本文選題：塞爾 + 集體意向性�。� 參考：《山東大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：意向性問題是當(dāng)代行動哲學(xué)和心靈哲學(xué)研究的重要議題。作為意向性問題研究的主要代表,塞爾對意向性的研究開始于他對言語行為理論的討論。隨后,塞爾把意向性引入到對言語行為理論的研究中,認(rèn)為意向性是以言行事的基礎(chǔ)。按照塞爾的觀點,雖然個體意向性是意向性研究的重要方面,但他仍然把研究的重心轉(zhuǎn)向了集體意向性。本文通過討論塞爾的集體意向性的相關(guān)論題、結(jié)構(gòu)、社會本體論以及規(guī)范性等角度對集體意向性進(jìn)行研究,試圖理清集體意向性的豐富內(nèi)涵。 在關(guān)于集體行動的討論中,意向性的概念是十分重要的。塞爾認(rèn)為,個體意向性是真實存在的,個體具有各自的心靈,而在這一點上集體是不同于個體的,那么集體意向性的存在是怎樣的呢?個體意向性與集體意向性之間的關(guān)系問題就成為十分重要的問題。關(guān)于這些問題,塞爾主要通過以下論題來解釋：首先,塞爾通過比較集體意向與個體意向的差異來證明集體意向性是真實存在的,集體意向性存在于個體的心靈當(dāng)中；其次,我們在理解集體意向性時還存在一個前提,即集體意向性不能被還原為個體意向性；第三,集體意向性預(yù)設(shè)了作為合作候選者的他者感。塞爾通過目的與手段的因果性關(guān)系和目的與方式的構(gòu)成性關(guān)系這兩個方面來論述了集體意向性的內(nèi)在結(jié)構(gòu)。此外,在社會本體論的討論中,塞爾通過前語言意向性與意向性的語言形式之間的差別、集體意向性與制度性事實的關(guān)系以及承諾和道義論等方面來討論集體意向性是如何形成的。 關(guān)于塞爾的集體意向性理論存在著吉爾伯特等人的質(zhì)疑。在吉爾伯特看來,集體合作行為必然涉及到規(guī)范性,而塞爾的集體意向性理論沒有體現(xiàn)出規(guī)范性。筆者認(rèn)為,塞爾雖然沒有在集體意向性中明確提出規(guī)范性這一概念,但是塞爾的集體意向性中仍然包含著規(guī)范性的思想；并且,吉爾伯特也沒有說明規(guī)范性是否是由人們的內(nèi)部意向狀態(tài)產(chǎn)生的。 塞爾的集體意向性理論是我們討論集體行動和社會行為的基礎(chǔ)。尤其在社會實體的建構(gòu)方面,如果沒有集體意向性的存在,社會實體的建構(gòu)就不可能得到實現(xiàn)。至于塞爾集體意向性理論中存在的爭議,比如集體意向性是否可以還原,集體意向性是否存在規(guī)范性等爭論,從某種意義上說明了塞爾的集體意向性理論還并不十分完善,我們需要對集體意向性做進(jìn)一步的研究。
[Abstract]:Intentionality is an important issue in contemporary philosophy of action and philosophy of mind. As the main representative of the study of intentionality, Searle's study of intentionality began with his discussion of speech act theory. Then, Searle introduced intentionality into the study of speech act theory, and thought that intentionality was the basis of words and deeds. According to Searle, although individual intentionality is an important aspect of intentionality research, he still focuses on collective intentionality. This paper attempts to clarify the rich connotation of collective intentionality by discussing the related topics, structure, social ontology and standardization of Searle's collective intentionality. In the discussion of collective action, the concept of intentionality is very important. According to Searle, individual intentionality is real, individual has its own mind, and at this point the collective is different from individual, so what is the existence of collective intentionality? The relationship between individual intentionality and collective intentionality becomes a very important issue. These questions are explained by Searle mainly through the following topics: first, by comparing the differences between collective intention and individual intention, Searle proves that collective intentionality is real, collective intentionality exists in individual mind; secondly, When we understand collective intentionality, there is a premise that collective intentionality can not be reduced to individual intentionality; third, collective intentionality presupposes a sense of otherness as a candidate for cooperation. Searle discusses the internal structure of collective intentionality through the causality of ends and means and the constitutive relationship between ends and ways. In addition, in the discussion of social ontology, Searle makes use of the differences between prelinguistic intentionality and intentional linguistic forms. The relationship between collective intentionality and institutional facts as well as commitment and deontic theory are discussed to discuss how collective intentionality is formed. The theory of collective intentionality of Searle has been questioned by Gilbert et al. In Gilbert's view, collective cooperative behavior must involve norms, but Searle's theory of collective intentionality does not embody normality. The author thinks that although Searle did not explicitly put forward the concept of norm in the collective intentionality, it still contains the normative thought in his collective intentionality. Gilbert also did not say whether the norm is caused by people's internal state of intention. Searle's theory of collective intentionality is the basis of our discussion of collective action and social behavior. Especially in the construction of social entity, if there is no collective intention, the construction of social entity can not be realized. As for the controversy existing in Searle's theory of collective intentionality, such as whether collective intentionality can be reduced, whether collective intentionality is normative or not, it shows in a sense that Searle's theory of collective intentionality is not very perfect. We need to do further research on collective intentionality.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：B565.59

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