本文選題：中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)　切入點(diǎn)：混合所有制　出處：《吉林大學(xué)》2017年博士論文

【摘要】：中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨十八屆三中全會(huì)提出了中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制的國(guó)有企業(yè)改革新方向。回顧中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制的歷程,大致經(jīng)歷了萌芽(1980年-1993年)、實(shí)踐探索(1993年-2013年)和深化發(fā)展(2013年至今)三個(gè)發(fā)展階段。中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制的歷程表明,中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)的混合所有制改革取得了階段性成績(jī),但仍然存在諸多制約和影響混合所有制契約關(guān)系發(fā)展的客觀問題,為此,研究中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制的契約問題對(duì)于促進(jìn)中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)的混合所有制深化發(fā)展尤為必要。本文從中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制的契約關(guān)系演進(jìn)角度,梳理和提出中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制存在的混合顧慮、逆向選擇、混合目標(biāo)沖突、資產(chǎn)專用性投入不足與搭便車、敲竹杠與控制權(quán)爭(zhēng)奪以及單一所有制的低效率路徑依賴等混合所有制契約關(guān)系發(fā)展問題,并綜合運(yùn)用完全契約理論、不完全契約理論、關(guān)系契約理論對(duì)中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制的契約問題進(jìn)行理論分析,最后從混合所有制契約關(guān)系發(fā)展的混合環(huán)境、混合所有制契約關(guān)系締結(jié)的市場(chǎng)資源配置、混合所有制契約關(guān)系履行的治理體系、混合所有制契約關(guān)系發(fā)展的制度安排以及混合所有制契約關(guān)系發(fā)展的政府監(jiān)管體系五個(gè)方面提出完善和促進(jìn)混合所有制契約關(guān)系發(fā)展的政策建議。本文研究的是中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制的契約問題,全文共分為八章:第1章是緒論。本章首先闡述了本文研究的意義與背景,其次是對(duì)中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制與混合所有制契約問題的已有研究進(jìn)行文獻(xiàn)綜述與述評(píng),再次,對(duì)于本文的研究思路、研究方法、研究的主要內(nèi)容與框架進(jìn)行介紹,最后指出本文的創(chuàng)新與不足。第2章是混合所有制契約問題研究的相關(guān)理論基礎(chǔ)。本章首先對(duì)全文研究中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制的契約問題所運(yùn)用的經(jīng)濟(jì)理論進(jìn)行概述,主要包括完全契約理論、不完全契約理論和關(guān)系契約理論。其次,提出中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制的契約問題研究的契約理論分析視角。第3章是中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制的歷程與契約問題。本章首先把中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制的歷程劃分為萌芽(1980年-1993年)、實(shí)踐探索(1993年-2013年)和深化發(fā)展(2013年至今)三個(gè)發(fā)展階段,并對(duì)中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制各階段的狀況和特點(diǎn)進(jìn)行了概述。其次,在中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制的現(xiàn)實(shí)歷程基礎(chǔ)上梳理和提出中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制存在的混合顧慮、混合壁壘、混合對(duì)象逆向選擇、混合目標(biāo)沖突等混合所有制契約關(guān)系締結(jié)問題以及混合所有制資產(chǎn)專用性投入不足、敲竹杠與控制權(quán)爭(zhēng)奪、制度路徑依賴等混合所有制契約關(guān)系履行問題。第4章是中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制的契約締結(jié)分析。本章首先在論述國(guó)有企業(yè)與私有企業(yè)比較優(yōu)勢(shì)的基礎(chǔ)上得出混合所有制的帕累托改進(jìn),這是中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制的基本前提和混合所有制契約關(guān)系締結(jié)的基礎(chǔ),同時(shí)也是破除混合顧慮與混合壁壘問題的重要理論支撐。其次,針對(duì)混合所有制契約締結(jié)的逆向選擇問題本章通過構(gòu)建混合信息搜尋博弈模型,分析和論述了中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制的混合信息搜尋策略與最佳混合對(duì)象搜尋次數(shù)決定。最后,針對(duì)混合所有制契約締結(jié)的混合目標(biāo)沖突問題,本章分析了中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制的多重委托代理關(guān)系與多任務(wù)目標(biāo),并通過構(gòu)建混合所有制雙重任務(wù)雙重委托代理模型,得出滿足國(guó)有企業(yè)與私有企業(yè)混合所有制發(fā)展目標(biāo)實(shí)現(xiàn)的混合所有制股權(quán)分配與激勵(lì)契約設(shè)計(jì)。第5章是中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制的契約再談判分析。本章首先分析了中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制的初始激勵(lì)契約不完全性以及產(chǎn)生的混合所有制資產(chǎn)專用性準(zhǔn)租占用、敲竹杠等問題。其次,由于混合所有制初始激勵(lì)契約的不完全性,為實(shí)現(xiàn)混合所有制契約的優(yōu)化與履行,中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制需要進(jìn)行基于治理結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整與剩余權(quán)利配置的混合所有制契約再談判,本章通過構(gòu)建混合所有制資產(chǎn)專用性投入與治理結(jié)構(gòu)模型、混合所有制剩余權(quán)利配置模型,分析得出混合所有制契約再談判的治理結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整與混合所有制剩余權(quán)利配置的合理范圍。第6章是中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制的契約履行分析。本章首先分析了單一所有制的制度路徑依賴性及由此產(chǎn)生的中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制的契約履行效率損失問題。由于在一次性博弈的條件下,混合所有制契約履行的效率損失難以避免,基于重復(fù)博弈的混合所有制關(guān)系契約治理就尤為必要。本章接下來論述了混合所有制關(guān)系契約的產(chǎn)生機(jī)理、混合所有制關(guān)系契約治理實(shí)現(xiàn)的條件以及關(guān)系契約治理結(jié)構(gòu)選擇,最后論述了基于聲譽(yù)機(jī)制激勵(lì)與信任機(jī)制保證的混合所有制契約履行的自動(dòng)履約機(jī)制。第7章是完善和發(fā)展混合所有制契約關(guān)系的政策建議。針對(duì)中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制存在的契約問題,通過對(duì)中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制的契約締結(jié)、契約再談判與契約履行的理論分析,本章主要從混合所有制契約關(guān)系發(fā)展的混合環(huán)境、混合所有制契約關(guān)系締結(jié)的市場(chǎng)資源配置、混合所有制契約關(guān)系履行的治理體系、混合所有制契約關(guān)系發(fā)展的制度安排和混合所有制契約關(guān)系發(fā)展的政府監(jiān)管體系五個(gè)方面提出完善和促進(jìn)混合所有制契約關(guān)系發(fā)展的政策建議。第8章是研究結(jié)論與展望。本章主要是總結(jié)全文的研究結(jié)論,并對(duì)進(jìn)一步研究中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制的契約問題做一個(gè)研究展望。
[Abstract]:In the third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee China Communist Party put forward the development of China new direction of state-owned enterprises of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises. A review of the development of China course of state-owned enterprises of mixed ownership, experienced the bud (1980 -1993), practice (1993 -2013) and development (since 2013) the three stages of development. The development of state-owned enterprises of mixed China the ownership of the process showed that China mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises has achieved initial results, but there are still many constraints and the impact of mixed ownership contract development objective problems, therefore, the development of state-owned enterprises of mixed Chinese contract of ownership for the promotion of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises China development is particularly necessary. In this paper the development of China state-owned enterprises of mixed ownership contract relationship evolution, combing and put forward state-owned enterprise development Chinese Mixed ownership concerns, the adverse selection, mixed goal conflict, asset specificity, insufficient investment and free riding, and for control and hold up problem single ownership inefficient path dependence of mixed ownership contract relations, and the integrated use of complete contract theory, incomplete contract theory, relational contract theory analysis on the development of China state-owned enterprises of mixed ownership contract problems, finally from the mixed ownership contract between the development of a mixed environment, mixed ownership contract concluded the allocation of market resources, mix all fulfill the contractual relationship for governance system, mixed ownership contract relationship development institutional arrangements and mixed ownership contract relations the government supervision system in five aspects to improve and promote the development of mixed ownership contract policy recommendations. This study is in The development of state-owned enterprises of mixed contract of ownership, the full text is divided into eight chapters: the first chapter is the introduction. This chapter first describes the background and significance of this study, followed by the research on the development of China state-owned enterprises of mixed ownership and mixed ownership contract problems of literature review and commentary, again, for in this paper, the research ideas, research methods, the main research content and framework are introduced, finally pointed out the innovation and shortcomings of this paper. The second chapter is the theory study on the mixed ownership contract. This chapter begins with the development of the research Chinese state-owned enterprises mixed contract of ownership by the use of economic theories are summarized, mainly including the complete contract theory and incomplete contract theory and contract theory. Secondly, the analysis of apparent contract theory research on contract of ownership of state-owned enterprises China mixed development Angle. The third chapter is the development Chinese of state-owned enterprises of mixed ownership process and contract problems. Firstly, the development of Chinese state-owned enterprises of mixed ownership history into bud (1980 -1993), practice (1993 -2013) and development (since 2013) the three stages of development, and the development of state-owned Chinese mixed ownership enterprises in various stages of the status and characteristics are summarized. Secondly, combing in the course of the basic reality of state-owned enterprises of mixed ownership development Chinese on Chinese and put forward the development of state-owned enterprises of mixed ownership concerns, the presence of mixed barriers, adverse selection of mixed objects, mixed mixed ownership conflict concluded contract relationship problems and mixed ownership lack of special assets investment, and hold up for control system, path dependence of mixed ownership to fulfill the contractual relationship problems. The fourth chapter is China state The development of enterprises of mixed ownership contracts. This chapter first analysis based on comparative advantage of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises of mixed ownership of Pareto improvement, which is the development of Chinese state-owned enterprises of mixed ownership of the basic premise and foundation of mixed ownership to conclude contract relationship, but also an important theoretical support to get rid of worries and mixed mixed barriers. Secondly, based on the mixed ownership contracts adverse selection problems through this chapter to construct a hybrid information search game model, analyzes and discusses the development of China mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises of mixed information search strategies and optimal mixed object search times decision. Finally, according to the mixed ownership contracts mixed goal conflict Chinese, this chapter analyzes the development of state-owned enterprises of mixed ownership of multiple principal-agent relationship and multi objectives, and To construct a mixed ownership dual task principal-agent model that can meet the state-owned enterprises and private enterprises of mixed ownership development to realize the goal of ownership allocation and incentive contract design. The fifth chapter is the development of Chinese state-owned enterprises of mixed ownership and contract negotiation analysis. This chapter first analyzes the development of state-owned enterprises of mixed Chinese initial excitation the ownership of the incomplete contract and the mixed ownership of the asset specificity of quasi occupation, extortion and other problems. Secondly, due to the incompleteness of mixed ownership incentive contract for the realization of the initial, mixing and fulfill all the contract optimization, the development of China mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises need to mix governance structure and surplus the allocation of ownership rights based on contract re negotiation, this chapter through the construction of mixed ownership specific assets investment and governance model, mixed Co ownership residual rights allocation model, analysis of mixed ownership contract renegotiation governance structure and mixed ownership allocation of residual rights reasonably. The sixth chapter is the development of Chinese state-owned enterprises of mixed ownership contract analysis. This chapter first analyzes the system for the single path dependence and the resulting the development of state-owned enterprises of mixed ownership China efficiency loss performance system contract. Due to the one-time game under the condition of mixed ownership contract efficiency loss is difficult to avoid the repeated game based on mixed ownership contract governance is particularly necessary. This chapter then discusses the formation mechanism of the mixed ownership relation contract, mixed ownership conditions the relationship between contractual governance and relational contract governance structure choice, finally discusses the reputation incentive mechanism and guarantee mechanism based on trust The mixed ownership contract to perform automatic fulfillment mechanism. The seventh chapter is the improvement and development of mixed ownership contract policy suggestions for the development of state-owned enterprises. China mixed ownership contract problems exist, through the development of China state-owned enterprises of mixed ownership contracts, contract negotiation and contract performance analysis and the theory of this chapter mainly from the contractual relationship between the development of mixed ownership mixed environment, mixed ownership contract concluded the allocation of market resources, fulfill the contract relationship between the mixed ownership governance system, mixed ownership system arrangement of contractual relationship and the development of the five aspects of mixed ownership contract development of relations between the government supervision system to improve and promote the mixed ownership contract the relationship between the development of policy recommendations. The eighth chapter is the conclusion and Prospect of the research. This chapter mainly summarizes the research conclusion, and further study China's state-owned enterprises to develop a mixed ownership of the contract issues to do a research prospect.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F276.1;F271

【相似文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 陳國(guó)富;混合所有制研究的開創(chuàng)性成果──《過渡經(jīng)濟(jì)中的混合所有制》評(píng)介[J];南開經(jīng)濟(jì)研究;2000年02期

2 賈根良;混合所有制研究:現(xiàn)實(shí)主義方法論的新探索——評(píng)《過渡經(jīng)濟(jì)中的混合所有制》[J];天津社會(huì)科學(xué);2000年06期

3 曉亮;論混合所有制[J];新長(zhǎng)征;2000年05期

4 王金存;西方混合所有制企業(yè)比較[J];世界經(jīng)濟(jì);2002年08期

5 張旭;關(guān)于混合所有制的兩個(gè)問題[J];理論學(xué)刊;2004年02期

6 曉亮;論大力發(fā)展混合所有制[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家;2004年02期

7 王永年;廣義混合所有制概念辨析[J];江淮論壇;2004年06期

8 楊寧;混合所有制的性質(zhì)及其作用[J];和田師范�？茖W(xué)校學(xué)報(bào);2005年02期

9 郭克力;混合所有制的雙重構(gòu)架[J];企業(yè)改革與管理;2005年08期

10 孫加祺;論混合所有制的雙重構(gòu)架及相互關(guān)系[J];經(jīng)濟(jì)界;2005年05期

相關(guān)會(huì)議論文 前3條

1 王海杰;;論混合所有制的混合條件、途徑及混合邊界界定[A];中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展進(jìn)程中的熱點(diǎn)問題探討[C];2003年

2 陳伯庚;張永岳;;公有制實(shí)現(xiàn)形式的重大創(chuàng)新——論混合所有制[A];上海市社聯(lián)紀(jì)念鄧小平誕辰100周年座談會(huì)會(huì)議資料匯編[C];2004年

3 陳伯庚;張永岳;;公有制實(shí)現(xiàn)形式的重大創(chuàng)新——論混合所有制[A];上海市經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)會(huì)學(xué)術(shù)年刊（2004）[C];2004年

相關(guān)重要報(bào)紙文章 前10條

1 本報(bào)記者 王棟琳;發(fā)展混合所有制 趟過改革“深水區(qū)”[N];中國(guó)證券報(bào);2013年

2 本報(bào)記者 高江虹;混合所有制撬起改革大空間[N];21世紀(jì)經(jīng)濟(jì)報(bào)道;2013年

3 本報(bào)記者 周勇剛;切莫延誤混合所有制改革[N];中華工商時(shí)報(bào);2014年

4 齊魯證券 劉昭亮 李超;煤企混合所有制改革開啟 引入民資釋放行業(yè)活力[N];通信信息報(bào);2014年

5 張平;混合所有制改革要邁“三道坎”[N];經(jīng)濟(jì)參考報(bào);2014年

6 周子勛;上海國(guó)企推進(jìn)混合所有制怎么“混”[N];中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)時(shí)報(bào);2014年

7 呂勇明 市政協(xié)委員 東方國(guó)際集團(tuán)有限公司董事長(zhǎng);混合所有制：不僅僅是資本混合的改革[N];聯(lián)合時(shí)報(bào);2014年

8 全國(guó)政協(xié)常委、正泰集團(tuán)董事長(zhǎng) 南存輝;發(fā)展混合所有制不能“一窩蜂”、“一刀切”[N];人民政協(xié)報(bào);2014年

9 韓學(xué)功 石油干部管理學(xué)院教授;混合所有制要為社會(huì)主義市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)服務(wù)[N];中國(guó)能源報(bào);2014年

10 沈治永 神華集團(tuán);煤炭行業(yè)混合所有制的喜與憂[N];中國(guó)能源報(bào);2014年

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前5條

1 林凱程;混合所有制醫(yī)療機(jī)構(gòu)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的研究[D];南方醫(yī)科大學(xué);2016年

2 張鳳帆;我國(guó)混合所有制醫(yī)院發(fā)展模式研究[D];華中科技大學(xué);2016年

3 劉仲儀;中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)發(fā)展混合所有制的契約問題研究[D];吉林大學(xué);2017年

4 曹立;混合所有制研究[D];中共中央黨校;2002年

5 謝軍;中國(guó)混合所有制企業(yè)國(guó)有產(chǎn)權(quán)管理研究[D];武漢理工大學(xué);2013年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前10條

1 于君;國(guó)有集團(tuán)混合所有制改革問題研究[D];昆明理工大學(xué);2015年

2 楊艷平;東方核能服務(wù)集團(tuán)混合所有制改革研究[D];蘭州大學(xué);2015年

3 陳嫵青;基于財(cái)務(wù)視角混合所有制企業(yè)治理研究[D];安徽財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2015年

4 任瑋;股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)國(guó)有企業(yè)混合所有制改革的促進(jìn)作用研究[D];對(duì)外經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué);2015年

5 周紅明;XX市旅游集團(tuán)混合所有制模式下的并購(gòu)研究[D];重慶理工大學(xué);2015年

6 李娜;企業(yè)混合所有制模式選擇與績(jī)效研究[D];首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué);2015年

7 游少權(quán);利用優(yōu)先股進(jìn)行國(guó)有企業(yè)混合所有制改革的分析[D];華東師范大學(xué);2015年

8 邵鷗;借助資本市場(chǎng)深化混合所有制改革的探索[D];上海交通大學(xué);2014年

9 葉宗華;混合所有制公司的特別股法律問題研究[D];華東政法大學(xué);2015年

10 徐世安;北京通達(dá)實(shí)業(yè)公司實(shí)行企業(yè)混合所有制改革設(shè)計(jì)[D];東北農(nóng)業(yè)大學(xué);2015年

，

本文編號(hào)：1658742