holds that human nature, as well as reason, act as the source of law in civil trials, and reason, as a sense of common sense and a sense of equity, amends the law. Huang believed that the understanding of traditional justice should be differentiated between expression and practice. The reason why Shiga reached the above conclusion was influenced by official expression, and in practice, state and county officials basically decided cases according to law. In the field of mediation, love is human relationship or interpersonal relationship, which is the reason. Seen from the theoretical confrontation between the two scholars, Shiga and Huang have both noticed the limitation of avoiding "Western-centrism" in their theoretical interpretation, but it is undoubtedly unsuccessful. At the same time, Huang has artificially expanded the distinction between expression and practice. And ignore the mutual fusion between the two.
Domestic scholars, based on their native characteristics, begin to pay attention to the semantics of rational law, explain the rationality of rational law and elevate it to the character or character of traditional Chinese legal culture on the basis of recognizing the internal relationship between rational law and Chinese people. As far as the phenomena of transformation are concerned, the above-mentioned research results are only obtained from a certain aspect of the "problem" as a breakthrough point, and the lack of an overall understanding of the "rational law" culture is undoubtedly a flaw in the study of "theory".
This paper is to study the traditional law of reason from a cultural perspective out of the aforementioned "problem consciousness". Firstly, it takes "reason" as a discourse "symbol" in the traditional law culture. Its purpose is to explore the internal relationship between "discourse-knowledge-power" of reason and explain its "synchronicity" in the sense of "knowledge archaeology". Secondly, the history of "reason" related to legislation, justice and the text of the story, as an "narrative" type of the ancients, in the ancients'experience in the evolution of its production and reproduction process, in order to explain its "diachronic" significance.
The interpretation of the above ideas is based on the following three aspects.
Firstly, from the ontological point of view, it combs out the meaning of emotion and reason in traditional concepts. Emotion originates from the heart and has the meaning of emotion. It also has the meaning of objective reality, such as case, plot and situation. By examining Ming Gong Shu Ju Qing Ming Ji, we can find that the meaning of emotion in judgment is pluralistic, which can be divided into four meanings: interpersonal relationship, public order and good custom, factual plot and human nature. "Reason" is more about guaranteeing the reasonableness of the judgment. Of course, in the judicial context, "human feeling" actually has the meaning of common sense, and "heaven" indicates the legitimacy of the judgment.
Second, from the narrative point of view, explain the development of rational law in history. As far as the subject of narration and the structure of traditional society are concerned, narrative has two aspects: official and people. Secondly, in the judicial field, in order to make the judicial results reasonable, judges need to combine the Confucian concepts of "loyalty and forgiveness", "classics and power" to try cases. That is, the humanistic spirit and feelings contained in the law of reason. Of course, in legislation and judicature, "reason" is directly related to the ancient ideas and actions of governing the world. Folk narrative is a kind of "no words" or oral form of narrative of the law of reason. Of course, we can also see from the official text. One or two. Folk narrative, as the reference of official narrative, is of fundamental significance to the overall understanding of traditional legal culture. Through the empirical study of the Notes of the Yaowwei Caotang, we can find that in the lawsuits of the peasants in the countryside, their litigation requests are pluralistic, some are "appealing for grievances", some are "filial piety", some are "striving for profits" and so on. In the world of life, some disputes are settled through mediation, which is an important aspect of investigating the common people's emotional concepts. It is determined by economic considerations. In addition, revenge is also a representative phenomenon among the people. On the one hand, revenge is prohibited because of the provisions of state law; on the other hand, it is encouraged by "rites" because it is consistent with Confucian ethics and morality.
Thirdly, rational official discourse and folk discourse converge in the traditional judicial links, showing the compromise of "legal meaning" by "human feelings". Although this is the inevitable requirement of the limitation of traditional administrative authority, we can deeply understand the inherent meaning of "discourse-knowledge-power" in rational. In fact, rational justice is just like "rational justice". Generally speaking, fair judicature means, on the one hand, seeking legal punishment measures consistent with the specific "feeling" from the particularity of the case, and on the other hand, alleviating the rigidity of the law through the spirit of law.
It can be said that the above three aspects have explained the appearance of reason in history and its deep-seated structure from the whole point of view, which not only restores the space and practice of reason law, but also points out its limitations and reference significance. To provide assistance for our times.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號】：D929

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