本文選題：索引詞 + 分析性心靈哲學��； 參考：《世界哲學》2017年06期

【摘要】：分析性心靈哲學中新生的關(guān)于自我的"索引詞方案"不太關(guān)心有關(guān)自我的本體論、形而上學問題,至少不是一開始就切入這些問題。它試圖通過對作為索引詞的"我"的研究,最終澄清這個領(lǐng)域過去常陷入混亂的原因。盡管許多論者都倡導和堅持"索引詞方案",但其內(nèi)部差別很大,存在著"有我"與"無我"的爭論。筆者認為,"我"的用法很多,每種用法只要誠實地加以運用,都有其合理性,都有其真實所指。哲學應關(guān)注的是它的兩種指稱:一是每個人對之有直覺的、同一不變、且貫穿一生的我;二是從這種自我中抽象出的作為一個最一般哲學范疇的自我。這種自我盡管不能是傳統(tǒng)實我論所說的小人式實在,但有其特殊的本體論地位和作為整體性模塊而表現(xiàn)出來的存在方式。
[Abstract]:The new "index word scheme" about self in analytical philosophy of mind does not concern itself with ontology, metaphysics, at least not from the beginning. It attempts to clarify the cause of the confusion in this field through the study of "I" as an index word. Although many commentators advocate and adhere to the "index word scheme", there are many internal differences between "with me" and "without self". The author thinks that there are many uses of "I", and each usage has its rationality and its true meaning as long as it is used honestly. Philosophy should pay attention to its two kinds of references: one is that everyone has intuition to it, the same constant, and the whole life I, the other is the ego abstracted from this kind of self as a most general philosophical category. Although this kind of ego can not be the traditional reality, but it has its special ontological status and existence mode as a whole module.
【作者單位】： 武漢華中師范大學哲學所;武漢大學文學院;
【基金】：國家社科基金重大招標項目“東西方心靈哲學及其比較研究”(項目編號:12&ZD120)的階段性成果
【分類號】：B089

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1 鄭輝軍;;索引詞視域下信念認知意義的重構(gòu)[J];自然辯證法研究;2014年01期

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本文編號：1904169