關懷倫理對自由主義的挑戰(zhàn)
發(fā)布時間:2018-11-25 21:03
【摘要】:在道德領域,如果關懷倫理想要成為一種可以取代傳統(tǒng)主義、理性主義方法的系統(tǒng)方案,它必須令人信服地討論政治問題。然而我們向來討論政治權利的典型方式并不是關懷倫理式的,關懷倫理相對于康德式、羅爾斯式理性主義的政治自由主義似乎處于弱勢地位。不僅是理性主義哲學家,甚至普通的美國人也認為我們有關于公民自由的基本權利:例如,言論自由和宗教信仰自由。但任何一種發(fā)自其原初傾向的關懷倫理都會說這種對于直覺意義上的基本的和獨立的權利的強調(diào)是錯誤的,我們應該通過源自于人類情感關聯(lián)和關心觀念的術語來思考政治權利,而這事實上并不是當今大多數(shù)美國人的思考方式。自由主義的權利概念在言論自由等重要問題上犯了錯誤,如果我們把權利建立于對共感的考量和對別人福利的關心就會得到規(guī)范意義上正確的結論,因此,關懷倫理能糾正我們在人權或政治權利的基礎問題上的錯誤觀念。
[Abstract]:In the field of morality, if caring ethics is to become a systematic solution which can replace the traditional and rationalistic methods, it must discuss the political problem convincingly. However, the typical way of discussing political rights is not caring for ethics. Compared with Kant, the political liberalism of Rawls rationalism seems to be in a weak position. Not only rationalist philosophers but also ordinary Americans believe that we have fundamental rights to civil liberties: for example, freedom of expression and freedom of religious belief. But any kind of caring ethic that comes from its original inclination would say that this emphasis on basic and independent rights in the intuitive sense is wrong, We should think about political rights in terms derived from human affective associations and caring concepts, which are not the way most Americans think today. The liberal concept of rights makes mistakes on important issues such as freedom of speech. If we base our rights on the consideration of empathy and concern for the welfare of others, we can get a normative and correct conclusion. Caring ethics corrects our misconceptions about the basis of human rights or political rights.
【作者單位】: 美國邁阿密大學哲學系;
【分類號】:B82-06
本文編號:2357361
[Abstract]:In the field of morality, if caring ethics is to become a systematic solution which can replace the traditional and rationalistic methods, it must discuss the political problem convincingly. However, the typical way of discussing political rights is not caring for ethics. Compared with Kant, the political liberalism of Rawls rationalism seems to be in a weak position. Not only rationalist philosophers but also ordinary Americans believe that we have fundamental rights to civil liberties: for example, freedom of expression and freedom of religious belief. But any kind of caring ethic that comes from its original inclination would say that this emphasis on basic and independent rights in the intuitive sense is wrong, We should think about political rights in terms derived from human affective associations and caring concepts, which are not the way most Americans think today. The liberal concept of rights makes mistakes on important issues such as freedom of speech. If we base our rights on the consideration of empathy and concern for the welfare of others, we can get a normative and correct conclusion. Caring ethics corrects our misconceptions about the basis of human rights or political rights.
【作者單位】: 美國邁阿密大學哲學系;
【分類號】:B82-06
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