本文選題：內(nèi)感官 + 先驗(yàn)觀念論��； 參考：《中國(guó)政法大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：本文以內(nèi)感官為康德《純粹理性批判》的視角切入點(diǎn),考察先驗(yàn)觀念論的重要主張以及內(nèi)感官在其中所起到的重要作用,以此闡發(fā)內(nèi)感官學(xué)說(shuō)在康德知識(shí)論中的價(jià)值與意義。本文以《純粹理性批判》為主要文本,圍繞內(nèi)感官問(wèn)題進(jìn)行論述,分別就內(nèi)感官在康德知識(shí)論中的兩個(gè)視閾,即對(duì)象意識(shí)與自我意識(shí)中所表征的內(nèi)涵為論點(diǎn),試圖將內(nèi)感官作為這兩個(gè)視閾之間的邏輯聯(lián)結(jié)以烘托康德先驗(yàn)觀念論的中心思想。其次將康德先驗(yàn)觀念論置于近代知識(shí)論發(fā)展的歷史框架中,以縱向視角理解康德先驗(yàn)觀念論在哲學(xué)史中所表現(xiàn)出來(lái)的獨(dú)特內(nèi)涵。 在對(duì)象意識(shí)中,內(nèi)感官首先表現(xiàn)為時(shí)間的直觀形式。時(shí)間與內(nèi)感官具有不可分割的緊密聯(lián)系,因而對(duì)于時(shí)間與內(nèi)感官之間的關(guān)系的闡述是第二章的重點(diǎn)。在此基礎(chǔ)上,內(nèi)感官表現(xiàn)為經(jīng)驗(yàn)的直觀,區(qū)別于時(shí)間的純直觀形式,是使經(jīng)驗(yàn)對(duì)象在場(chǎng)的被動(dòng)性能力,筆者通過(guò)考察對(duì)象被給予內(nèi)感官時(shí)的“刺激”概念,論證內(nèi)感官與經(jīng)驗(yàn)對(duì)象的同質(zhì)關(guān)系,并且正是這種同質(zhì)關(guān)系使得內(nèi)感官具有經(jīng)驗(yàn)實(shí)在性的表征作用,而這種經(jīng)驗(yàn)實(shí)在性也是康德先驗(yàn)觀念論中的重要一面。 在自我意識(shí)中,圍繞內(nèi)感官問(wèn)題展現(xiàn)出諸多復(fù)雜的范疇關(guān)系,內(nèi)感官作為一種經(jīng)驗(yàn)的統(tǒng)覺(jué),與先驗(yàn)統(tǒng)覺(jué)、時(shí)間意識(shí)、先驗(yàn)想象力等諸多范疇相互纏繞,構(gòu)建出康德自我意識(shí)理論的復(fù)雜性。因而第三章將內(nèi)感官分別以知性及意識(shí)作為區(qū)分其外性與內(nèi)性的依據(jù),在兩個(gè)視角中整體論述內(nèi)感官在自我意識(shí)中的重要作用。其中,內(nèi)感官的外性仍然表現(xiàn)為對(duì)象意識(shí)在知性領(lǐng)域中的引申部分,內(nèi)感官作為一種內(nèi)直觀表現(xiàn)為為知性提供質(zhì)料的經(jīng)驗(yàn)性范疇；而內(nèi)感官的內(nèi)性則進(jìn)入康德自我反思的視閾中,康德的自我意識(shí)理論表現(xiàn)為主體對(duì)于自身作為客體的刺激并形成一種可知現(xiàn)象,而自我意識(shí)中的刺激則不同于對(duì)象意識(shí)中的刺激,表現(xiàn)為先驗(yàn)想象力對(duì)內(nèi)感官的綜合功能,內(nèi)感官作為經(jīng)驗(yàn)的統(tǒng)覺(jué)為先驗(yàn)統(tǒng)覺(jué)的思維能力提供了作為現(xiàn)象的表象,使得理性與知性無(wú)法超越經(jīng)驗(yàn)而認(rèn)識(shí)背后的自在之我,這就是內(nèi)感官學(xué)說(shuō)在先驗(yàn)觀念論中所起的中心作用,也即貫穿康德內(nèi)感官學(xué)說(shuō)的核心觀念。 本文在兩個(gè)視閾的考察中所得到的結(jié)論是：內(nèi)感官問(wèn)題對(duì)于康德先驗(yàn)觀念論的主張起到了不可或缺的支撐作用,這個(gè)學(xué)說(shuō)雖然本身并未在康德哲學(xué)中得到充分發(fā)揮,但它隱含在康德的重要思想之中,并起到了最基礎(chǔ)的作用,這也是內(nèi)感官能做到理解康德知識(shí)論的切入點(diǎn)的原因,即本文的意義所在。
[Abstract]:From the perspective of Kant's critique of Pure reason, this paper examines the important propositions of transcendental concept and the important role played by internal senses in Kant's theory of knowledge, so as to elucidate the value and significance of the theory of internal senses in Kant's theory of knowledge. This paper takes "critique of Pure reason" as the main text, discusses the problem of internal senses, and points out the two visual thresholds of internal senses in Kant's theory of knowledge, that is, the connotation of object consciousness and self-consciousness. This paper attempts to regard the inner senses as the logical connection between these two thresholds in order to contrast the central idea of Kant's transcendental concept. Secondly, Kant's transcendental concept is placed in the historical framework of the development of modern knowledge theory, and the unique connotation of Kant's transcendental concept in the history of philosophy is understood from a vertical perspective. In the object consciousness, the internal senses are first shown as the visual form of time. Time and internal senses are inextricably related, so the relationship between time and internal senses is the focus of the second chapter. On this basis, the expression of internal senses is the intuition of experience, which is different from the pure intuitive form of time, and is the passive ability to make the objects of experience present. The author examines the concept of "stimulation" when the objects are given the internal senses. This paper demonstrates the homogeneity relationship between internal senses and experiential objects, and it is this kind of homogeneity that makes the internal senses have the representation of empirical reality, which is also an important aspect of Kant's transcendental concept. In self-consciousness, there are many complicated category relations around internal sensory problems. As a kind of experience, internal senses are intertwined with transcendental apocalypse, time consciousness, transcendental imagination and so on. Construct the complexity of Kant's theory of self-consciousness. Therefore, the third chapter discusses the important role of internal senses in self-consciousness from two perspectives. Among them, the externality of internal senses is still the extension part of object consciousness in the field of knowledge, and the internal senses as an empirical category that provides material for knowledge as an internal intuitionistic performance; The internality of the inner senses enters the threshold of Kant's self-reflection. Kant's theory of self-consciousness shows that the subject stimulates himself as an object and forms a kind of knowable phenomenon. The stimulus in self-consciousness is different from the stimulus in object consciousness, which is manifested as the comprehensive function of transcendental imagination to internal senses, and the inner senses, as the apocalypse of experience, provide the appearance of phenomena for the thinking ability of transcendental apocalypse. It makes reason and understanding unable to transcend experience and understand the free self behind it, which is the central function of internal sensory theory in transcendental concept theory, that is, the core idea that runs through Kant's inner sensory theory. The conclusion of this paper is that internal sensory problems play an indispensable supporting role in Kant's theory of transcendental concept, although the theory itself has not been fully developed in Kant's philosophy. But it is implicit in Kant's important thought and plays the most basic role, which is the reason why the internal senses can understand Kant's theory of knowledge, that is, the meaning of this paper.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國(guó)政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：B516.31

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相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

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本文編號(hào)：1872886