【摘要】：商業(yè)銀行是我國金融系統(tǒng)最主要的組成部分，商業(yè)銀行的資金安全，關系社會民生，尤其信貸資產(chǎn)的質(zhì)量，關系到國家整體經(jīng)濟運營是否健康、平穩(wěn)、有序，在當前國內(nèi)外經(jīng)濟形勢復雜多變的環(huán)境下，如何防控商業(yè)銀行的信用風險，提升商業(yè)銀行的信用風險管理能力，是擺在商業(yè)銀行面前的十分具有現(xiàn)實意義的課題也是急需解決的問題。從銀行的不良授信案例來看，信用風險的形成都是人為有意或無意造成銀企之間信息不對稱，影響了銀行對企業(yè)的經(jīng)營情況，盈利能力，法律合規(guī)等情況做出正確的判斷，從而造成信用風險的形成，而信息不對稱的成因主要有兩個方面：銀行內(nèi)部信息傳遞漏損，缺失，造成了信息不對稱的結果：借款人對銀行有選擇的傳遞信息，，主觀過濾負面信息。因此降低信用風險的關鍵是減小銀行內(nèi)部信息傳遞中的漏損，減低銀行與借款人之間信息不對稱。 本文主要結合筆者自身在銀行授信發(fā)起、審批、貸后管理、不良清收等多個崗位的實踐經(jīng)驗，從介紹銀行信用風險的類型、信用風險的識別入手，分析了中建銀行深圳分行的信貸投放現(xiàn)狀、信用風險防控體系，并對現(xiàn)有信用風險防控體系進行了剖析，揭示了銀行授信中存在的信息不對稱問題，通過實際案例的調(diào)研和論證，思考當前銀行在信貸審批、貸后管理中如何規(guī)避信息盲點，創(chuàng)新的提出在面對銀行信用風險中存在的信息不對稱問題中對于實際控制人、核心競爭力，經(jīng)營情況、財務情況等方面入手，細化信息采集內(nèi)容，強調(diào)彼此印證關系，力求得到相對完全的信息以對抗信息不對稱造成不良影響，并提出從產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新、體制創(chuàng)新、模式創(chuàng)新等多個方面，應用銀團貸款等新興金融產(chǎn)品，采取派駐式客戶經(jīng)理制度、搭建防控體系等具體措施消除信息不對稱問題，以點帶面強化研究成果的轉(zhuǎn)化和應用。希望有助于銀行加強授信的風險管理能力，推動銀行信貸的安全、穩(wěn)定及和諧發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:Commercial banks are the most important part of our financial system. The capital safety of commercial banks is related to the people's livelihood of the society, especially the quality of credit assets, and is related to the health, stability and order of the overall economic operation of the country. How to prevent and control the credit risk of commercial banks and improve their ability of credit risk management under the complicated and changeable economic situation at home and abroad, In front of commercial banks is a very practical issue is also urgent to solve the problem. Judging from the bad credit cases of banks, the formation of credit risks is artificially or unintentionally resulting in asymmetric information between banks and enterprises, which affects the banks' correct judgment on the operation, profitability, legal compliance and other situations of the enterprises. Therefore, the formation of credit risk, and the causes of information asymmetry mainly have two aspects: leakage and loss of information transmission within banks, resulting in the result of information asymmetry: the borrower has the choice to transmit information to the bank. Subjective filtering of negative information. Therefore, the key to reduce the credit risk is to reduce the leakage in the internal information transmission of the bank and to reduce the information asymmetry between the bank and the borrower. This paper mainly combines the author's practical experience in many posts such as bank credit initiation, examination and approval, post-loan management, bad collection and so on, starting with the introduction of the types of bank credit risk and the identification of credit risk. This paper analyzes the present situation of credit supply and credit risk prevention and control system of China Construction Bank Shenzhen Branch, and analyzes the existing credit risk prevention and control system, which reveals the information asymmetry in the credit granting of the bank. Through the investigation and argumentation of actual cases, this paper thinks about how to avoid the blind spot of information in the current bank's credit examination and approval and post-loan management, and puts forward innovatively the problem of information asymmetry in the face of the bank's credit risk. Starting with the core competitiveness, business situation, financial situation and so on, we should refine the content of information collection, emphasize the relationship between each other, strive to obtain relatively complete information to counter the adverse effects of information asymmetry, and put forward the idea of product innovation. System innovation, model innovation, and so on, applying new financial products such as syndicated loans, adopting the system of stationed account manager, setting up a system of prevention and control, and so on, to eliminate the problem of information asymmetry. To strengthen the transformation and application of research results. Hope to help banks strengthen the risk management ability of credit, promote the security, stability and harmonious development of bank credit.
【學位授予單位】：天津大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F832.4

【參考文獻】

相關期刊論文 前10條

1 畢鑒亭;;轉(zhuǎn)型期國有商業(yè)銀行不良貸款控制策略探析[J];金融論壇;2006年09期

2 潘蔚琳,王可;信用風險計量模型的分析與借鑒[J];北方經(jīng)貿(mào);2002年08期

3 吳軍,張繼寶;信用風險量化模型比較分析[J];國際金融研究;2004年08期

4 趙曉菊;信息不對稱與金融風險的控制管理[J];國際金融研究;1999年05期

5 李蓉;伍瑞凡;;不對稱信息下信貸市場的兩種博弈模型分析[J];經(jīng)濟管理;2005年12期

6 魏燦秋;降低商業(yè)銀行信用風險的貸前分析方法研究[J];經(jīng)濟體制改革;2003年03期

7 齊志鯤;銀行惜貸、信貸配給與貨幣政策有效性[J];金融研究;2002年08期

8 蔣海,溫思美;制度變遷中的金融博弈與金融風險轉(zhuǎn)嫁[J];金融研究;1998年09期

9 黃敏;論國有銀行金融風險的深層原因[J];汕頭大學學報;1999年06期

10 宋華;論物流企業(yè)的經(jīng)營戰(zhàn)略[J];外國經(jīng)濟與管理;2000年06期

本文編號：2391887