高管持股門檻下的技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的就業(yè)效應(yīng)
本文選題:技術(shù)創(chuàng)新 + 就業(yè)效應(yīng); 參考:《重慶大學(xué)》2016年博士論文
【摘要】:就業(yè)問題長期以來一直是經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究的焦點(diǎn)之一。作為勞動(dòng)大國的中國,在近幾年人口紅利逐步消失的過程中,就業(yè)問題逐漸成為影響整體經(jīng)濟(jì)長期穩(wěn)定發(fā)展的核心問題之一。同時(shí),中國正努力通過技術(shù)創(chuàng)新促進(jìn)產(chǎn)業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)升級(jí),提高產(chǎn)品附加值,提升國際競(jìng)爭優(yōu)勢(shì),為躋身技術(shù)創(chuàng)新強(qiáng)國而夯實(shí)基礎(chǔ)。技術(shù)創(chuàng)新對(duì)就業(yè)的影響由此引起了廣泛的爭論。在大量的實(shí)證研究中,既有結(jié)果顯示技術(shù)創(chuàng)新摧毀了大量傳統(tǒng)的就業(yè)崗位造成對(duì)就業(yè)的破壞,也有研究支持技術(shù)創(chuàng)新在破壞舊工作的同時(shí)也創(chuàng)造了新的工作形成“就業(yè)補(bǔ)償”。作為承載就業(yè)的微觀主體,中國企業(yè)正發(fā)生著制度變遷的改革,改革過程中一系列“委托-代理”問題也逐步浮現(xiàn)出來,結(jié)果使得技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的就業(yè)效應(yīng)更加復(fù)雜。本文以2009-2013年中國滬、深A(yù)股上市238家公司作為樣本,在YS Katsoulacos(1986)提出的過程創(chuàng)新和產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新的就業(yè)效應(yīng)由“替代效應(yīng)”和“福利效應(yīng)”構(gòu)成的理論指導(dǎo)下,借鑒Garcia(2002)對(duì)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新就業(yè)效應(yīng)的測(cè)度模型,分析在Morck等(1988)提出的利益趨同效應(yīng)和管理防御效應(yīng)發(fā)生作用的區(qū)間,中國企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的就業(yè)效應(yīng)的具體變化。首先,在傳統(tǒng)理論將技術(shù)創(chuàng)新劃分為過程創(chuàng)新和產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新的基礎(chǔ)上,本文進(jìn)一步借鑒福利經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中脆弱性的概念將企業(yè)的技術(shù)創(chuàng)新活動(dòng)界定為技術(shù)創(chuàng)新投入、創(chuàng)新績效和創(chuàng)新績效脆弱性三個(gè)層次。通過對(duì)三者的現(xiàn)狀觀察發(fā)現(xiàn),當(dāng)前中國企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新面臨的最重要的問題不是技術(shù)創(chuàng)新投入與創(chuàng)新績效的增長,而是創(chuàng)新績效水平脆弱的問題。大部分企業(yè)的創(chuàng)新績效水平是脆弱的,創(chuàng)新匱乏是造成企業(yè)創(chuàng)新績效水平脆弱的主要原因。由于缺乏響應(yīng)創(chuàng)新風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的能力使得企業(yè)創(chuàng)新績效脆弱的狀況正在惡化。盡管部分企業(yè)短期內(nèi)擺脫了創(chuàng)新匱乏狀態(tài)卻因?yàn)閯?chuàng)新績效水平脆弱而陷入了“創(chuàng)新匱乏陷阱”。其次,在對(duì)企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新三個(gè)層次進(jìn)行分析的基礎(chǔ)上,本文運(yùn)用Hansen(1999)的門檻面板回歸模型,引入高管持股比例作為門檻變量分別對(duì)不同企業(yè)性質(zhì)、行業(yè)的企業(yè)其技術(shù)創(chuàng)新對(duì)就業(yè)產(chǎn)生的創(chuàng)造效應(yīng)與破壞效應(yīng)的非線性影響開展實(shí)證分析。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn):對(duì)于企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新投入而言,在企業(yè)制度變遷過程中,無論是國有企業(yè)還是非國有企業(yè),其就業(yè)效應(yīng)隨著高管持股比例的增加表現(xiàn)為先創(chuàng)造后破壞的就業(yè)效應(yīng)。兩者的差異在于非國有企業(yè)的就業(yè)創(chuàng)造程度要高于國有企業(yè),就業(yè)破壞程度要低于國有企業(yè)。由于行業(yè)屬性的差異使得制造企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新投入的就業(yè)效應(yīng)表現(xiàn)為先破壞后創(chuàng)造,而非造企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新投入的就業(yè)效應(yīng)則表現(xiàn)為先創(chuàng)造后破壞。與企業(yè)創(chuàng)新投入不同,創(chuàng)新績效的就業(yè)效應(yīng)隨著高管持股比例的增加表現(xiàn)出雙重門檻效應(yīng)。其中,國有企業(yè)創(chuàng)新績效的就業(yè)效應(yīng)表現(xiàn)為先破壞后創(chuàng)造再破壞的變化趨勢(shì),非國有企業(yè)創(chuàng)新績效的就業(yè)效應(yīng)則表現(xiàn)為先創(chuàng)造后破壞隨后破壞程度減小的變化趨勢(shì)。行業(yè)屬性的差異使得制造企業(yè)創(chuàng)新績效整體的就業(yè)效應(yīng)要弱于非制造企業(yè)。企業(yè)創(chuàng)新績效脆弱性對(duì)就業(yè)的影響表現(xiàn)為先創(chuàng)造后破壞的雙重門檻效應(yīng)。在就業(yè)破壞的過程中,管理防御效應(yīng)的作用淡化了創(chuàng)新績效脆弱性對(duì)就業(yè)的破壞程度。最后,本文進(jìn)一步將企業(yè)創(chuàng)新績效脆弱性分解為創(chuàng)新匱乏和創(chuàng)新風(fēng)險(xiǎn)兩個(gè)部分進(jìn)一步分析其就業(yè)效應(yīng),實(shí)證結(jié)果表明:作為創(chuàng)新績效脆弱性的組成部分,隨著高管持股比例的增加,創(chuàng)新匱乏對(duì)就業(yè)的影響表現(xiàn)為先創(chuàng)造后破壞再創(chuàng)造的就業(yè)效應(yīng)。企業(yè)性質(zhì)差異造成的創(chuàng)新匱乏就業(yè)效應(yīng)的差異在于,在高管持股比例較高的區(qū)間,同樣受到管理防御效應(yīng)的影響,國有企業(yè)創(chuàng)新匱乏的就業(yè)效應(yīng)表現(xiàn)為破壞效應(yīng)而非國有企業(yè)表現(xiàn)為創(chuàng)造效應(yīng)。行業(yè)差異造成的創(chuàng)新匱乏就業(yè)效應(yīng)的差異在于,隨著高管持股比例的增加,制造企業(yè)創(chuàng)新匱乏對(duì)就業(yè)的影響表現(xiàn)為先創(chuàng)造后破壞的就業(yè)效應(yīng),而非制造企業(yè)表現(xiàn)為先破壞后創(chuàng)造的就業(yè)效應(yīng)。基于對(duì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的謹(jǐn)慎態(tài)度,創(chuàng)新風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的就業(yè)效應(yīng)呈先破壞后創(chuàng)造,并且在破壞效應(yīng)區(qū)間,利益趨同效應(yīng)放大了破壞的作用。企業(yè)性質(zhì)不同造成的創(chuàng)新風(fēng)險(xiǎn)就業(yè)效應(yīng)的差異主要表現(xiàn)高管持股比例較低區(qū)間就業(yè)效應(yīng)方向和影響程度兩方面的差別。行業(yè)屬性對(duì)創(chuàng)新風(fēng)險(xiǎn)就業(yè)效應(yīng)差異的影響并不顯著。
[Abstract]:Employment has long been one of the focus of economic research. As a great working country, in the process of the gradual disappearance of the demographic dividend in recent years, the employment problem has gradually become one of the core issues affecting the long-term and stable development of the whole economy. At the same time, China is working hard to promote industrial structure upgrading and increase production through technological innovation. The effect of technological innovation on employment has been widely debated. In a large number of empirical studies, the results show that technological innovation destroys a large number of traditional jobs, and also has research support for technological innovation. At the same time, the old work has created new work to form "employment compensation". As the microcosmic body of carrying out employment, Chinese enterprises are undergoing the reform of institutional change. In the process of reform, a series of "principal-agent" problems have emerged gradually. The result makes the employment effect of technological innovation more complicated. This article is in 2009-2013 years. In China and Shanghai, 238 companies listed in Shenzhen stock market are listed as samples. Under the guidance of the theory of "substitution effect" and "welfare effect", the employment effect of process innovation and product innovation proposed by YS Katsoulacos (1986) is guided by the "substitution effect" and "welfare effect". This paper draws on the measurement model of Garcia (2002) on the effect of technological innovation employment, and analyzes the benefit convergence effect proposed by Morck (1988) in Morck and so on. And the specific changes in the employment effect of Chinese enterprises' technological innovation. Firstly, on the basis of the traditional theory that the technological innovation is divided into process innovation and product innovation, this paper further draws on the concept of vulnerability in the welfare economics to define the technological innovation activities of the enterprise as the investment of technological innovation. There are three levels of innovation performance and innovation performance vulnerability. Through the observation of the status quo of the three, the most important problem in the current Chinese enterprises' technological innovation is not the growth of technological innovation investment and innovation performance, but the fragile innovation performance level. The innovation performance level of most enterprises is fragile, and the lack of innovation is made. The weakness of enterprise innovation performance is deteriorating because of the lack of ability to respond to innovation risk. Although some enterprises are getting rid of the lack of innovation in the short term, they are trapped in the "innovation deficient trap" because of the fragile innovation performance level. Secondly, the technological innovation of enterprises is three. On the basis of the analytic hierarchy process, this paper uses the threshold panel regression model of Hansen (1999) and introduces the proportion of senior executive stock as a threshold variable to the different enterprise nature, and the nonlinear influence of the technological innovation on the creation effect and the damage effect of employment. The results are as follows: for enterprise technology In the process of innovation investment, the employment effect of both state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises in the process of enterprise system changes, the employment effect of the employment effect with the increase of the proportion of executive stock is first created and then destroyed, the difference lies in that the employment creation degree of non-state-owned enterprises is higher than that of the state-owned enterprises, and the degree of employment destruction is lower than that of the state-owned enterprises. The employment effect of the manufacturing enterprise's technological innovation input is manifested by the first damage creation, while the employment effect of the technological innovation investment is first created after the creation, and the employment effect of the innovation performance shows a double threshold with the increase of the proportion of executive stock ownership. Among them, the employment effect of the innovation performance of the state-owned enterprises is the change trend after the first destruction, and the employment effect of the innovation performance of the non-state-owned enterprises is manifested by the change trend after the first creation and the decrease of the subsequent destruction degree. The difference of the industry attribute makes the overall employment effect of the innovation performance of the manufacturing enterprises weaker than that of the enterprises. Non manufacturing enterprises. The impact of enterprise innovation performance vulnerability on employment is the double threshold effect of first creation and post destruction. In the process of employment destruction, the role of management defense effect desalination the damage degree of innovation performance vulnerability to employment. Finally, this paper further decomposes the vulnerability of enterprise innovation performance into innovation scarcity and creation. The two parts of new risk further analyze their employment effect. The empirical results show that as the component of the vulnerability of innovation performance, with the increase of the proportion of executive stock, the impact of innovation scarcity on employment is the employment effect after the creation of the first creation, and the difference in the employment effect of innovation scarcity, which is caused by the difference of the nature of the enterprise, lies in the difference in the effect of the employment effect. In the range of higher proportion of executive stock, the effect of management defense effect is also influenced by the management defense effect. The employment effect of the lack of state-owned enterprises is manifested by the destructive effect, but not the creation effect of the state-owned enterprises. The difference of the employment effect caused by the innovation shortage caused by the industry difference lies in the lack of innovation of the manufacturing enterprises with the increase of the proportion of high managerial ownership. The influence of employment is manifested by the employment effect of first creation and destruction, but not the employment effect created by the failure of the manufacturing enterprise. Based on the prudent attitude to the risk, the employment effect of the innovation risk is created first, and in the destruction effect interval, the benefit convergence effect magnifies the effect of the destruction. The different nature of the enterprise is caused by the different nature of the enterprise. The difference in the employment effect of innovation risk mainly shows the difference between the two aspects of the low interval employment effect and the degree of influence. The effect of the industry attribute on the difference of the employment effect of innovation risk is not significant.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:重慶大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2016
【分類號(hào)】:F273.1;F272.92
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