農作物商業(yè)化育種合作的契約模式選擇及效率研究
發(fā)布時間：2018-11-22 13:49
【摘要】：長期以來,我國實行以公益性科研單位為主體的種業(yè)創(chuàng)新體系,科研單位負責育種技術創(chuàng)新及其推廣使用,因此科研單位擁有大部分農作物育種資源。這種資源分布狀況使得企業(yè)不得不與科研單位建立長期、正式的商業(yè)化育種合作關系,以保證穩(wěn)定的技術供給。而商業(yè)化育種合作契約往往不能描述和界定未來所有或然狀態(tài)下契約雙方的權、責、利,雙方會為了追求私人利益而背離育種合作的共同利益,引發(fā)機會主義行為,導致合作關系不穩(wěn)定甚至破裂,形成了商業(yè)化育種資源的低效率配置。因此設計和選擇可有效規(guī)制機會主義行為的契約模式,成為緩解上述困境的重要議題,本文以契約不完全性——契約模式選擇——效率(I-C-E)為分析范式,以農作物商業(yè)化育種的技術和交易屬性為切入點,從商業(yè)化育種合作剩余最大化的視角,對農作物商業(yè)化育種合作的契約模式選擇及其效率進行分析,探索農作物商業(yè)化育種合作發(fā)展的規(guī)律性,為推進現(xiàn)代農作物種業(yè)發(fā)展提供決策依據(jù)。主要觀點如下:(1)分析范式。在產權理論和交易費用理論的基礎上,提出了本文所采用的分析范式,即契約不完全性——契約模式選擇——效率。根據(jù)這一分析范式,契約的不完全性是經濟社會中交易的顯著特征,需要選擇相應的契約模式預防和規(guī)制機會主義行為,而最優(yōu)的契約模式是能最大程度降低資源配置效率損失的契約模式。(2)農作物商業(yè)化育種合作契約的不完全性分析。本文以農作物商業(yè)化育種合作契約的技術屬性和交易屬性(技術交易結構)為切入點,分析契約的不完全性。這類技術交易結構主要包括育種合作的資產專用性、育種技術的公共品屬性、育種技術的可轉移性差和育種交易的不確定性等。交易技術結構產生了描述和界定育種技術非獨占性、關鍵信息不可契約化以及要素非完全替代性的交易成本,是形成商業(yè)化育種合作契約不完全的基本原因。契約的不完全引發(fā)了信息竊取和項目交叉資助的機會主義行為,成為簽訂和實施契約的主要障礙,需要設計相應的協(xié)調機制來彌補育種合作的效率損失。這種協(xié)調機制主要包括契約的產權結構、支付結構和聲譽(關系契約),不同的協(xié)調機制及其結構形成了不同的契約模式。(3)最優(yōu)商業(yè)化育種合作契約模式選擇。本文通過一個關系契約模型,分析了最優(yōu)商業(yè)化育種合作契約模式的適用范圍。從博弈次數(shù)的維度,若契約雙方的貼現(xiàn)率低于臨界貼現(xiàn)率,聲譽機制將發(fā)揮作用,多次的商業(yè)化育種合作契約(關系契約)可以有效避免機會主義行為,優(yōu)于單期的商業(yè)化育種合作契約,達到最優(yōu)效率。然而這一貼現(xiàn)率依賴于雙方選擇關系契約的機會成本,在新品種差異化較小的情況下,單期契約即可獲利,關系契約的機會成本較高,從而難以將貼現(xiàn)率維持在低于臨界貼現(xiàn)率的水平。從關系契約適用邊界的維度,在關系契約中,當植物新品種保護程度較低時,多次的委托育種、共同研發(fā)和準縱向一體化契約均可實現(xiàn)最優(yōu)效率。同一條件下,隨著契約雙方要素投入的替代性增加,契約雙方對關系契約的選擇順序為多次的準縱向一體化、共同研發(fā)和委托育種契約。(4)農作物商業(yè)化育種合作的效率分析。本文通過結構方程模型,對最優(yōu)契約模式選擇的影響因素與效率進行實證分析,驗證契約的協(xié)調機制實現(xiàn)效率的路徑。本文用主體滿意度表示契約雙方的育種合作效率,將影響因素歸納為預期收益因素、契約層面影響因素和法律層面影響因素等三類因素。預期收益因素主要包括預期收益及其支付結構、新品種的價格高低等觀察指標,契約層面影響因素主要包括交易風險高低、適應性成本承擔比例等觀察指標,法律層面影響因素主要包括植物新品種保護強度、侵權時的維權成本等觀察指標。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)這三類因素對契約行為主體的滿意度均存在顯著正向影響,其中預期收益因素對主體滿意度的影響最大,標準化路徑系數(shù)達到53.0%。
[Abstract]:For a long time, our country implements the seed industry innovation system with the public welfare scientific research unit as the main body, the scientific research unit is responsible for the breeding technology innovation and the promotion and use, so the scientific research unit has most of the crop breeding resources. This kind of resource distribution condition makes the enterprise have to establish a long-term and formal commercial breeding cooperative relationship with the scientific research unit to ensure the stable technology supply. The commercial breeding cooperation contract is often unable to describe and define the rights, responsibilities and interests of the contractual parties in all or the future states of the future, and the two parties will, in order to pursue the private interests, depart from the common interests of the breeding and cooperation, trigger the opportunistic behavior, and lead to the instability and even the rupture of the cooperative relationship, the low-efficiency configuration of the commercial breeding resource is formed. Therefore, it is an important topic to design and choose the contract model that can effectively regulate the opportunistic behavior, and it is an important topic to alleviate the above-mentioned difficulties. In this paper, the contract incomplete _ contract mode selection _ efficiency (I-C-E) is the analytical paradigm, and the technology and transaction attributes of the commercial breeding of the crops are the starting point. From the perspective of the maximization of the commercial breeding cooperation, the contract model selection and the efficiency of the commercial breeding cooperation of the crops are analyzed, the regularity of the development of the commercial breeding and breeding of the crops is explored, and the decision-making basis for promoting the development of the modern crop breeding industry is provided. The main points of view are as follows: (1) Analysis paradigm. On the basis of the theory of property right theory and transaction cost, this paper puts forward the analysis paradigm adopted in this paper, that is, the contract incomplete _ contract mode selection _ efficiency. According to this analysis model, the incompleteness of the contract is the significant characteristic of the transaction in the economy and society, and it is necessary to select the corresponding contract mode to prevent and regulate the opportunistic behavior, and the optimal contract mode is the contract mode which can minimize the loss of the resource allocation efficiency. (2) The incomplete analysis of the commercial breeding cooperation contract of the crops. This paper analyzes the incompleteness of the contract with the technical property and the transaction property (the technical transaction structure) of the commercial breeding cooperative contract of the crops. The structure of this kind of technology mainly includes the asset specificity of the breeding cooperation, the common property of the breeding technology, the transferability of the breeding technology, the uncertainty of the breeding transaction, and the like. The transaction technology structure has produced a description and a definition of the non-exclusive nature of the breeding technology, the non-contract of the key information, and the cost of the non-complete alternative of the elements, which is the basic reason for the incomplete development of the commercial breeding cooperation contract. The contract does not completely trigger the opportunistic behavior of information theft and cross-financing of the project, becomes the main obstacle to the signing and implementation of the contract, and needs to design the corresponding coordination mechanism to make up for the efficiency loss of the breeding cooperation. This kind of coordination mechanism mainly includes the property right structure of the contract, the payment structure and the reputation (relationship contract), the different coordination mechanism and its structure form different contract modes. (3) The choice of the best commercial breeding cooperative contract model. In this paper, through a relationship contract model, the application scope of the optimal commercial breeding cooperative contract model is analyzed. From the dimension of the number of times of game, if the discount rate of the two parties is lower than the critical discount rate, the reputation mechanism will play a role, and the multiple commercial breeding cooperation contract (the relationship contract) can effectively avoid the opportunistic behavior, which is superior to the commercial breeding cooperation contract of the single period, so as to achieve the optimal efficiency. However, this discount rate is dependent on the opportunity cost of the relationship contract between the two parties. In the case of small new varieties, the opportunity cost of the relationship contract is high, so it is difficult to maintain the discount rate at a level lower than the critical discount rate. From the dimension of the application boundary of the relationship contract, in the relationship contract, when the protection degree of the new plant new variety is lower, the optimal efficiency can be achieved by the multi-time entrusted breeding, the common research and development and the quasi-longitudinal integration contract. Under the same condition, with the alternative increase of the input of the two parties, the contract of contract selection is the quasi-longitudinal integration of many times, and the contract of co-development and commission of the contract is co-developed and commissioned. (4) Efficiency analysis of the commercial breeding cooperation of crops. Based on the structural equation model, this paper makes an empirical analysis on the influence factors and efficiency of the optimal contract mode selection and the path of the efficiency of the coordination mechanism of the verification contract. In this paper, the main body satisfaction is used to express the efficiency of the two parties' breeding and cooperation, and the influencing factors are summarized into three kinds of factors, such as the expected income factor, the influence factor of the contract level and the influence factors at the legal level. The expected income factor mainly includes the expected income and its payment structure, the price of the new variety, and other observation indexes, and the influence factors of the contract level mainly include the transaction risk, the proportion of the adaptability cost and other observation indexes. The influence factors at the legal level mainly include the protection strength of new varieties of plants, and the cost of protecting the rights in the case of infringement. The study found that these three factors had a significant positive impact on the satisfaction of the principal of the contract, of which the expected income factors had the greatest impact on the satisfaction of the subject, and the standardized path coefficient reached 53.0%.
【學位授予單位】：山東農業(yè)大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F324.6
，
本文編號：2349551
[Abstract]:For a long time, our country implements the seed industry innovation system with the public welfare scientific research unit as the main body, the scientific research unit is responsible for the breeding technology innovation and the promotion and use, so the scientific research unit has most of the crop breeding resources. This kind of resource distribution condition makes the enterprise have to establish a long-term and formal commercial breeding cooperative relationship with the scientific research unit to ensure the stable technology supply. The commercial breeding cooperation contract is often unable to describe and define the rights, responsibilities and interests of the contractual parties in all or the future states of the future, and the two parties will, in order to pursue the private interests, depart from the common interests of the breeding and cooperation, trigger the opportunistic behavior, and lead to the instability and even the rupture of the cooperative relationship, the low-efficiency configuration of the commercial breeding resource is formed. Therefore, it is an important topic to design and choose the contract model that can effectively regulate the opportunistic behavior, and it is an important topic to alleviate the above-mentioned difficulties. In this paper, the contract incomplete _ contract mode selection _ efficiency (I-C-E) is the analytical paradigm, and the technology and transaction attributes of the commercial breeding of the crops are the starting point. From the perspective of the maximization of the commercial breeding cooperation, the contract model selection and the efficiency of the commercial breeding cooperation of the crops are analyzed, the regularity of the development of the commercial breeding and breeding of the crops is explored, and the decision-making basis for promoting the development of the modern crop breeding industry is provided. The main points of view are as follows: (1) Analysis paradigm. On the basis of the theory of property right theory and transaction cost, this paper puts forward the analysis paradigm adopted in this paper, that is, the contract incomplete _ contract mode selection _ efficiency. According to this analysis model, the incompleteness of the contract is the significant characteristic of the transaction in the economy and society, and it is necessary to select the corresponding contract mode to prevent and regulate the opportunistic behavior, and the optimal contract mode is the contract mode which can minimize the loss of the resource allocation efficiency. (2) The incomplete analysis of the commercial breeding cooperation contract of the crops. This paper analyzes the incompleteness of the contract with the technical property and the transaction property (the technical transaction structure) of the commercial breeding cooperative contract of the crops. The structure of this kind of technology mainly includes the asset specificity of the breeding cooperation, the common property of the breeding technology, the transferability of the breeding technology, the uncertainty of the breeding transaction, and the like. The transaction technology structure has produced a description and a definition of the non-exclusive nature of the breeding technology, the non-contract of the key information, and the cost of the non-complete alternative of the elements, which is the basic reason for the incomplete development of the commercial breeding cooperation contract. The contract does not completely trigger the opportunistic behavior of information theft and cross-financing of the project, becomes the main obstacle to the signing and implementation of the contract, and needs to design the corresponding coordination mechanism to make up for the efficiency loss of the breeding cooperation. This kind of coordination mechanism mainly includes the property right structure of the contract, the payment structure and the reputation (relationship contract), the different coordination mechanism and its structure form different contract modes. (3) The choice of the best commercial breeding cooperative contract model. In this paper, through a relationship contract model, the application scope of the optimal commercial breeding cooperative contract model is analyzed. From the dimension of the number of times of game, if the discount rate of the two parties is lower than the critical discount rate, the reputation mechanism will play a role, and the multiple commercial breeding cooperation contract (the relationship contract) can effectively avoid the opportunistic behavior, which is superior to the commercial breeding cooperation contract of the single period, so as to achieve the optimal efficiency. However, this discount rate is dependent on the opportunity cost of the relationship contract between the two parties. In the case of small new varieties, the opportunity cost of the relationship contract is high, so it is difficult to maintain the discount rate at a level lower than the critical discount rate. From the dimension of the application boundary of the relationship contract, in the relationship contract, when the protection degree of the new plant new variety is lower, the optimal efficiency can be achieved by the multi-time entrusted breeding, the common research and development and the quasi-longitudinal integration contract. Under the same condition, with the alternative increase of the input of the two parties, the contract of contract selection is the quasi-longitudinal integration of many times, and the contract of co-development and commission of the contract is co-developed and commissioned. (4) Efficiency analysis of the commercial breeding cooperation of crops. Based on the structural equation model, this paper makes an empirical analysis on the influence factors and efficiency of the optimal contract mode selection and the path of the efficiency of the coordination mechanism of the verification contract. In this paper, the main body satisfaction is used to express the efficiency of the two parties' breeding and cooperation, and the influencing factors are summarized into three kinds of factors, such as the expected income factor, the influence factor of the contract level and the influence factors at the legal level. The expected income factor mainly includes the expected income and its payment structure, the price of the new variety, and other observation indexes, and the influence factors of the contract level mainly include the transaction risk, the proportion of the adaptability cost and other observation indexes. The influence factors at the legal level mainly include the protection strength of new varieties of plants, and the cost of protecting the rights in the case of infringement. The study found that these three factors had a significant positive impact on the satisfaction of the principal of the contract, of which the expected income factors had the greatest impact on the satisfaction of the subject, and the standardized path coefficient reached 53.0%.
【學位授予單位】：山東農業(yè)大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F324.6
，
本文編號：2349551
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