本文選題：歐洲主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī) + 歐元��； 參考：《吉林大學(xué)》2016年博士論文

【摘要】：2009年希臘主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)爆發(fā),隨即蔓延到愛爾蘭、葡萄牙、西班牙、意大利和塞浦路斯等歐元區(qū)國家,歐洲主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)全面爆發(fā)。從危機(jī)的爆發(fā)至今,已經(jīng)超過7年。在此期間,雖然德法等歐元區(qū)核心國家、歐盟、歐洲央行和國際貨幣基金組織均先后啟動了多種救助機(jī)制,債務(wù)國自身也為緩和危機(jī)做了很大的努力。但外部援助和債務(wù)國內(nèi)部緊縮努力的效果都不盡如人意,未能從根本上解決危機(jī),歐洲主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)不斷演化,已經(jīng)成為困擾整個歐盟經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇的關(guān)鍵問題。不僅如此,危機(jī)還引起了世人對于歐元前景和未來歐盟一體化進(jìn)程的擔(dān)憂,可以說,這場主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)成為了事關(guān)歐盟前途的重大事件,在經(jīng)濟(jì)政治領(lǐng)域?qū)κ澜鐚a(chǎn)生深遠(yuǎn)影響。從20世紀(jì)80年代至今,在世界范圍內(nèi)發(fā)生多次債務(wù)金融危機(jī),但一般經(jīng)過一到二年就解決了,為什么歐洲主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)遲遲得不到解決?這是由于歐洲主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)的特殊性所決定的。1980年在韓國,1985年左右在拉丁美洲國家,1997年在東南亞國家,和2001年在阿根廷先后發(fā)生的金融危機(jī),都具有外債危機(jī)的特點;美國發(fā)生的次貸危機(jī)具有內(nèi)債危機(jī)的特點;而歐洲主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)似乎是外債危機(jī),但又不像外債危機(jī)。之所以像外債危機(jī),是因為希臘等債務(wù)國所借的債務(wù)是來自德國、法國等其他國家。之所以不像外債危機(jī),是因為債務(wù)是用歐元計價的,而歐元是歐洲主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)國家所使用的本國貨幣。與此相對應(yīng),歐洲主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)似乎又是內(nèi)債危機(jī),但也不像內(nèi)債危機(jī)。因為,希臘等國的債務(wù)雖是歐元計價,但不是從本國企業(yè)和家庭籌集的,而是從外部籌集,本國政府也沒有能力發(fā)行和管理歐元。所以說,歐洲主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)即不是完全意義上的外債危機(jī),也不是完全意義上的內(nèi)債危機(jī)。由于歐洲主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)“兩不像”的特點,嘗試用解決外債危機(jī)的方法來化解歐債危機(jī)難以奏效,同樣,用解決內(nèi)債危機(jī)的方法也難以奏效,這是歐債危機(jī)至今未能徹底解決的根本原因�；谶@一特殊性,本文首先從馬克思經(jīng)典債務(wù)理論入手,以債務(wù)危機(jī)反應(yīng)的是債權(quán)人和債務(wù)人之間合作與對抗關(guān)系為視角,對歐洲主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)進(jìn)行全景式研究。通過分析歐洲主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)的特殊性,揭示債務(wù)危機(jī)與債務(wù)國貨幣主權(quán)喪失之間的內(nèi)在聯(lián)系,說明舉債、生產(chǎn)、貿(mào)易和償債之間的關(guān)系,從而找到債務(wù)危機(jī)治理的根本出路,為我國合理利用外債提供參考。通過對不同債務(wù)危機(jī)進(jìn)行比較研究,探尋這些危機(jī)的異同點,揭示債務(wù)危機(jī)的本質(zhì),對我們?nèi)嬲J(rèn)識債務(wù)危機(jī),防范危機(jī)發(fā)生提供有益的借鑒。馬克思的債務(wù)理論認(rèn)為,債務(wù)關(guān)系體現(xiàn)了債權(quán)人與債務(wù)人之間的合作與對抗關(guān)系。如果債務(wù)人通過對外舉債,能夠有效的實現(xiàn)提高生產(chǎn)、增加貿(mào)易、推動經(jīng)濟(jì)增長,那么,償債就有保證,債權(quán)人與債務(wù)人之間就可以進(jìn)行良好的循環(huán)合作;反之,則債權(quán)與債務(wù)雙方就會發(fā)生對抗,直至以極端的債務(wù)危機(jī)形式表現(xiàn)出來。這一關(guān)系在希臘債務(wù)危機(jī)中表現(xiàn)最為明顯。希臘政府的對外負(fù)債,未能用來有效地發(fā)展生產(chǎn)、貿(mào)易和推動本國經(jīng)濟(jì)增長,而是用來增加國民福利、提高收入水平,最終導(dǎo)致無力償債,從而引發(fā)了債權(quán)國與希臘的對抗,爆發(fā)債務(wù)危機(jī)。同時,債權(quán)國對希臘救助所附加的嚴(yán)格緊縮性條件,又引發(fā)了希臘國內(nèi)民眾與政府,希臘與歐盟的對抗。歐元區(qū)各國主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)的成因一般有兩類,一類是本國政府為維護(hù)金融穩(wěn)定,防止經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退而使用財政資金救助本國銀行業(yè),使銀行業(yè)危機(jī)轉(zhuǎn)化為主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī);另一類是政府受歷史債務(wù)和經(jīng)濟(jì)疲軟拖累,財政赤字飆升,債務(wù)居高不下,最終導(dǎo)致嚴(yán)重的主權(quán)債務(wù)問題。歐元區(qū)成員國的政府財政赤字,無法通過發(fā)行貨幣的方式緩解,只有求助于債權(quán)國的寬限和援助,雖然歐盟委員會、歐洲央行和國際貨幣基金組織提供了多輪救助,但只是暫時緩解,而未能徹底解除危機(jī)。歐洲主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)有著深刻的制度根源,是歐元區(qū)貨幣制度和政治制度缺陷的集中反映。歐元區(qū)各成員國使用的歐元,是由歐洲央行發(fā)行的超主權(quán)信用貨幣。貨幣的統(tǒng)一給歐元區(qū)國家?guī)砹司薮蟮慕?jīng)濟(jì)利益,但卻無法滿足各國政府調(diào)節(jié)各自經(jīng)濟(jì)的需要,當(dāng)各成員國面對非對稱經(jīng)濟(jì)沖擊時,財政政策成為唯一調(diào)節(jié)手段。歐元區(qū)國家各自獨立的財政政策和統(tǒng)一的貨幣政策之間出現(xiàn)巨大矛盾。歐元的制度設(shè)計,突出了統(tǒng)一的貨幣權(quán)力對分散的財政權(quán)力的制約,卻忽視了兩者相互的配合。同時,歐盟治理結(jié)構(gòu)的缺陷,也導(dǎo)致成員國財政紀(jì)律松弛,道德風(fēng)險頻發(fā),聯(lián)盟內(nèi)部政策協(xié)調(diào)不足,金融監(jiān)管不力。在危機(jī)發(fā)生后又出現(xiàn)決策行動遲緩,央行救助不力,成員國之間對立加劇等一系列問題。歐洲經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化過程中的關(guān)稅同盟和共同市場階段運行良好,但是運行到經(jīng)濟(jì)貨幣聯(lián)盟階段,則遭遇重大挑戰(zhàn),從根本上來看,這是經(jīng)濟(jì)聯(lián)盟與國家主權(quán)的沖突。因此,歐洲主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)本質(zhì)上是政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)危機(jī)。歐元區(qū)統(tǒng)一了貨幣和中央銀行體系,進(jìn)而統(tǒng)一了區(qū)內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì),但完全的貨幣經(jīng)濟(jì)解決不了各成員國現(xiàn)實存在的失業(yè)和收入分配不公的問題,需要依靠各國政府自行調(diào)節(jié)。歐元區(qū)的各成員國政府沒有發(fā)行貨幣的權(quán)力,喪失了貨幣主權(quán),失去了利率、匯率等調(diào)節(jié)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)的杠桿,只能依靠財政擴(kuò)張和舉借外債來解決本國失業(yè)和收入問題。經(jīng)濟(jì)統(tǒng)一,而政治仍獨立的矛盾,是歐元區(qū)的根本矛盾,歐債危機(jī)的最終解決,也要通過推進(jìn)歐盟政治一體化來實現(xiàn)。對比以往發(fā)生的幾次主要債務(wù)危機(jī),我們能進(jìn)一步看清歐債危機(jī)的特殊性。盡管債務(wù)危機(jī)本質(zhì)上都是信用危機(jī),但以往發(fā)生過危機(jī)的韓國、拉美國家、泰國和阿根廷等危機(jī)國,都是主權(quán)國家,有自己的貨幣主權(quán),發(fā)生危機(jī)時,可以利用匯率、利率調(diào)節(jié)其國際收支,抵御來自外部的沖擊。而此次深陷歐洲主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)中的希臘等國,則由于加入歐元區(qū)而喪失了貨幣主權(quán),不再有能力通過調(diào)節(jié)本國國際收支化解危機(jī),只能依靠其他歐元區(qū)成員國的全面支持和合作。進(jìn)一步對比中國和希臘利用外債的效果,我們發(fā)現(xiàn),我國有效的利用外債發(fā)展生產(chǎn),擴(kuò)大貿(mào)易,推動經(jīng)濟(jì)增長,從而實現(xiàn)了債權(quán)債務(wù)關(guān)系的和諧;而反觀希臘,其在利用主權(quán)債務(wù)方面未能實現(xiàn)以上目的,從而造成了債務(wù)國和債權(quán)國的嚴(yán)重對抗。因此,如何有效利用外債,如何防范債務(wù)危機(jī),歐洲主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)給我國帶來了重要啟示。
[Abstract]:The Greek sovereign debt crisis broke out in 2009 and then spread to euro zone countries such as Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Cyprus. The European sovereign debt crisis broke out in an all-round way. It has been over 7 years since the outbreak of the crisis. During this period, although Germany and France, such as the euro zone core countries, the European Union, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund A variety of rescue mechanisms have been launched successively, and the debtor countries themselves have made great efforts to mitigate the crisis. However, the effects of external aid and debt domestic contraction efforts are not satisfactory, and the crisis has not been solved fundamentally. The evolution of the European sovereign debt crisis has become the key problem that has plagued the economic recovery of the whole European Union. In this case, the crisis has also raised concerns about the future of the euro and the future of EU integration. It can be said that the sovereign debt crisis has become a major event in the future of the European Union, and will have a far-reaching impact on the world in the economic and political field. Since 1980s, there have been a number of debt financial crises in the world, but there have been many financial crises in the world. Generally after one or two years, why is the European sovereign debt crisis unresolved? This is due to the special nature of the European sovereign debt crisis in.1980 in Korea, in Latin American countries around 1985, in 1997 in Southeast Asia, and in the financial crisis of 2001 in Argentina. The subprime crisis in the United States has the characteristics of the internal debt crisis; the European sovereign debt crisis seems to be a foreign debt crisis, but not as a foreign debt crisis. The debt crisis, like the debt crisis in Greece and other countries, is from Germany, France and other countries. It is not like the external debt crisis because the debt is Europe. The euro is the domestic currency used by the European sovereign debt crisis countries. In contrast, the European sovereign debt crisis seems to be an internal debt crisis, but it is not like the internal debt crisis. The debt of Greece and other countries, although it is the euro, is not raised from domestic enterprises and families, but is raised from the outside, and the government is also a government. There is no ability to issue and manage the euro. Therefore, the European sovereign debt crisis is not a complete external debt crisis, nor is it a complete internal debt crisis. As the European sovereign debt crisis is "two unlike", it is difficult to resolve the European debt crisis with the method of solving the external debt crisis, as well as to solve the internal debt crisis. This is the root cause of the failure of the European debt crisis. Based on this particularity, this article begins with Marx's classical debt theory, taking the debt crisis as the perspective of the cooperation and confrontation between creditors and debtors, and carries out a panoramic study of the European sovereign debt crisis. This paper analyzes the particularity of the European sovereign debt crisis, reveals the inherent relationship between the debt crisis and the loss of the sovereign money sovereignty of the debtor countries, and illustrates the relationship between the debt raising, production, trade and debt service, thus finding the fundamental way out for the management of the debt crisis, providing a reference for the rational use of foreign debt in our country. Looking for the similarities and differences of these crises and revealing the essence of the debt crisis, we can provide useful reference for us to fully understand the debt crisis and guard against the crisis. Marx's debt theory holds that the debt relationship embodies the relationship of cooperation and confrontation between the creditor and the debtor. In order to produce, increase trade and promote economic growth, the debt service is guaranteed, and the creditor and the debtor can carry on good circular cooperation; on the other hand, the creditor and the debt will fight against the debt crisis in the form of extreme debt crisis. This relationship is most evident in the Greek debt crisis. External liabilities, which were not used to effectively develop production, trade and economic growth, were used to increase national welfare, increase income levels, and eventually lead to insolvency, which led to the confrontation between the creditor countries and Greece and the debt crisis. At the same time, the strict austerity conditions attached to the Greek rescue were triggered by Greece. There are two kinds of causes of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro zone. The one is that the government is to protect the financial stability, prevent the economic recession and use financial funds to save the domestic banking industry, turn the banking crisis into the sovereign debt crisis; the other is the government is subject to historical debt and economy. The weakening of the deficit, soaring fiscal deficits and high debt eventually led to serious sovereign debt problems. The government's fiscal deficit in the member countries of the euro zone could not be eased by the way of issuing currency, only the grace and assistance of the creditor countries, although the European Commission, the European Bank of Europe and the International Monetary Fund provided multiple rounds of assistance, The European sovereign debt crisis has a profound institutional root, a reflection of the monetary and political flaws in the euro zone. The euro is the ultra sovereign credit issued by the European Central Bank. The unity of the currency has brought a huge amount of money to the euro zone countries. Economic benefits, but can not meet the needs of governments to regulate their respective economies. When each member countries face asymmetrical economic shocks, fiscal policy becomes the only means of regulation. There is a huge contradiction between the independent financial policies of the euro zone countries and the unified monetary policy. The system design of the euro has highlighted the unified monetary rights. The restriction of the decentralized financial power has ignored the cooperation between the two. At the same time, the defects of the EU governance structure also lead to the relaxation of the financial discipline of the Member States, the frequent moral hazard, the lack of internal policy coordination in the alliance, and the poor financial supervision. The customs union and the common market stage in the process of European economic integration run well, but the operation to the economic and monetary union stage is a major challenge. Fundamentally, this is the conflict between the economic alliance and the sovereignty of the state. Therefore, the European sovereign debt crisis is essentially a political economic crisis. The region unifies the currency and the central bank system, and then unifies the economy in the region, but the complete monetary economy can not solve the problem of unemployment and unfair income distribution in the members of the member countries. It is necessary to rely on the government to regulate it. The governments of the member states of the euro zone have no power to issue money, lost monetary sovereignty and lost profit. The leverage of macroeconomic adjustment, such as rate, exchange rate and so on, can only rely on financial expansion and borrowing of foreign debt to solve the problem of unemployment and income in the country. Economic unity, and the contradiction of political independence, is the fundamental contradiction of the euro area, the ultimate solution of the European debt crisis and the integration of the EU's political governance. The crisis, we can further see the particularity of the European debt crisis. Although the debt crisis is essentially a credit crisis, the crisis countries, such as South Korea, Latin American countries, Thailand and Argentina, are sovereign countries with their own monetary sovereignty. In the event of a crisis, they can use exchange rates, interest rates to adjust their balance of payments and resist Greece and other countries in the European sovereign debt crisis have lost their monetary sovereignty because of their accession to the euro zone, and no longer have the ability to resolve the crisis by adjusting their own balance of payments. They can only rely on the overall support and cooperation of other euro zone members. We find that our country effectively uses foreign debt to develop production, expand trade and promote economic growth, thus achieving a harmonious relationship between debt and debt. In the case of Greece, it has failed to achieve the above purpose in the use of sovereign debt, thus causing severe confrontation between debtor countries and creditor countries. Therefore, how to effectively use foreign debt and how to guard against debt The European sovereign debt crisis has brought important enlightenment to our country.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F815
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本文編號：2099876