本文關(guān)鍵詞：終極控制權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)上市公司投資行為的影響研究　出處：《華東師范大學(xué)》2017年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 投資規(guī)模 投資質(zhì)量 終極控制權(quán) 現(xiàn)金流權(quán) 兩權(quán)分離

【摘要】：在上市公司的生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)中,投資決策行為是決定它的價(jià)值和發(fā)展前景的重要因素之一,投資質(zhì)量的好壞直接影響到上市公司的成長(zhǎng)發(fā)展前景以及未來(lái)現(xiàn)金流的增長(zhǎng)。因?yàn)橥顿Y可以將公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)與價(jià)值有效的結(jié)合起來(lái),所以通過(guò)對(duì)上市公司的投資行為和效果的悉知,可以在理論和實(shí)務(wù)方面指導(dǎo)預(yù)測(cè)上市公司的業(yè)績(jī)價(jià)值或?qū)σ压嫉膬r(jià)值進(jìn)行分析。在中國(guó),因?yàn)榉N種歷史因素的存在,資本市場(chǎng)發(fā)展還不夠完全。在我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)不斷發(fā)展的前提下,我國(guó)的上市公司都普遍存在非理性投資,所以研究上市公司的投資規(guī)模和投資質(zhì)量的影響因素具有重要的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。本文目標(biāo)是探究終極產(chǎn)權(quán)對(duì)投資行為的影響,我們將投資行為分為投資規(guī)模和投資質(zhì)量?jī)蓚�(gè)維度分別討論。將投資規(guī)模的影響因素加入到Vogt模型和擴(kuò)展模型中作為控制變量,探究終極控制權(quán)、現(xiàn)金流權(quán)和終極控制權(quán)與現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的分離程度這三個(gè)變量對(duì)投資規(guī)模的影響;同時(shí)將投資質(zhì)量的影響因素加入到多元回歸模型中作為控制變量,因?yàn)樗麄冎g存在較高的相關(guān)性,我們引入了嶺回歸的方法估計(jì)分析終極產(chǎn)權(quán)變量對(duì)投資質(zhì)量的影響。本文在理論模型和假設(shè)準(zhǔn)備基礎(chǔ)上,采取篩選后的我國(guó)2012年～2014年A股上市公司3042個(gè)數(shù)據(jù)做實(shí)證研究,研究得到的主要結(jié)論有:(1)我國(guó)上市公司具有較強(qiáng)的投資現(xiàn)金流敏感性,投資與現(xiàn)金流之間存在顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系。(2)終極控股股東控制權(quán)與企業(yè)投資規(guī)模呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系,終極控股股東的現(xiàn)金流權(quán)與控制權(quán)的分離程度與企業(yè)投資規(guī)模之間也是顯著正相關(guān),而現(xiàn)金流權(quán)與上市公司的投資規(guī)模呈顯著的負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。(3)終極控股股東控制權(quán)與企業(yè)投資質(zhì)量呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,終極控股股東的現(xiàn)金流權(quán)與控制權(quán)的分離程度與企業(yè)投資質(zhì)量也是顯著負(fù)相關(guān),而現(xiàn)金流權(quán)與上市公司的投資質(zhì)量呈顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系。據(jù)此,本文從宏觀和微觀角度提出了相關(guān)建議:宏觀而言,1)完善法制建設(shè),強(qiáng)化法律保護(hù)關(guān)注意識(shí),完善投資者利益的法律保護(hù),從法律方面對(duì)控股股東侵占中小股東利益行為明令禁止,從法規(guī)制度上監(jiān)督并懲罰利益侵占行為。2)大力發(fā)展資本市場(chǎng),提高金融保障機(jī)制,適當(dāng)放低企業(yè)上市的門(mén)檻,在市場(chǎng)準(zhǔn)入降低之后更多的企業(yè)才能通過(guò)上市獲取更多資金,大力發(fā)展公司業(yè)務(wù)與此同時(shí)我國(guó)應(yīng)該加快銀行體制改革,減少政府對(duì)銀行業(yè)務(wù)的干預(yù),放寬借款利率波動(dòng)的幅度。微觀來(lái)說(shuō),1)上市公司應(yīng)增加投資規(guī)模和提高投資質(zhì)量,可以適當(dāng)增加其融資負(fù)債水平和提高自身技術(shù)的先進(jìn)性來(lái)適當(dāng)增加投資規(guī)模,可以通過(guò)改善投資經(jīng)營(yíng)管理制提高投資質(zhì)量,從而使投資高效地進(jìn)行。2)規(guī)范董事會(huì)建設(shè),首先,改善董事長(zhǎng)和總經(jīng)理兩職位設(shè)置情況,實(shí)現(xiàn)真正意義上的兩職分離;其次,建立以董事會(huì)為代表的充分務(wù)實(shí)的高管層約束體系;最后,要完善經(jīng)理人任用機(jī)制。
[Abstract]:In the production and operation activities of listed companies, investment decision making is one of the important factors that determine its value and development prospects. The quality of investment directly affects the growth and development prospects of listed companies and the growth of future cash flows. Because investment can effectively integrate corporate governance structure and value. Therefore, knowing the investment behavior and effect of listed companies can guide the prediction of the performance value of Listed Companies in theory and practice and analyze the published value. In China, because of the existence of various historical factors, the development of the capital market is not enough. Under the premise of the continuous development of China's capital market, there are irrational investments in China's listed companies. Therefore, it is of great practical significance to study the factors affecting the scale of investment and the quality of investment of listed companies. The aim of this paper is to explore the effect of ultimate property right on investment behavior. We divide the investment behavior into two dimensions, the scale of investment and the quality of investment respectively. The factors that influence the scale of investment is added to the Vogt model and the extended model as control variables, explore the impact of ultimate control rights, cash flow rights and control rights of the ultimate flow separation degree of right and cash these three variables on the scale of investment; influence factors and the quality of investment into the multiple regression model as control variables because, there is a high correlation between them, we introduce the method of ridge regression analysis of the influence of ultimate ownership variables on the quality of investment estimation. Based on the theoretical model and assumptions are based on, take after screening in China in 2012 to do empirical research on 2014 A shares of listed companies 3042 data, the main conclusions are: (1) Chinese listed companies with strong investment cash flow sensitivity, there is a significantly positive relationship between investment and cash flow. (2) the ultimate controlling shareholders and corporate investment are positively related, the separation between the degree and the enterprise ultimate controlling shareholder's cash flow rights and control rights is positively related to the scale of investment, investment scale is the cash flow rights of listed companies with a significant negative correlation. (3) there is a negative correlation between the ultimate controlling shareholder's control right and the quality of corporate investment. The separation of cash flow right and control right of ultimate controlling shareholder is also negatively correlated with the quality of corporate investment, while cash flow right has a significant positive correlation with the quality of investment of listed companies. Accordingly, this paper puts forward some relevant suggestions from macro and micro perspectives: macro, 1) improve the legal system, strengthening the legal protection awareness, improve legal protection of the interests of the investors, banned the Controlling Shareholders Expropriation of small shareholders behavior from the legal aspects, from the laws and regulations on the supervision and punishment of expropriation. 2) to develop the capital market, improve the financial guarantee mechanism, proper low threshold of listed companies, listed more money after the market access reduced by more and more enterprises to develop the company's business at the same time, China should speed up the reform of banking system, reduce government intervention in the banking business, the relaxation of loan interest rate volatility. The micro, 1) listed companies should increase investment and improve the quality of investment, may be appropriate to increase its debt financing level and appropriate to increase the scale of investment to improve its advanced technology, can improve the investment management system to improve the quality of investment, thus making investment efficiently. 2) standardize the construction of the board of directors. First, improve the position of the two positions of the chairman and the general manager, and achieve the separation of two duties in a real sense. Secondly, establish a fully practical and practical top management system that is represented by the board of directors, and finally, improve the manager appointment mechanism.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

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