發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-06-21 06:46

  本文選題：收費(fèi)公路PPP項(xiàng)目 + 收益補(bǔ)償　； 參考：《蘭州交通大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：收費(fèi)公路的建設(shè)不僅能帶動(dòng)區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展,而且能進(jìn)一步提升區(qū)域交通區(qū)位優(yōu)勢(shì)、改善投資環(huán)境、為區(qū)域產(chǎn)業(yè)布局提供有力支撐。收費(fèi)公路項(xiàng)目屬于資金、技術(shù)密集型項(xiàng)目,由于其建設(shè)周期長(zhǎng)、建設(shè)環(huán)境復(fù)雜及社會(huì)對(duì)其越來(lái)越高的建設(shè)和服務(wù)要求,僅僅依靠政府一方提供已經(jīng)完全不現(xiàn)實(shí)。近年來(lái)迅速發(fā)展起來(lái)的PPP模式以“特許經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)”的方式將政府部門(mén)部分支出責(zé)任轉(zhuǎn)移給私人部門(mén),不僅緩解了政府財(cái)政壓力,也使得私人部門(mén)的閑置資本得到合理有效的利用。因此,對(duì)于收費(fèi)公路領(lǐng)域來(lái)說(shuō),PPP模式的引入能夠極大促進(jìn)其發(fā)展。然而,由于收費(fèi)公路準(zhǔn)公共產(chǎn)品屬性和正外部性等特征,私人部門(mén)并不能夠獲得合理的收益,為此政府需要承擔(dān)一定的補(bǔ)償責(zé)任。通過(guò)文獻(xiàn)研究發(fā)現(xiàn)目前的PPP項(xiàng)目補(bǔ)償模型只能補(bǔ)償私人部門(mén)的投資缺口,并沒(méi)有對(duì)私人部門(mén)起到激勵(lì)性作用。因此,建立有效且具有激勵(lì)性質(zhì)的收益補(bǔ)償模型,為收費(fèi)公路PPP項(xiàng)目的順利實(shí)施提供保障顯得尤為重要。本文綜合運(yùn)用文獻(xiàn)研究法、博弈分析法、定性和定量分析相結(jié)合的方法,對(duì)收費(fèi)公路PPP項(xiàng)目的收益補(bǔ)償模型進(jìn)行了研究。首先,對(duì)目前我國(guó)收費(fèi)公路的發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行闡述,對(duì)PPP模式的國(guó)內(nèi)外補(bǔ)償現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行梳理和分析。隨后對(duì)收費(fèi)公路PPP項(xiàng)目收益補(bǔ)償?shù)南嚓P(guān)理論進(jìn)行闡述,分析了收費(fèi)公路PPP項(xiàng)目的四大經(jīng)濟(jì)特性及補(bǔ)償?shù)谋匾?同時(shí)對(duì)博弈論和委托代理理論進(jìn)行了介紹,并對(duì)收費(fèi)公路PPP項(xiàng)目收益補(bǔ)償中的委托代理關(guān)系進(jìn)行了研究,為后文理論模型的構(gòu)建做好鋪墊。其次,對(duì)收費(fèi)公路PPP項(xiàng)目收益補(bǔ)償問(wèn)題進(jìn)行描述,介紹了目前PPP項(xiàng)目補(bǔ)償主流的兩種補(bǔ)償模式:建設(shè)期補(bǔ)償模式和運(yùn)營(yíng)期補(bǔ)償模式;在明確政府和私人部門(mén)是委托代理關(guān)系的情況下,借用委托代理模型分別構(gòu)建了“補(bǔ)建設(shè)”和“補(bǔ)運(yùn)營(yíng)”兩種情形下的“固定補(bǔ)償+激勵(lì)補(bǔ)償”的收益補(bǔ)償委托代理博弈模型,并對(duì)模型進(jìn)行求解和分析,探討了信息對(duì)稱(chēng)下和信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)下政府給予私人部門(mén)的固定補(bǔ)償,企業(yè)努力水平和政府激勵(lì)報(bào)酬之間的關(guān)系,以及企業(yè)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避度、外部影響因素對(duì)最優(yōu)補(bǔ)償合約的影響,進(jìn)而從理論上分析了激勵(lì)補(bǔ)償模型的有效性和可行性。最后,結(jié)合具體實(shí)際案例,重點(diǎn)對(duì)信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)情況下“補(bǔ)建設(shè)”和“補(bǔ)運(yùn)營(yíng)”兩種補(bǔ)償模型進(jìn)行了定量分析,并提出基于運(yùn)營(yíng)成本的補(bǔ)償模型選擇是政府的最優(yōu)補(bǔ)償決策,同時(shí)根據(jù)本文構(gòu)建的補(bǔ)償模型及計(jì)算結(jié)果提出了幾條補(bǔ)償實(shí)施建議。
[Abstract]:The construction of toll roads can not only promote the regional economic development, but also further enhance the regional transportation location advantages, improve the investment environment, and provide strong support for the regional industrial distribution. Toll road project is a kind of capital and technology-intensive project. Because of its long construction cycle, complex construction environment and the society's increasing demands on its construction and service, it is completely unrealistic to rely solely on the government to provide it. In recent years, the PPP mode, which has developed rapidly, transfers part of government expenditure responsibility to the private sector in the form of "franchise", which not only alleviates the government financial pressure, but also makes the idle capital of the private sector reasonably and effectively utilized. Therefore, the introduction of PPP model can greatly promote the development of toll roads. However, due to the characteristics of quasi-public goods and positive externalities of toll roads, the private sector can not obtain reasonable income, so the government should bear certain compensation responsibilities. It is found that the current PPP project compensation model can only compensate for the investment gap of the private sector, and does not play an incentive role to the private sector. Therefore, it is very important to establish an effective and incentive revenue compensation model to guarantee the smooth implementation of PPP project of toll road. In this paper, the revenue compensation model of toll road PPP project is studied by means of literature research, game analysis, qualitative and quantitative analysis. Firstly, the development of toll roads in China is expounded, and the compensation status of PPP at home and abroad is analyzed. Then it expounds the relevant theories of PPP project income compensation, analyzes the four economic characteristics of toll road PPP project and the necessity of compensation, and introduces the game theory and principal-agent theory. The principal-agent relationship in the revenue compensation of PPP project of toll road is studied, which lays the foundation for the construction of the theoretical model. Secondly, the paper describes the revenue compensation of PPP project of toll road, and introduces two main compensation modes of PPP project: compensation mode in construction period and compensation mode in operation period; Under the condition that the government and the private sector are principal-agent relationship, the principal-agent game model of "fixed compensation incentive compensation" and "fixed compensation incentive compensation" is constructed by using the principal-agent model. By solving and analyzing the model, the paper discusses the fixed compensation given by the government to the private sector under information symmetry and information asymmetry, the relationship between the level of enterprise effort and the government incentive reward, and the risk aversion of the enterprise. The influence of external factors on the optimal compensation contract is analyzed, and the validity and feasibility of the incentive compensation model are analyzed theoretically. Finally, combined with practical cases, the paper focuses on the quantitative analysis of compensation models of "compensation construction" and "compensation operation" under the condition of asymmetric information, and points out that the choice of compensation model based on operation cost is the optimal compensation decision of the government. At the same time, according to the compensation model constructed in this paper and the results of calculation, several suggestions for the implementation of compensation are put forward.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：蘭州交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F542;F283

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