認知蘊含:一個非真值函項聯結詞
發(fā)布時間:2019-01-14 11:47
【摘要】:真值函項的蘊含面臨著所謂的"蘊含悖論",它也是"烏鴉悖論"、"經驗意義標準"難題、葛第爾問題等一系列認識論難題的邏輯根源。認知蘊含定義了一種非真值函項的蘊含關系。如果"如果p那么q"是一種認知蘊含,那么這個蘊含式是真的,當且僅當在p為真的條件下,q的概率是1。因此,認知蘊含表達一種特殊的條件概念。相應地,部分認知蘊含可以基于概率論建立起來。引入認知蘊含,可以消解上述認識論難題,普通認知條件句和虛擬條件句(反事實條件句)也能以同樣的方式來處理,而不必求助于"可能世界"。
[Abstract]:The implication of truth function is faced with the so-called "paradox of implication", which is also the logical root of a series of epistemological problems, such as the "Raven Paradox", the "Standard of empirical meaning" and the Gerdil problem. Cognitive implication defines the implication of nontruth-valued functions. If "if p then Q" is a cognitive implication, then the implication is true, if and only if p is true, the probability of Q is 1. Therefore, cognitive implication expresses a special conditional concept. Accordingly, part of the cognitive implication can be established on the basis of probability theory. With the introduction of cognitive implication, the above epistemological problems can be solved, and the common cognitive conditional sentence and the virtual conditional sentence (counter-factual conditional sentence) can be dealt with in the same way, without resorting to the "possible world".
【作者單位】: 武漢大學哲學學院;
【基金】:國家社會科學基金項目“自然主義哲學與唯物主義的當代形態(tài)研究”(14AZX011)
【分類號】:B842.1
,
本文編號:2408663
[Abstract]:The implication of truth function is faced with the so-called "paradox of implication", which is also the logical root of a series of epistemological problems, such as the "Raven Paradox", the "Standard of empirical meaning" and the Gerdil problem. Cognitive implication defines the implication of nontruth-valued functions. If "if p then Q" is a cognitive implication, then the implication is true, if and only if p is true, the probability of Q is 1. Therefore, cognitive implication expresses a special conditional concept. Accordingly, part of the cognitive implication can be established on the basis of probability theory. With the introduction of cognitive implication, the above epistemological problems can be solved, and the common cognitive conditional sentence and the virtual conditional sentence (counter-factual conditional sentence) can be dealt with in the same way, without resorting to the "possible world".
【作者單位】: 武漢大學哲學學院;
【基金】:國家社會科學基金項目“自然主義哲學與唯物主義的當代形態(tài)研究”(14AZX011)
【分類號】:B842.1
,
本文編號:2408663
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