本文選題：雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈 + Stackelberg博弈��； 參考：《天津大學(xué)》2015年博士論文

【摘要】：近年來,雙渠道營銷模式已經(jīng)成為越來越多品牌制造商的主要運(yùn)營模式.由于網(wǎng)絡(luò)渠道的開設(shè),制造商與零售商之間不僅存在傳統(tǒng)渠道的縱向博弈,而且還存在著傳統(tǒng)零售渠道與網(wǎng)絡(luò)渠道之間的橫向競爭.這種激烈的競爭和需求環(huán)境的不確定性,可能會引起供應(yīng)鏈成員的公平關(guān)切行為或風(fēng)險規(guī)避行為.不同于大多文獻(xiàn)中成員是完全理性的傳統(tǒng)假設(shè),本文考慮了成員的行為因素,并結(jié)合雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈的應(yīng)用背景,來進(jìn)一步研究決策者的決策策略與供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)問題.顯然,本文的研究問題更接近于現(xiàn)實(shí)情況,拓展了供應(yīng)鏈管理問題的研究范疇,研究成果對供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)中的協(xié)調(diào)決策問題來說有著重要的理論指導(dǎo)意義.本文主要的研究成果包括如下幾個方面:首先,考慮由一個制造商和一個獨(dú)立的零售商構(gòu)成的雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈.零售商為消費(fèi)者提供增值服務(wù)且具有公平關(guān)切行為,使用Stackelberg博弈來建立數(shù)學(xué)模型,求解出均衡解.研究發(fā)現(xiàn):當(dāng)零售商為消費(fèi)者提供增值服務(wù)且具有公平關(guān)切行為時,不能通過一個常數(shù)批發(fā)價合同來協(xié)調(diào)整個供應(yīng)鏈.其次,以目前消費(fèi)者先在實(shí)體店享受售前體驗(yàn)式服務(wù)后轉(zhuǎn)移到網(wǎng)絡(luò)渠道下單購買產(chǎn)品的問題背景為基礎(chǔ),設(shè)計了兩類問題情景,并求出了相應(yīng)的均衡解.基于解的分析,探索了供應(yīng)鏈成員之間應(yīng)如何簽訂對于雙方都有利的服務(wù)合作合同,分析了售前體驗(yàn)式服務(wù)對成員的定價和利潤產(chǎn)生的影響.第三,在制造商引入直銷渠道的問題背景下,考慮市場規(guī)模信息不對稱的情況.假設(shè)零售商具有更為精確預(yù)測市場規(guī)模的能力.但零售商為了應(yīng)對制造商入侵零售渠道的情況,可能會扭曲向制造商訂貨的數(shù)量,以誘導(dǎo)制造商作出錯誤的決策.本文采用均值-方差方法來度量零售商的風(fēng)險規(guī)避行為,證明了唯一的貝葉斯均衡解的存在性,并求解出制造商為了準(zhǔn)確判斷真實(shí)的市場規(guī)模而設(shè)定的閾值.還求解出了使供應(yīng)鏈各成員的利潤或效用達(dá)到最優(yōu)情況的零售商的最優(yōu)訂貨量與制造商的最優(yōu)直銷量.最后,本文研究了由一個制造商和一個獨(dú)立的傳統(tǒng)零售商構(gòu)成的動態(tài)雙渠道系統(tǒng).為了提升銷量,制造商投資全國性廣告,而零售商決策地方性廣告.比較了單渠道和雙渠道供應(yīng)鏈中的均衡解和利潤,且分析了制造商引入網(wǎng)絡(luò)渠道后雙方的利潤變化,設(shè)計了一個雙向收益共享合同來實(shí)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào).
[Abstract]:In recent years, two-channel marketing mode has become the main operation mode of more and more brand manufacturers. Because of the opening of the network channel, there is not only the vertical game of the traditional channel between manufacturer and retailer, but also the horizontal competition between the traditional retail channel and the network channel. This fierce competition and uncertainty of demand environment may lead to fair concern behavior or risk aversion behavior of supply chain members. Different from the traditional hypothesis that members are completely rational in most literatures, this paper considers the behavior factors of members, and combines the application background of two-channel supply chain to further study the decision-making strategy and supply chain coordination of decision makers. Obviously, the research in this paper is closer to the reality and extends the research scope of supply chain management. The research results have important theoretical significance to coordinate decision-making in supply chain system. The main research results of this paper are as follows: firstly, a two-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and an independent retailer is considered. Retailers provide value-added services to consumers and have fair concern behavior. Stackelberg game is used to establish mathematical model to solve the equilibrium solution. It is found that when retailers provide value-added services to consumers and have fair concerns, they cannot coordinate the whole supply chain through a constant wholesale price contract. Secondly, based on the background of the problem that consumers first enjoy the pre-sale experience service in the physical stores and then transfer to the network channel to issue orders to purchase products, two kinds of problem scenarios are designed, and the corresponding equilibrium solutions are obtained. Based on the analysis of the solution, this paper explores how to sign a service cooperation contract between the members of the supply chain which is beneficial to both parties, and analyzes the influence of the pre-sale experience service on the pricing and profit of the members. Thirdly, under the background of direct marketing channel, the information asymmetry of market scale is considered. Assume retailers have the ability to predict market size more accurately. But retailers may distort the amount of orders they place with manufacturers in response to manufacturers breaking into retail channels to induce them to make the wrong decisions. In this paper, we use mean-variance method to measure retailers' risk-averse behavior, prove the existence of a unique Bayesian equilibrium solution, and solve the threshold set by manufacturers in order to judge the real market size accurately. The optimal order quantity of the retailer and the optimal direct selling quantity of the manufacturer are also obtained, in which the profit or utility of each member of the supply chain reaches the optimal condition. Finally, this paper studies a dynamic dual channel system composed of a manufacturer and an independent traditional retailer. To boost sales, manufacturers invest in national advertising, while retailers make decisions about local advertising. This paper compares the equilibrium solution and profit between single channel supply chain and double channel supply chain, analyzes the profit variation of both sides after the manufacturer introduces network channel, and designs a two-way revenue-sharing contract to realize the coordination of supply chain.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F274
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本文編號：1841378