本文選題：自由 + 法權(quán)��； 參考：《山東大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：探尋康德法權(quán)學(xué)說的規(guī)范性價(jià)值,關(guān)鍵在于明晰康德法權(quán)學(xué)說的證成路徑,主要表現(xiàn)為厘清法權(quán)學(xué)說與康德先行確立的道德哲學(xué)的關(guān)系。在法權(quán)原則和道德原則的關(guān)系問題上,康德本人的論述中存在一定的模糊性,國內(nèi)外學(xué)者圍繞此問題的解釋論辯大致分為兩種立場:派生論和分離論。派生論者認(rèn)為,康德的法權(quán)學(xué)說以道德學(xué)說為基礎(chǔ),法權(quán)原則源于道德原則(表現(xiàn)為絕對命令),兩者具有共同的規(guī)范性前提。強(qiáng)的立場認(rèn)為,絕對命令不僅蘊(yùn)含著法權(quán)原則,而且法權(quán)原則預(yù)設(shè)了道德原則。弱的立場認(rèn)為,法權(quán)原則雖然不能直接源于絕對命令,但卻源于道德原則的基本價(jià)值;分離論者則認(rèn)為,法權(quán)學(xué)說作為獨(dú)立的體系,可以經(jīng)由實(shí)踐理性所確立,法權(quán)原則并不能夠源于道德原則。強(qiáng)的立場認(rèn)為,法權(quán)原則不僅獨(dú)立于道德原則,而且也不用預(yù)設(shè)道德原則。弱的立場認(rèn)為,法權(quán)原則預(yù)設(shè)了道德原則,但道德原則卻推不出法權(quán)原則。本文在汲取學(xué)界相關(guān)研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上,通過細(xì)致解讀康德法權(quán)學(xué)說的論證脈絡(luò),呈現(xiàn)并確證"自由"作為根本價(jià)值的乃是康德法權(quán)學(xué)說的規(guī)范性來源,以此表明康德的法權(quán)學(xué)說具有融貫的體系。在此基本線索的指引下,導(dǎo)論梳理了康德法權(quán)學(xué)說的諸多爭論,提出本文解讀將遵循康德文本的邏輯順序:"自由—法則—義務(wù)"。第一章,以"自由"的概念為切入點(diǎn),以此表明只有經(jīng)由純粹實(shí)踐理性確立道德法則才能獲得"真正的自由",而這個(gè)自由的體系包含內(nèi)在的德性學(xué)說和外在的法權(quán)學(xué)說。第二章,法權(quán)普遍原則表征著"自由"的根本價(jià)值,其能夠源于絕對命令的"人性公式",并且絕對命令能夠?yàn)閺?qiáng)制的合法性提供辯護(hù)。第三章,法權(quán)義務(wù)分為內(nèi)在法權(quán)、私人法權(quán)和公共法權(quán),聯(lián)結(jié)其中推論的"實(shí)踐理性的法權(quán)公設(shè)"不僅契合于"人性公式"的基本理念,而且也與"自由"的根本價(jià)值相一致。第四章,康德法權(quán)學(xué)說以道德合理性為基礎(chǔ),分離論的反對意見不僅忽視了自由在康德法權(quán)學(xué)說中的統(tǒng)攝作用,而且也偏離了康德實(shí)踐哲學(xué)的根本意圖。本文最終得出結(jié)論:康德法權(quán)學(xué)說的規(guī)范性價(jià)值在于"自由"的根本理念,法權(quán)普遍原則源于"人性目的"公式,法權(quán)義務(wù)也確證了"人性目的"公式的價(jià)值理念。盡管康德的法權(quán)論義務(wù)和德性義務(wù)論在立論基礎(chǔ)、動機(jī)要素和強(qiáng)制方式等方面存在差異,但兩者的基礎(chǔ)都是奠基于自由價(jià)值理念并且表征了人性目的論的價(jià)值旨趣,兩者的方式都是經(jīng)由純粹實(shí)踐理性進(jìn)而確立普遍性法則,兩者的目的都是通過普遍法則"限制自由而獲得自由",進(jìn)而確保每個(gè)人享有平等的自由價(jià)值。
[Abstract]:To explore the normative value of Kant's doctrine of right of law, the key lies in clarifying the path of proof of Kant's doctrine of right of law, which is mainly manifested in clarifying the relationship between the doctrine of right of law and the moral philosophy established by Kant in advance. On the relationship between the principle of legal right and the principle of morality, Kant has some vagueness in his exposition, and the explanations and arguments of scholars at home and abroad on this issue can be divided into two positions: derivation theory and separation theory. Derivative theorists believe that Kant's doctrine of right of law is based on moral doctrine, and the principle of legal right originates from moral principle (expressed as absolute command), both of which have the same normative premise. The strong position is that absolute order not only contains the principle of legal right, but also presupposes moral principle. The weak position holds that the principle of legal right, although not derived directly from absolute command, is derived from the basic value of moral principle, while the separatist view is that the doctrine of legal right, as an independent system, can be established by practical rationality. The principle of legal power cannot be derived from moral principles. The strong position is that the principle of legal right is not only independent of moral principles, but also does not need to presuppose moral principles. The weak position holds that the principle of legal right presupposes moral principle, but moral principle cannot infer the principle of right of law. On the basis of drawing on the relevant research results of academic circles, this paper, through careful interpretation of Kant's doctrine of right of law, presents and confirms that "freedom" is the normative source of Kant's doctrine of right of law as its fundamental value. This shows that Kant's doctrine of right of law has a coherent system. Under the guidance of this basic clue, the introduction combs many arguments about Kant's doctrine of right of law, and points out that the interpretation of this paper will follow the logical order of Kant's text: "Freedom-Rule-obligation". In the first chapter, the concept of "freedom" is taken as the starting point, which shows that "real freedom" can only be obtained through the establishment of moral law through pure practical reason, and the system of freedom includes the internal moral doctrine and the external doctrine of legal power. The second chapter, the universal principle of legal power symbolizes the fundamental value of "freedom", which can be derived from the "human nature formula" of absolute order, and it can provide a defense for the legality of compulsion. In the third chapter, the legal rights and obligations are divided into the inherent right, the private right and the public right. The corollary "the postulate of the legal right of practice rationality" not only accords with the basic idea of "human nature formula", but also accords with the fundamental value of "freedom". In the fourth chapter, Kant's doctrine of right of law is based on moral rationality. The dissenting opinion of separation theory not only ignores the dominating role of freedom in Kant's doctrine of right of law, but also deviates from the fundamental intention of Kant's philosophy of practice. Finally, this paper draws a conclusion that the normative value of Kant's doctrine of right of law lies in the fundamental idea of "freedom", the universal principle of right of law originates from the formula of "purpose of human nature", and the duty of right of law confirms the concept of value of formula of "purpose of humanity". Although there are differences between Kant's theory of legal right and duty of virtue in the aspects of theoretical basis, motivational elements and compulsory ways, both of them are based on the concept of free value and represent the value purport of the teleological theory of human nature. Both ways are to establish universal law through pure practical reason, and both aim is to "restrict freedom and obtain freedom" through universal law, so as to ensure that everyone has equal value of freedom.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：B516.31

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