本文關(guān)鍵詞：基于過程專業(yè)性的業(yè)主被套牢問題研究　出處：《西南交通大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 建設(shè)項目 過程專用性 套牢

【摘要】：改革開放以來,各類型建設(shè)項目拔地而起,建筑行業(yè)呈蓬勃發(fā)展之勢,目前其已成為國民經(jīng)濟不可或缺的部分。業(yè)主與承包商作為建筑活動的核心利益相關(guān)者,在以利益最大化為前提的建筑市場,多處于利益對立的博弈狀態(tài)。雖然業(yè)主希望通過締結(jié)各種合同達到平衡,但天然的信息不對稱使得承包商可以更好地利用自身優(yōu)勢和不完全合同采取機會主義行為侵占業(yè)主準租,獲取額外收益,套牢問題由此產(chǎn)生。本文從過程專用性入手,研究建設(shè)項目業(yè)主與承包商間的套牢問題。由于已有的文獻對建設(shè)項目資產(chǎn)專用性的研究仍有不足,Chang于2006年提出過程專用性,對已有的資產(chǎn)專用性進行延伸和拓展。過程專用性屬于特殊類型的資產(chǎn)專用性,專門用于描述建設(shè)項目業(yè)主與承包商間的相互依賴關(guān)系,反映其資產(chǎn)專用性的特性；本文運用此觀點從新的角度去探討建設(shè)項目中套牢問題發(fā)生的根本原因。人類的有限理性、信息不對稱以及經(jīng)濟、社會環(huán)境不確定性強等原因?qū)е潞贤煌耆?并且業(yè)主為建設(shè)項目投資的資產(chǎn)專用性強,產(chǎn)生的可占用準租多,另外合同簽訂后,業(yè)主與承包商談判地位發(fā)生轉(zhuǎn)變,承包商更具優(yōu)勢。承包商為追求利益最大化,具有很強的投機動力,其實施機會主義行為侵占業(yè)主準租獲得額外收益的客觀條件和主觀傾向同時具備,因此建設(shè)項目中套牢現(xiàn)象屢見不鮮。針對建設(shè)項目中業(yè)主被承包商套牢問題,本文首先分析了建設(shè)項目特點及其特點下業(yè)主可能面臨的套牢風(fēng)險,以及建設(shè)項目特殊的資產(chǎn)專用性即過程專用性,并從套牢問題產(chǎn)生的四要素解釋了業(yè)主與承包商之間套牢關(guān)系產(chǎn)生的原因。然后建立套牢模型分析,運用博弈論求得建設(shè)項目業(yè)主與承包商策略均衡解,此外討論了業(yè)主與承包商的策略選擇對各自期望收益產(chǎn)生的影響,得出結(jié)論：業(yè)主的期望收益與承包商選擇套牢行為的概率負相關(guān)、與自身維持原合同的概率正相關(guān)；承包商的期望收益與業(yè)主維持原合同的概率正相關(guān),且與自身被更換時的沉沒成本、剩余工程收益及套牢收益相關(guān),當承包商套牢業(yè)主的收益大于剩余工程的收益及沉沒成本兩者之和與被業(yè)主更換概率的乘積時,其期望收益與采取機會主義行為的概率呈正相關(guān),反之則為負相關(guān)；并且建設(shè)項目中業(yè)主與承包商的博弈存在子博弈完美納什均衡,即(套牢,維持原合同)。最后,本文針對業(yè)主被承包商套牢的問題提出了相應(yīng)的治理措施,經(jīng)典的長期合同機制、聲譽機制,建設(shè)項目特色的擔(dān)保機制引入以及外部宏觀環(huán)境改善機制等,以期緩解此類套牢現(xiàn)象,最終實現(xiàn)業(yè)主和承包商的雙贏。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, various types of construction projects have emerged, and the construction industry is booming. At present, it has become an indispensable part of the national economy. Owners and contractors as the core stakeholders of construction activities. In the construction market with the premise of maximization of interests, most of them are in the state of competing interests, although the owners hope to achieve balance through the conclusion of various contracts. But the natural information asymmetry enables the contractor to make better use of its own advantages and incomplete contract to take advantage of opportunism behavior encroach on the owner's quasi-rent to obtain additional income. This paper starts with the process specificity, studies the construction project between the owner and the contractor, because of the existing literature on the construction project asset specificity research is still insufficient. In 2006, Chang proposed process specificity, which extends and extends the existing asset specificity. Process specificity belongs to a special type of asset specificity. It is specially used to describe the interdependence between the owner and the contractor of the construction project and to reflect the characteristics of the specificity of its assets; This paper uses this viewpoint to probe into the root causes of the problem of hold-up in construction projects. The reasons of limited rationality of human beings, asymmetric information and strong uncertainty of economy and social environment lead to incomplete contracts. And the owner investment for the construction project has strong specificity of assets, resulting in a large number of potential occupancy, in addition, after the signing of the contract, the negotiation position between the owner and the contractor has changed. The contractor has more advantages. In order to pursue the maximization of interests, the contractor has a strong speculative motivation, and the objective conditions and subjective tendencies of taking advantage of the opportunistic behavior of encroaching on the owner's quasi-rent to obtain additional income are simultaneously possessed. In view of the problem of the owner being locked up by the contractor in the construction project, this paper first analyzes the characteristics of the construction project and the risk that the owner may face under the characteristics of the construction project. And the special asset specificity of the construction project, that is, process specificity, and explain the reasons of the relationship between the owner and the contractor from the four elements of the hold-up problem. The game theory is used to obtain the strategic equilibrium solution between the owner and the contractor of the construction project. In addition, the influence of the choice of the strategy between the owner and the contractor on the expected income is discussed. It is concluded that the expected income of the employer is negatively correlated with the probability of the contractor's choice of the entrapment behavior, and is positively correlated with the probability of maintaining the original contract. The expected profit of the contractor is positively related to the probability of the owner maintaining the original contract, and is related to the sunk cost, the residual project income and the lock income when the contractor is replaced. When the contractor holds the owner's income greater than the sum of the remaining works' income and sunk cost and the product of the replacement probability by the owner, the expected income is positively correlated with the probability of adopting opportunistic behavior. Vice versa; And in the construction project, the game between the owner and the contractor has the perfect Nash equilibrium of sub-game, that is (hold up, maintain the original contract). Finally, this paper puts forward the corresponding measures to deal with the problem of the owner being locked up by the contractor. The classic long-term contract mechanism, reputation mechanism, construction project characteristic guarantee mechanism and external macro environment improvement mechanism are introduced in order to alleviate this kind of entrapment phenomenon and finally realize the win-win situation between the owner and the contractor.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F426.92

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