本文選題：對(duì)賭協(xié)議 + 博弈論��； 參考：《系統(tǒng)管理學(xué)報(bào)》2017年03期

【摘要】：采用博弈論作為研究方法,在兩階段融資重復(fù)對(duì)賭情境下,全面探討融資企業(yè)和投資方之間的決策行為,探討投融資雙方訂立的對(duì)賭目標(biāo)的嚴(yán)格程度和企業(yè)的努力水平對(duì)企業(yè)預(yù)期收益的影響,揭示對(duì)賭協(xié)議存在的潛在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。同時(shí),運(yùn)用Matlab軟件得出:采用重復(fù)對(duì)賭結(jié)構(gòu),企業(yè)達(dá)到業(yè)績目標(biāo)的概率值要小于一次對(duì)賭達(dá)到業(yè)績目標(biāo)的概率值。這對(duì)投融資雙方而言都是有利的,當(dāng)?shù)?階段結(jié)束時(shí),雙方均有權(quán)根據(jù)階段性結(jié)果來選擇是否繼續(xù)博弈或調(diào)整條款繼續(xù)博弈,可以有效克服短期利益的束縛和信息風(fēng)險(xiǎn),避免由于一次性簽約業(yè)績目標(biāo)過高所采取的冒險(xiǎn)行為,對(duì)于雙方的互惠互利具有重要作用。
[Abstract]:By using the game theory as the research method, the decision-making behavior between the financing enterprise and the investor is discussed comprehensively in the context of double gambling in two stages of financing.This paper probes into the influence of the strict degree of the gambling target and the level of the enterprise's effort on the expected income of the enterprise, and reveals the potential risk of the gambling agreement.At the same time, by using Matlab software, it is concluded that the probability value of enterprise to reach the performance goal is smaller than the probability value of one bet to achieve the achievement goal.At the end of the first stage, both sides have the right to choose whether to continue the game or the adjustment clause according to the stage results, which can effectively overcome the constraints of short-term interests and information risks.Avoiding the risk-taking behavior due to the excessive target of one-off signing performance is of great importance to the mutual benefit of both parties.
【作者單位】： 東華大學(xué)旭日工商管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：中央高�；究蒲袠I(yè)務(wù)費(fèi)專項(xiàng)資金資助項(xiàng)目(CUSFDH-D-2015065) 國家留學(xué)基金委資助項(xiàng)目(201506630047)
【分類號(hào)】：F224.32;F272

【相似文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前3條

1 馮雪;;對(duì)賭協(xié)議博弈分析——以蒙牛集團(tuán)的對(duì)賭協(xié)議為例[J];商業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì);2011年09期

2 王少豪;;期權(quán)定價(jià)模型評(píng)估對(duì)賭協(xié)議相關(guān)價(jià)值的探討[J];中國資產(chǎn)評(píng)估;2013年04期

3 李愛民;王海靜;楊凡;;基于對(duì)賭協(xié)議的公司績效估值討價(jià)還價(jià)博弈分析[J];會(huì)計(jì)之友;2013年22期

，

本文編號(hào)：1756305