本文選題：共生演化　切入點(diǎn)：演化博弈　出處：《華北電力大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：為消除可再生能源發(fā)電、上網(wǎng)和市場消納這三大主要障礙,優(yōu)化能源結(jié)構(gòu),促進(jìn)可再生能源的大規(guī)模開發(fā)與利用,政府提出將推出了可再生能源配額制(Renewable Portfolio Standard, RPS)。RPS的有效性與參與主體(發(fā)電廠商)的應(yīng)對策略密不可分。RPS的實(shí)施影響發(fā)電廠商的行為決策,發(fā)電廠商的市場行為也會反過來影響RPS的順利推行。因此,研究發(fā)電廠商的市場行為和可再生能源配額制的交互影響與共生演化具有十分重要的科學(xué)意義與實(shí)踐參考價值�；谏鲜霰尘�,本文研究了發(fā)電廠商的市場行為和可再生能源配額制共生演化的機(jī)理。首先,界定了可再生能源配額制的主要政策參數(shù)內(nèi)涵,并建立了火電和綠電廠商行為決策樹,因此構(gòu)建了不同情境下火電、綠電廠商的收益函數(shù)；其次,建立火電廠商和綠電廠商的演化博弈模型,在不同參數(shù)設(shè)置范圍內(nèi),討論了廠商策略的穩(wěn)定性情況,并使用Simulink對不同的參數(shù)進(jìn)行靈敏性因素分析；最后,基于哈耶克的社會秩序二元觀和第三章的結(jié)論,建立了發(fā)電廠商企業(yè)與可再生能源配額制的共生演化框架。研究結(jié)果表明：①政策參數(shù)的變化會影響廠商的行為選擇。只有合理的配額比例、較高的單位罰金、較低的交易成本和綠電生產(chǎn)成本才有利于廠商選擇交易可交易綠色證書。②政府應(yīng)該設(shè)置科學(xué)的政策參數(shù)以促進(jìn)綠色證書交易。充分考慮發(fā)電廠商的收益成本現(xiàn)狀,保證配額比例的合理性；對于未完成配額任務(wù)的火電廠商予以高額懲罰,其罰金應(yīng)該高于TGC出清價格；及時發(fā)布綠證交易信息、簡化審批程序、規(guī)范市場,以減少交易成本；鼓勵可再生能源發(fā)電技術(shù)進(jìn)步,并出臺配套的激勵政策以降低綠電的生產(chǎn)成本。③發(fā)電廠商必須不斷優(yōu)化自身的策略�？稍偕茉磁漕~制在與發(fā)電廠商群體共生演化的過程中不斷完善,因此發(fā)電廠商也應(yīng)相應(yīng)的調(diào)整自身策略,使“內(nèi)部規(guī)則”與“外部規(guī)則”達(dá)成一致性。
[Abstract]:In order to eliminate the three major obstacles of renewable energy generation, access to the Internet and market acceptance, optimize the energy structure and promote the large-scale development and use of renewable energy, The government has proposed that the renewable Portfolio standard will be introduced. The effectiveness of RPS).RPS is closely related to the coping strategies of the main players (power producers). The implementation of RPS affects the behavior decisions of power producers. In turn, the market behavior of power generation firms will affect the smooth implementation of RPS. It is of great scientific significance and practical reference value to study the market behavior of power producers and the interaction and symbiotic evolution of renewable energy quota system. In this paper, the market behavior and the mechanism of symbiotic evolution of renewable energy quota system are studied. Firstly, the connotation of main policy parameters of renewable energy quota system is defined, and the decision tree of thermal power and green power producer behavior is established. Therefore, the profit function of thermal power and green power manufacturers is constructed under different circumstances. Secondly, the evolutionary game model of thermal power and green power manufacturers is established, and the stability of the manufacturer's strategy is discussed in different parameter settings. Finally, based on Hayek's dualistic view of social order and the conclusion of chapter three, the sensitivity factors of different parameters are analyzed by using Simulink. In this paper, a symbiotic evolution framework between power generation enterprises and renewable energy quota system is established. The results show that the change of the policy parameters of 1 / 1 will affect the behavior choice of the manufacturer. Only a reasonable quota ratio and a higher unit fine can be obtained. The lower transaction cost and green electricity production cost are helpful for manufacturers to choose tradeable green certificate. 2. The government should set up scientific policy parameters to promote green certificate trading. To ensure the rationality of quota proportion; to punish the coal-fired power plants that have not completed the quota task, the fine should be higher than the TGC clearing price; to release the green card transaction information in time, to simplify the examination and approval procedure, to standardize the market, so as to reduce the transaction cost; Encouraging advances in renewable energy generation technologies, And to reduce the production cost of green electricity, 3 power generation companies must constantly optimize their own strategies. The renewable energy quota system is constantly improved in the process of symbiotic evolution with the power generation manufacturers. Therefore, power generation companies should adjust their own strategies accordingly to achieve consistency between "internal rules" and "external rules".
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華北電力大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F426.2

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)會議論文 前1條

1 周小亮;笪賢流;;偏好、制度與行為共生演化視角下金融危機(jī)之分析[A];社會主義經(jīng)濟(jì)理論研究集萃——紀(jì)念新中國建國60周年（2009）[C];2009年

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本文編號：1685652