【摘要】：在商業(yè)銀行中,有效的薪酬激勵能夠改善銀行的資本充足率,提高資產(chǎn)質(zhì)量,增強盈利能力,也能為銀行培育人力資源。同時達到提高銀行現(xiàn)實競爭力和潛在競爭力的效果。薪酬激勵是指通過薪酬制度的設(shè)計和實施對員工進行獎懲達到激勵約束目標(biāo)的一種激勵方式。而薪酬設(shè)計如果科學(xué)合理,可以高效難調(diào)動員工工作熱情,起到激勵作用。 客戶經(jīng)理的薪酬機制對商業(yè)銀行而言意義深遠(yuǎn),而設(shè)計客戶經(jīng)理的薪酬機制本質(zhì)上是解決商業(yè)銀行與客戶經(jīng)理之間的代理問題。相對于商業(yè)銀行的其它基本活動,客戶經(jīng)理的工作有其內(nèi)在的特殊性:一方面,客戶經(jīng)理并不在商業(yè)銀行內(nèi)部工作,而是在他們各自負(fù)責(zé)的區(qū)域內(nèi)同客戶接觸。因而,除非花費奇高的觀測成本,客戶經(jīng)理很難觀測到客戶經(jīng)理的努力程度。另一方面,除客戶經(jīng)理的努力外,銷售業(yè)績還受諸多不確定的市場因素之影響,譬如區(qū)域的潛在需求、客戶的心理因素、競爭者的戰(zhàn)略,以及商業(yè)銀行的廣告策略等。因而,客戶經(jīng)理并不能直接根據(jù)銷售業(yè)績來推斷客戶經(jīng)理的努力程度,這就給客戶經(jīng)理予機會主義行為之機,即出現(xiàn)敗德行為(Moral Hazard)。 本文首先對薪酬的相關(guān)理論進行了概述,對薪酬的構(gòu)成與作用進行了探討。然后主要分析了美國、德國和日本的薪酬體系,并對他們的先進經(jīng)驗進行了總結(jié)。隨后,分析了中國光大銀行廣州分行客戶經(jīng)理薪酬機制的現(xiàn)狀,對目前客戶經(jīng)理薪酬管理辦法進行了詳細(xì)介紹,在此基礎(chǔ)上,實證分析了客戶經(jīng)理薪酬水平與我行相關(guān)業(yè)績指標(biāo)的關(guān)系,發(fā)現(xiàn)目前光大銀行廣州分行客戶經(jīng)理薪酬水平只同存貸款額的提高有聯(lián)系,而同銀行的其它業(yè)績指標(biāo)的關(guān)系不明顯。進而我們認(rèn)為中國光大銀行客戶經(jīng)理薪酬機制安排中存在缺乏長期激勵、考核體系不合理等問題。最后,我們設(shè)計出光大銀行客戶經(jīng)理薪酬機制優(yōu)化方案,對客戶經(jīng)理的基本工資、績效工資與福利進行了優(yōu)化設(shè)計,并提出了一些相關(guān)的配套措施。
[Abstract]:In commercial banks, effective compensation incentives can improve the capital adequacy ratio, improve the quality of assets, enhance profitability, and also cultivate human resources for banks. At the same time, to improve the bank's real competitiveness and potential competitiveness of the effect. Compensation incentive is an incentive way to achieve the goal of incentive and restraint through the design and implementation of compensation system. If the salary design is scientific and reasonable, it can be highly effective and difficult to mobilize the enthusiasm of the staff and play an incentive role. The compensation mechanism of the account manager is of great significance to the commercial bank, and the design of the compensation mechanism of the account manager is essentially to solve the agency problem between the commercial bank and the customer manager. Compared with other basic activities of commercial banks, the work of account managers has its own particularity: on the one hand, account managers do not work inside commercial banks, but contact with customers in their respective areas. As a result, it is difficult for account managers to see how hard the account manager works unless they spend extremely high observation costs. On the other hand, in addition to the efforts of account managers, sales performance is also affected by many uncertain market factors, such as regional potential demand, customer psychological factors, competitors' strategy, and commercial bank advertising strategy. Therefore, the account manager can not directly infer the degree of effort of the account manager based on the sales performance, which gives the account manager the opportunity of opportunistic behavior, that is, the emergence of moral behavior (Moral Hazard). This paper first summarizes the relevant theories of compensation, and probes into the composition and function of compensation. Then it analyzes the compensation system of the United States, Germany and Japan, and summarizes their advanced experience. Then, the paper analyzes the current situation of the compensation mechanism of customer manager in Guangzhou Branch of Everbright Bank of China, and introduces the current compensation management method of customer manager in detail. This paper empirically analyzes the relationship between the compensation level of customer manager and the related performance index of our bank, and finds that the compensation level of customer manager in Guangzhou Branch of Everbright Bank is only related to the increase of deposit and loan amount, but not to other performance indicators of the bank. Furthermore, we think that there are some problems in the arrangement of customer manager compensation mechanism of China Everbright Bank, such as lack of long-term incentive and unreasonable appraisal system. Finally, we design the optimized scheme of customer manager compensation mechanism of Everbright Bank, optimize the basic salary, performance salary and welfare of customer manager, and put forward some relevant supporting measures.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2009
【分類號】：F272.92;F832.3

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