【摘要】：在當代英美政治哲學(xué)的論辯語境下,證成(Justification)問題正日益引發(fā)著人們的關(guān)注。從可證成性的角度來看,不論是某種規(guī)范性原則的正當性、政治制度的合法性,還是日常行為的可接受性,如果人們希望對其進行反思、質(zhì)疑或者辯護的話,都必須構(gòu)造出某種方法或標準,以此來對這些原則、制度和行為的對錯標準給出相應(yīng)理由。羅爾斯的政治哲學(xué)不但為當代英美世界提供了一套影響深遠的正義原則,同時,其學(xué)說也是對政治哲學(xué)的證成方法進行自覺反思和批判的典范。通過對基礎(chǔ)主義和融貫論等傳統(tǒng)證成模式的質(zhì)疑和批判,羅爾斯最終明確形成了一套被稱為建構(gòu)主義的證成方法。這套方法意在對實踐推理的前提和過程進行自覺反思,即首先要找到一種能夠真實地反映出我們最為本真的生活世界的推理前提,并在此基礎(chǔ)上擬定出一套行之有效的、嚴格演繹的實踐推理之“程序”,以此將我們設(shè)定的所有推理前提“暫定化”,在這樣一種前提和程序的雙重規(guī)導(dǎo)和限定之下對原則、制度和行為的正當性、客觀性進行批評或辯護。在羅爾斯那里,這套推理框架十分復(fù)雜且不乏模糊性,羅爾斯本人的目的訴求和這套推理框架之間也不乏緊張關(guān)系。這種緊張關(guān)系使這套推理框架隨著羅爾斯的思考歷程而經(jīng)歷了多次微妙的調(diào)整和嬗變。借助這些調(diào)整和嬗變,羅爾斯試圖將“建構(gòu)”的地基、實踐推理的起點牢牢地扎根在人們最為真實的生活世界中,并在這一真實的生活世界中為自由主義的政治價值辯護。不過,在經(jīng)驗主義的論辯語境下,羅爾斯的理論意圖與徹底建構(gòu)主義自身的特征相矛盾。徹底的建構(gòu)主義必然導(dǎo)向一種動態(tài)的證成模式,該模式中的一切推理要素,不論是推理的起點還是結(jié)論,都將在這種動態(tài)化的推理進程中變得不確定。相反,羅爾斯的“兩個正義原則”卻是一種極具確定性的自由主義價值理念,并在不同的推理語境中始終保持其確定性。就此而言,羅爾斯在經(jīng)驗主義立場下構(gòu)造的建構(gòu)主義實踐推理盡管具有“去基礎(chǔ)主義”和“暫定化”的目的訴求,但這一訴求在客觀上無法貫徹得徹底,因而會潛在地引入基礎(chǔ)主義的奧援。羅爾斯的后學(xué)——奧諾拉·奧尼爾(Onora O'Neill)力圖同樣以經(jīng)驗主義的立場來解決羅爾斯學(xué)說所蘊含的這些張力和困境,以期修筑出一幅更加徹底的建構(gòu)主義圖景。不過,奧尼爾這種看似更加徹底的建構(gòu)主義仍然難以在“去基礎(chǔ)主義”這一意義上通達得徹底。最后,本文將跳出羅爾斯或奧尼爾的具體論述語境,并對建構(gòu)主義學(xué)說本身進行一般性的分析,該分析意在表明,建構(gòu)主義學(xué)說必然與基礎(chǔ)主義學(xué)說交織在一起展開理論的建構(gòu)。
[Abstract]:In the context of contemporary British and American political philosophy, the issue of (Justification) is attracting more and more attention. Whether it's the legitimacy of a normative principle, the legitimacy of a political system, or the acceptability of everyday behavior, if people want to reflect on it, question it or justify it, from the point of view of probability. Must construct some method or standard to give the corresponding reason to these principles, the system and the behavior right and wrong standard. Rawls' political philosophy not only provides a set of far-reaching principles of justice for the contemporary Anglo-American world, but also serves as a model for consciously reflecting and criticizing the method of political philosophy. By questioning and criticizing traditional evidential models such as foundationalism and integration theory Rawls finally formed a set of evidential methods called constructivism. This set of methods is intended to reflect on the premise and process of practical reasoning, that is, to first find a reasoning premise that truly reflects our most authentic world of life, and draw up a set of effective ones on this basis. The "procedure" of strictly deductive practical reasoning, whereby all the reasoning premises we set are "tentatively", the legitimacy of principles, institutions, and actions under the dual guidance and limitation of such a premise and procedure, To criticize or justify objectivity. In Rawls' case, the reasoning framework is complex and fuzzy, and there is no shortage of tension between Rawls' purpose and the reasoning framework. This kind of tension makes this reasoning frame undergo many subtle adjustments and changes with Rawls' thinking process. With these adjustments and transmutation, Rawls tries to establish the foundation of "construction" and the starting point of practical reasoning firmly rooted in the most real life world of people, and defend the political value of liberalism in this real life world. However, in the context of empiricism, Rawls' theoretical intention contradicts the characteristics of thorough constructivism itself. Thorough constructivism is bound to lead to a dynamic model of proof, in which all reasoning elements, whether the starting point or the conclusion, will become uncertain in this dynamic reasoning process. On the contrary, Rawls'"two principles of Justice" is a kind of very deterministic liberalism value concept, and always maintains its certainty in different reasoning contexts. In this regard, although the practical reasoning of constructivism constructed by Rawls under the position of empiricism has the purpose of "de-basicism" and "tentative", it cannot be carried out objectively and thoroughly. This would potentially lead to the introduction of foundational support. Honorat O'Neill (Onora O'Neill), Rawls' postschool, tries to solve the tension and predicament contained in Rawls' theory from the standpoint of empiricism, in order to build a more complete picture of constructivism. However, O'Neill 's seemingly more thorough constructivism is still difficult to be thorough in the sense of "de-fundamentalism". Finally, this paper will jump out of the specific discourse context of Rawls or O'Neill, and make a general analysis of constructivism itself, which is intended to show that, Constructivism is bound to interweave with foundationalism to construct the theory.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：D0

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