【摘要】：自古以來,真理是以人們追求確定性目標(biāo)的身份存在,人們一直走在追求真理的路途中。在真理的發(fā)展過程中,符合論真理觀和實用主義真理觀對羅蒂真理觀的形成影響較大。羅蒂認(rèn)為,傳統(tǒng)認(rèn)識論從主客二分出發(fā),強(qiáng)調(diào)主觀與客觀、心物二分的對應(yīng)、表象與實在相符合的真理觀是不合理的,這種片面崇尚理性,追求客觀性知識的真理觀給人類帶來了深重的災(zāi)難,它遠(yuǎn)離了人們的日常生活,壓抑了人性的發(fā)展。羅蒂指出分析哲學(xué)是康德哲學(xué)的新變種,其本質(zhì)是強(qiáng)調(diào)語言與世界的對應(yīng)性代替了傳統(tǒng)認(rèn)識論心靈與世界的對應(yīng)性,通過不斷的邏輯分析來擦亮“語言”這面鏡子來準(zhǔn)確的反映世界的圖景,這樣并不能解決人類的日常生活問題。在羅蒂的著作《哲學(xué)與自然之境》中表明,羅蒂從分析哲學(xué)陣營轉(zhuǎn)向?qū)嵱弥髁x陣營,他用分析哲學(xué)的語言指出了分析哲學(xué)發(fā)展的癥結(jié)所在,從分析哲學(xué)的支持者轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)榕涯嬲摺?羅蒂在批判符合論真理觀的過程中引入實用主義為西方哲學(xué)的發(fā)展注入了新鮮的血液,他綜合了分析哲學(xué)嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)?shù)目茖W(xué)態(tài)度、嚴(yán)密的邏輯分析和歐洲大陸哲學(xué)注重人性發(fā)展,動態(tài)的、歷史的看待哲學(xué)問題,把所有的人類活動全部置于一定的語境、時空、和歷史中,一切都成為暫時的、偶然的東西,全部都語言化了。他提出要在語境的基底上,綜合語形、語義、語用多角度的分析語言,真理是語言使用中的功能對話,是人類社會的普遍信念,它的核心是現(xiàn)實中動態(tài)交流的一致性,強(qiáng)調(diào)真理的語境化趨向。 羅蒂是現(xiàn)代哲學(xué)家中備受爭議的一位學(xué)者,有贊美者,亦有貶斥者。一些學(xué)者指出,羅蒂真理觀說出了哲學(xué)科學(xué)化所忽略的人的方面；而另一些學(xué)者把羅蒂實用主義真理觀說成是相對主義,認(rèn)為羅蒂用動態(tài)的、暫時的、偶然的方法分析解決問題相當(dāng)于什么也沒說,這種觀點沒有任何意義。但是,羅蒂作為傳統(tǒng)哲學(xué)的反叛者,站在反基礎(chǔ)主義、反本質(zhì)主義和反表象主義的基礎(chǔ)上對傳統(tǒng)哲學(xué)、真理以及語言的懷疑,為我們研究再述這些概念提供了一套新的思維方式。他真理觀中的實用主義思想,隱喻觀,以及建立在自然主義基礎(chǔ)上的語言觀,以語詞的自由選擇為途徑,以語境為基底的哲學(xué)思想值得我們深思。他的真理觀在某種層面與“后現(xiàn)代”理論有著一定的關(guān)聯(lián)性和相似性,代表著哲學(xué)發(fā)展的未來走向,體現(xiàn)著哲學(xué)發(fā)展的某種趨勢,值得我們深入研究。
[Abstract]:Since ancient times, truth has existed as people's pursuit of certainty, and people have been pursuing truth all the time. In the course of the development of truth, the theory of truth and pragmatism have a great influence on the formation of Rorty's view of truth. According to Rorty, the traditional epistemology starts from the dichotomy between subject and object, emphasizes the correspondence between subjective and objective, the correspondence between mind and object, and the correspondence between appearance and reality. This kind of one-sided respect for rationality is unreasonable. The truth view of the pursuit of objective knowledge has brought a deep disaster to human beings, which is far from people's daily life and suppresses the development of human nature. Rorty pointed out that analytical philosophy is a new variant of Kant's philosophy, whose essence is to emphasize the correspondence between language and the world instead of the traditional epistemological correspondence between the mind and the world. Continuous logical analysis to polish the mirror of "language" to accurately reflect the picture of the world, this can not solve the problems of human daily life. In his book philosophy and Nature, Rorty shows that Rorty has changed from analytical philosophy to pragmatism. He points out the crux of the development of analytical philosophy by using the language of analytic philosophy, and turns from a supporter of analytical philosophy to a rebel. In the process of criticizing the theory of truth, Rorty introduced pragmatism into the development of western philosophy. He integrated the rigorous scientific attitude of analytical philosophy, the rigorous logical analysis and the European continental philosophy to pay attention to the development of human nature. Dynamic, historical view of philosophical issues, all human activities in a certain context, time and space, and history, everything is temporary, accidental things, all the language. He put forward that on the basis of context, we should analyze language from various angles of form, semantics and pragmatics. Truth is a functional dialogue in language use and a universal belief in human society. Its core is the consistency of dynamic communication in reality. The tendency to emphasize the contextualization of truth. Rorty is a controversial scholar among modern philosophers, both admirers and deniers. Some scholars have pointed out that Rorty's view of truth speaks out the human aspect neglected by the scientization of philosophy. Some other scholars regard Rorty's pragmatism as relativism, and think that it is meaningless to analyze and solve problems by dynamic, temporary and accidental methods. However, as a rebel of traditional philosophy, Rorty's doubts about traditional philosophy, truth and language are based on anti-foundationalism, anti-essentialism and anti-representativism. It provides a new way of thinking for us to study and restate these concepts. The pragmatism, metaphor and language view based on naturalism in his view of truth are worthy of our deep thinking, which takes the free choice of words as the way and context as the base. His theory of truth has certain relevance and similarity with "postmodernism" theory on a certain level, which represents the future trend of philosophy development and reflects a certain trend of philosophy development, which is worthy of further study.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山西大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：B023.3;H030

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