本文選題：任人唯親 + 任人唯賢�。� 參考：《經(jīng)濟(jì)理論與經(jīng)濟(jì)管理》2017年04期

【摘要】：在中國傳統(tǒng)文化和市場經(jīng)濟(jì)的雙重環(huán)境下,企業(yè)在治理結(jié)構(gòu)上是"任人唯親"還是"任人唯賢"一直是一個(gè)存在爭議的問題。從公司治理實(shí)踐上看,兩種治理模式各有優(yōu)劣。那么,企業(yè)在什么情況下更可能"任人唯親"呢?本文基于最優(yōu)授權(quán)理論提出了一個(gè)理論框架,然后使用一個(gè)獨(dú)特的創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù),采取計(jì)量經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)方法進(jìn)行了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。本文的主要發(fā)現(xiàn)是:有創(chuàng)業(yè)經(jīng)歷的或文化水平低的企業(yè)主更愿意任用親戚擔(dān)任企業(yè)高管,而男性、有管理學(xué)背景或有銀行貸款的企業(yè)主更不愿意任用親戚擔(dān)任企業(yè)高管。本文的研究結(jié)論對于當(dāng)前"大眾創(chuàng)業(yè)、萬眾創(chuàng)新"政策具有重要的理論意義。
[Abstract]:Under the dual environment of Chinese traditional culture and market economy, it is always a controversial question whether the corporate governance structure is "cronyism" or "meritocracy". From the corporate governance practice, the two governance models have their own advantages and disadvantages. So under what circumstances are companies more likely to be "cronies"? This paper proposes a theoretical framework based on the optimal authorization theory, and then uses a unique entrepreneurial survey data to make an empirical test using econometric methods. The main findings of this paper are as follows: entrepreneurs with entrepreneurial experience or low education are more willing to appoint relatives as executives, while men with background in management or with bank loans are more reluctant to appoint relatives as executives. The conclusion of this paper is of great theoretical significance to the current policy of "Mass Entrepreneurship, Mass Innovation".
【作者單位】： 中國人民大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院;首都經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院;
【基金】：北京市自然科學(xué)基金青年項(xiàng)目(9154025) 中國人民大學(xué)新教師啟動(dòng)金項(xiàng)目(2016030032) 北京市優(yōu)秀人才項(xiàng)目的資助
【分類號】：G124

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