本文選題：網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性　切入點：鏈與鏈競爭　出處：《電子科技大學(xué)》2016年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：經(jīng)濟的全球化和市場競爭的加劇,使競爭的形式在悄然發(fā)生變化,由企業(yè)相互之間的競爭逐漸演變?yōu)楣⿷?yīng)鏈鏈際間的競爭。同時信息技術(shù)和網(wǎng)絡(luò)的快速發(fā)展,促進了具有網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性特征的網(wǎng)絡(luò)經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展。而網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性特征并不是僅限于網(wǎng)絡(luò)經(jīng)濟中,傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟中也存在網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性特征。在網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性的環(huán)境下,競爭供應(yīng)鏈在縱向運作機制上不僅會受競爭因素的影響,勢必會受到網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性因素的影響。本文應(yīng)用博弈論和網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性的理論與方法,研究最終產(chǎn)品具有網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性特征時,競爭供應(yīng)鏈縱向結(jié)構(gòu)選擇的博弈均衡,以及基于供應(yīng)鏈上下游企業(yè)同時改善收益或利潤的角度,研究競爭供應(yīng)鏈縱向合同選擇問題,并分析網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性強度、競爭強度等因素對結(jié)構(gòu)選擇邊界與合同參數(shù)的影響,為處在網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性環(huán)境下的競爭供應(yīng)鏈上的企業(yè)提供理論參考。首先,研究了最終產(chǎn)品具有網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性特征時的數(shù)量競爭供應(yīng)鏈的縱向結(jié)構(gòu)和合同選擇,揭示了網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性強度和競爭強度對縱向結(jié)構(gòu)和合同選擇演變路徑和均衡狀態(tài)的影響。主要結(jié)論表明:如果網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性對競爭范圍的影響很弱,在縱向結(jié)構(gòu)選擇上一體化結(jié)構(gòu)為占優(yōu)的均衡結(jié)構(gòu),在合同選擇策略上,縱向聯(lián)盟的收益共享合同實現(xiàn)零售商和供應(yīng)商收益的改進,數(shù)量折扣合同也會促進制造商和零售的收益。當網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性對競爭范圍的影響強烈時,競爭供應(yīng)鏈上縱向聯(lián)盟的收益共享合同失效,同時數(shù)量折扣合同也會失效;如果在網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性強度很大,同時網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性對數(shù)量競爭的范圍影響激烈時,在供應(yīng)鏈的縱向結(jié)構(gòu)選擇上,分散化結(jié)構(gòu)為占優(yōu)均衡。其次,當市場存在不確定風(fēng)險時,研究了最終產(chǎn)品具有網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性特征時的數(shù)量競爭供應(yīng)鏈的縱向結(jié)構(gòu)和縱向合同選擇,揭示了網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性強度、數(shù)量競爭強度和市場風(fēng)險因子對競爭供應(yīng)鏈縱向結(jié)構(gòu)和合同選擇演變路徑和均衡狀態(tài)的影響。結(jié)論表明:從節(jié)點企業(yè)的績效角度出發(fā),當產(chǎn)品的競爭強度較弱地依賴于網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性強度系數(shù),同時市場不確定性因素波動較大時,在縱向結(jié)構(gòu)選擇上,一體化結(jié)構(gòu)為競爭供應(yīng)鏈占優(yōu)的均衡結(jié)構(gòu),在競爭供應(yīng)鏈合同選擇策略上,利潤分享合同能實現(xiàn)節(jié)點企業(yè)的利潤改進。從供應(yīng)鏈的角度出發(fā),供應(yīng)鏈的縱向結(jié)構(gòu)選擇與市場風(fēng)險無關(guān)。最后,在供應(yīng)鏈上游企業(yè)進行技術(shù)創(chuàng)新情形下,研究了最終產(chǎn)品具有網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性特征時的數(shù)量競爭供應(yīng)鏈的縱向結(jié)構(gòu)和合同選擇,揭示了網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性強度和競爭強度對縱向結(jié)構(gòu)和合同選擇演變路徑和均衡狀態(tài)的影響。研究表明:當產(chǎn)品的網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性強度較弱、數(shù)量競爭強度也較弱時,在無技術(shù)溢出效應(yīng)時,利潤分享合同能實現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈節(jié)點企業(yè)的利潤改進,在有技術(shù)溢出效應(yīng)時,一體化結(jié)構(gòu)為供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)利潤改進的均衡。
[Abstract]:With the globalization of economy and the aggravation of market competition, the form of competition is changing quietly, from the competition among enterprises to the competition between supply chains, at the same time, the rapid development of information technology and network. It promotes the development of network economy with the characteristics of network externality, and the characteristics of network externality are not limited to the network economy, but also exist in the traditional economy. The vertical operation mechanism of competitive supply chain is not only affected by competition factors, but also by network externalities. This paper applies the theory and method of game theory and network externality. When the final product has the characteristics of network externality, the game equilibrium of the competitive supply chain vertical structure selection is studied, and the vertical contract selection problem of the competitive supply chain is studied based on the point of view that the upstream and downstream enterprises simultaneously improve the income or profit. The influence of network externality intensity and competition intensity on the structure selection boundary and contract parameters is analyzed, which provides a theoretical reference for the enterprises in the competitive supply chain under the network externality environment. This paper studies the vertical structure and contract selection of quantitative competitive supply chain when the final product has the characteristics of network externality. The effects of network externality and competition intensity on vertical structure, evolution path and equilibrium state of contract selection are revealed. The main conclusions are as follows: if the influence of network externality on competition scope is very weak, The integration structure is the dominant equilibrium structure in the vertical structure selection. In the contract selection strategy, the vertical alliance revenue-sharing contract realizes the improvement of retailer and supplier income. When the influence of network externality on the scope of competition is strong, the profit sharing contract of vertical alliance in competitive supply chain will be invalid, and the quantity discount contract will also be invalid. If the intensity of network externality is great and the influence of network externality on the range of quantitative competition is fierce, the decentralized structure is dominant equilibrium in the vertical structure selection of supply chain. Secondly, when there is uncertain risk in the market, This paper studies the vertical structure and vertical contract selection of quantitative competitive supply chain when the final product has the characteristics of network externality, and reveals the intensity of network externality. The influence of quantity competition intensity and market risk factor on the vertical structure of competitive supply chain, the evolution path and equilibrium state of contract selection. When the competitive intensity of the product depends on the network externality intensity coefficient and the market uncertainty fluctuates greatly, the integrated structure is the dominant equilibrium structure of the competitive supply chain in the vertical structure selection. In the competitive supply chain contract selection strategy, profit sharing contract can achieve the profit improvement of node enterprises. From the point of view of supply chain, the vertical structure selection of supply chain has nothing to do with market risk. Finally, In the case of technological innovation in upstream enterprises of supply chain, the vertical structure and contract selection of quantitative competitive supply chain with the characteristics of network externality are studied. The effects of network externality and competition intensity on vertical structure, evolution path and equilibrium state of contract selection are revealed. The results show that when the product network externality intensity is weak, the quantity competition intensity is also weak. When there is no technology spillover effect, the profit sharing contract can realize the profit improvement of the enterprise in the supply chain node. In the case of the technology spillover effect, the integrated structure is the equilibrium of the profit improvement in the supply chain system.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：電子科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F274

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