本文關(guān)鍵詞： 混合均勻群組 公共品博弈 懲罰與獎(jiǎng)勵(lì) 行為多樣性 針鋒相對(duì) 非線性 懲罰閾值　出處：《西安電子科技大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：生物之間的競爭無處不在,達(dá)爾文的自然選擇理論表明在競爭中適應(yīng)度大的個(gè)體更有可能存活下來。不存在任何機(jī)制的情況下,合作個(gè)體的適應(yīng)度低于不合作的個(gè)體。從而,為了生存,個(gè)體在競爭中傾向于選擇不合作。然而,生物系統(tǒng)最基本的一個(gè)特征就是合作。對(duì)于很多不同層次的生物組織,從單細(xì)胞生物到動(dòng)物群組,合作的交互行為都是必需的。因此,競爭性的世界中合作行為的廣泛存在就令人疑惑。從而,如何解釋自私個(gè)體間合作行為的涌現(xiàn)以及長期以來合作行為的維持受到了諸多領(lǐng)域科學(xué)家的關(guān)注。演化博弈論為上述問題的研究提供了有利的理論依據(jù)。本文致力于探討基于混合均勻群組的重復(fù)性公共品博弈的合作演化問題,主要成果如下:首先,在混合均勻種群中引入懲罰和獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)機(jī)制后,研究群組中不同策略的演化。在博弈之前每個(gè)個(gè)體需要付出一定代價(jià)來表明自己對(duì)于合作者或背叛者的態(tài)度,懲罰.或者獎(jiǎng)勵(lì),而不考慮之后自己的策略。懲罰和獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)單獨(dú)作用均不能夠促進(jìn)合作的演化,而在懲罰和獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)機(jī)制的共同作用下,合作水平隨選擇強(qiáng)度的增加而提高。研究結(jié)果還表明,在懲罰和獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)共存的博弈中,獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)比懲罰會(huì)有更大的優(yōu)勢。其次,在考慮噪聲的情況下,根據(jù)行為的多樣性提出了一個(gè)基于混合均勻群組的新模型來探究自適應(yīng)策略在重復(fù)性公共品博弈中的演化。我們引入針鋒相對(duì)特性,合作概率代表行為的多樣性,用基于頻率選擇的莫蘭過程來刻畫群組的動(dòng)態(tài)演化過程,這一過程表明了大自然的選擇:越是成功的個(gè)體越容易被復(fù)制。研究表明,在考慮行為多樣性的情況下,即使存在噪聲的影響,針鋒相對(duì)機(jī)制依然能夠促進(jìn)合作的演化。再次,在上述模型的基礎(chǔ)上我們考慮非線性和不同的群組規(guī)模對(duì)合作演化的影響。我們知道不同的非線性類型對(duì)重復(fù)性公共品博弈中合作演化的影響不盡相同。結(jié)果表明,在行為多樣性和針鋒相對(duì)特性存在的情況下,協(xié)同促進(jìn)作用的非線性會(huì)促進(jìn)合作的演化,而折扣效應(yīng)的非線性會(huì)抑制合作的演化。但是,在折扣效應(yīng)的非線性公共品博弈中,存在最適宜合作演化的群組規(guī)模值。最后,構(gòu)建了一個(gè)相對(duì)簡單的理論模型來研究當(dāng)懲罰行為基于某個(gè)特定閾值時(shí),各個(gè)策略在混合均勻群組的公共品博弈中是如何演化的。在每一輪的博弈中,個(gè)體付出不同的代價(jià),而懲罰只是針對(duì)群組中投入低于某一特定值的個(gè)體。研究表明,當(dāng)懲罰閾值適中時(shí),參加公共品博弈的個(gè)體的總投入量會(huì)處于最大值,并且出現(xiàn)頻率最高的策略類型是投入量略高于懲罰閾值的策略。
[Abstract]:Competition between organisms is ubiquitous, and Darwin's theory of natural selection suggests that individuals with greater fitness in competition are more likely to survive without any mechanism. The fitness of cooperative individuals is lower than that of non-cooperative individuals. Therefore, in order to survive, individuals tend to choose non-cooperation in the competition. One of the most basic features of biological systems is cooperation. For many different levels of biological tissue, cooperative interaction is required from single-celled organisms to animal groups. The widespread existence of cooperative behavior in a competitive world is puzzling. How to explain the emergence of cooperative behavior among selfish individuals and the long-term maintenance of cooperative behavior have attracted the attention of scientists in many fields. Evolutionary game theory provides a favorable theoretical basis for the study of these problems. The cooperative evolution of repeated public goods game based on mixed uniform group is discussed. The main results are as follows: first, after the introduction of punishment and reward mechanism in the mixed uniform population. Study the evolution of different strategies in groups. Each individual has to pay a price before the game to show his or her attitude towards collaborators or collaborators, punishment, or rewards. Punishment and reward alone can not promote the evolution of cooperation, but under the combined action of punishment and reward mechanism. The level of cooperation increases with the increase of the intensity of selection. The results also show that in the game of coexistence of punishment and reward, reward will have more advantages than punishment. Secondly, considering noise. According to the diversity of behavior, a new model based on mixed uniform group is proposed to explore the evolution of adaptive strategy in repetitive public goods game. We introduce the tit-for-tat characteristic. The cooperative probability represents the diversity of behavior. The Moran process based on frequency selection is used to describe the dynamic evolution of the group. This process shows nature's choice: the more successful individuals are, the easier they are to be replicated. Studies have shown that, even when noise is involved, the diversity of behavior is considered. Tit-for-tat mechanism can still promote the evolution of cooperation. On the basis of the above model, we consider the influence of nonlinearity and different group size on cooperative evolution. We know that different nonlinear types have different effects on cooperative evolution in repeated public goods games. Ming. In the presence of behavioral diversity and tit-for-tat characteristics, the nonlinearity of cooperative facilitation will promote the evolution of cooperation, while the nonlinearity of discount effect will inhibit the evolution of cooperation. In the nonlinear public goods game with discount effect, there is a group size value that is most suitable for cooperative evolution. Finally, a relatively simple theoretical model is constructed to study when the punishment behavior is based on a specific threshold. How each strategy evolves in the public goods game of mixed uniform groups. In each round of games, individuals pay different costs. However, the punishment is only for the individuals in the group who invest less than a certain value. The research shows that when the penalty threshold is moderate, the total input amount of the individuals participating in the public goods game will be the maximum. And the most frequent type of strategy is the one where the input load is slightly higher than the penalty threshold.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西安電子科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：O225;D035

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