本文選題：證券市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管　切入點(diǎn)：內(nèi)幕信息操縱　出處：《財(cái)經(jīng)問題研究》2017年09期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：針對(duì)我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)內(nèi)幕信息操縱監(jiān)管的現(xiàn)狀,本文利用博弈論建立內(nèi)幕信息操縱監(jiān)管的靜態(tài)博弈模型和動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型,探討內(nèi)幕信息操縱監(jiān)管的內(nèi)在機(jī)理,分析知情交易者與監(jiān)管部門之間博弈關(guān)系的策略,對(duì)博弈模型的純戰(zhàn)略和混合戰(zhàn)略納什均衡進(jìn)行求解與分析。研究表明,監(jiān)管部門要加大對(duì)內(nèi)幕信息操縱行為的處罰力度,增加內(nèi)幕信息操縱行為的違法成本,才能降低內(nèi)幕信息操縱行為,并有針對(duì)性地提出內(nèi)幕信息操縱監(jiān)管的對(duì)策和建議。
[Abstract]:In view of the present situation of insider information manipulation and supervision in China's securities market, this paper uses game theory to establish the static game model and dynamic game model of insider information manipulation and supervision, and probes into the internal mechanism of insider information manipulation and supervision. This paper analyzes the strategy of game relationship between informed trader and supervision department, solves and analyzes the Nash equilibrium of pure strategy and mixed strategy of game model. The research shows that the supervision department should increase the punishment for insider information manipulation. Only by increasing the illegal cost of insider information manipulation can we reduce the insider information manipulation and put forward some countermeasures and suggestions.
【作者單位】： 西南大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目“我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)內(nèi)幕信息操縱的形成與預(yù)警研究”(13BJY174) 重慶市社會(huì)科學(xué)規(guī)劃項(xiàng)目“中國(guó)股市內(nèi)幕交易的形成機(jī)理與識(shí)別機(jī)制研究”(2012YBJJ028)
【分類號(hào)】：F224.32;F832.51

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