發(fā)布時(shí)間：2019-04-01 08:04

【摘要】：在我國存在著一群既不符合廉租房的保障標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，又無力購買商品房或經(jīng)濟(jì)適用房的“夾心層”，針對(duì)這類人群，政府提出建設(shè)公租房。公共租賃本身具有非常多的優(yōu)勢，如較低的租金、靈活的退出機(jī)制、廣泛的覆蓋范圍等優(yōu)勢，這使得公租房在解決我國保障性住房結(jié)果結(jié)構(gòu)化問題的有效措施。 但是，目前已經(jīng)建成的很多公租房卻出現(xiàn)了“墻脆脆”、“樓歪歪”、“豆腐渣”“屋漏漏”等現(xiàn)象，主要原因是：由于項(xiàng)目一次性、不確定性等特點(diǎn)，參與項(xiàng)目的組織所屬企業(yè)往往從項(xiàng)目中可以獲得的短期利益出發(fā)考慮對(duì)項(xiàng)目進(jìn)行管理；建設(shè)者往往不能以公民的利益出發(fā)對(duì)項(xiàng)目進(jìn)行管理，監(jiān)督力度不夠等原因。最終形成了低投資效益以及高資源消耗的現(xiàn)狀。 本文針對(duì)該問題，從公租房代建項(xiàng)目的利益相關(guān)者的角度出發(fā)，首先識(shí)別出我國公租房代建項(xiàng)目中的主要利益相關(guān)者為政府、代建單位、承包商、咨詢服務(wù)機(jī)構(gòu)、金融機(jī)構(gòu)、政府部門、使用人以及其他利益相關(guān)者。進(jìn)而分析公租房代建項(xiàng)目中各個(gè)利益相關(guān)者的關(guān)系。之后，本文利用利益相關(guān)者理論中的米切爾評(píng)分方法，，找出公租房代建項(xiàng)目的核心利益相關(guān)者，即為政府、代建單位和承包商。 在識(shí)別出公租房代建項(xiàng)目的核心利益相關(guān)者之后，對(duì)這些核心利益相關(guān)者的行為進(jìn)行分析。在此基礎(chǔ)上，利用演化博弈論，對(duì)公租房代建項(xiàng)目中核心利益相關(guān)者的行為關(guān)系進(jìn)行演化博弈。在模擬演化博弈中，發(fā)現(xiàn)政府在與代建單位和承包商進(jìn)行博弈的時(shí)候，主要的問題是代建單位是否努力積極工作，是否承包商合謀。而政府的行為選擇中是否進(jìn)行積極的監(jiān)督激勵(lì)措施公租房代建項(xiàng)目的順利進(jìn)行有非常重大的影響。因此要實(shí)現(xiàn)進(jìn)公租房市場的穩(wěn)定發(fā)展，必須積極采取監(jiān)督激勵(lì)機(jī)制，促進(jìn)公租房代建市場的良性地發(fā)展。 本文提出了公租房代建項(xiàng)目長期穩(wěn)定發(fā)展的約束激勵(lì)措施。即采取健全溝通機(jī)制、加強(qiáng)運(yùn)行的法律環(huán)境、充分發(fā)揮行業(yè)協(xié)會(huì)和學(xué)會(huì)對(duì)承包商行為的約束以及充分發(fā)揮代建制的社會(huì)監(jiān)督的越是機(jī)制；采取報(bào)酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制、聲譽(yù)刺激機(jī)制的激勵(lì)機(jī)制。最后總結(jié)全文，并提出了本文在研究的深度和廣度上的不足，是今后深入研究和探討的方向。
[Abstract]:In our country, there exists a group of people who do not meet the guarantee standard of low-rent housing and cannot afford to buy commercial housing or comfortable housing's "sandwich layer". In view of this kind of people, the government proposes to build public rental housing. Public lease itself has many advantages, such as low rent, flexible exit mechanism, wide coverage and other advantages, which makes public rental housing in China to solve the structural problems of affordable housing effective measures. However, many public rental houses that have been built at present have appeared such phenomena as "brittle walls", "crooked buildings", "bean curd dregs" house leaks "and so on. The main reasons are: due to the characteristics of one-off and uncertainty of the project, The enterprises owned by the participating organizations often consider the management of the project from the short-term benefits that can be obtained in the project; Builders are often unable to manage projects in the interests of citizens, such as inadequate supervision. Finally, the present situation of low investment benefit and high resource consumption has been formed. In view of this problem, from the point of view of stakeholders of public rental housing construction projects, this paper firstly identifies the main stakeholders in the construction projects of public rental housing in our country as government, agent, contractor, consulting service institution, financial institution, and so on, and the main stakeholders in the project are government, agency, contractor, consulting service institution, financial institution, and so on. Government departments, users and other stakeholders. And then analyze the relationship between the stakeholders in the public rental housing construction project. Then, using the Mitchell scoring method in the stakeholder theory, this paper finds out the core stakeholders of the public rental housing agent project, that is, the government, the agent and the contractor. After identifying the core stakeholders of the public rental housing agent project, the behavior of these core stakeholders is analyzed. On this basis, the evolutionary game theory is used to carry on the evolutionary game to the behavior relation of the core stakeholders in the public rental housing construction project. In the simulation evolutionary game, it is found that when the government plays the game with the agent and contractor, the main problem is whether the agent works hard and whether the contractor is complicit. And the government's behavior choice whether carries on the positive supervision incentive measure the public rental housing agent construction project to carry on smoothly has the very important influence. Therefore, in order to realize the stable development of the public rental housing market, we must actively adopt the supervision and incentive mechanism to promote the benign development of the public rental housing market. This paper puts forward the restriction and incentive measures for the long-term stable development of the public rental housing construction project. That is, to adopt perfect communication mechanism, strengthen the legal environment of operation, give full play to the restraint of contractors' behavior by trade associations and society, and give full play to the more mechanism of social supervision of agent system; Adopt reward incentive mechanism, reputation incentive mechanism of incentive mechanism. Finally, this paper summarizes the full text, and puts forward the deficiency in the depth and breadth of the research, which is the direction of in-depth research and discussion.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F299.23

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