【摘要】：房地產(chǎn)監(jiān)管產(chǎn)生的直接基礎(chǔ)是市場失靈，，隨著自由市場經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展，市場出現(xiàn)了自然壟斷、人為壟斷、外部效應(yīng)、信息不對(duì)稱等失靈的狀況，證明市場這只看不見得手并不是萬能的，需要政府作為公共利益的代表，糾正市場失靈。加強(qiáng)房地產(chǎn)市場監(jiān)管對(duì)解決房地產(chǎn)市場信息不對(duì)稱和負(fù)外部性問題，打破房地產(chǎn)市場壟斷，實(shí)現(xiàn)房地產(chǎn)調(diào)控政策預(yù)期效果，維護(hù)社會(huì)公平，彌補(bǔ)法律不完備性具有重要的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 本文在對(duì)房地產(chǎn)監(jiān)管理論和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理理論綜述的基礎(chǔ)上，從風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理的視角對(duì)房地產(chǎn)監(jiān)管問題進(jìn)行研究。首先，對(duì)我國房地產(chǎn)監(jiān)管機(jī)制進(jìn)行概述，分析房地產(chǎn)市場監(jiān)管的價(jià)值。采用相似度法對(duì)房地產(chǎn)市場監(jiān)管的效果進(jìn)行評(píng)估，選取若干有代表性的房地產(chǎn)監(jiān)管效果評(píng)判指標(biāo)為尺度，給定各指標(biāo)的評(píng)價(jià)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)值，運(yùn)用模糊綜合評(píng)判原理，得出某一階段的監(jiān)管指標(biāo)與標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的相似度，據(jù)以評(píng)判該階段監(jiān)管效果優(yōu)劣。結(jié)果顯示我國的房地產(chǎn)監(jiān)管效果在整體上還非常差，房地產(chǎn)監(jiān)管效果沒有達(dá)到預(yù)期的目標(biāo)，但是從趨勢來看，呈現(xiàn)出逐年發(fā)展進(jìn)步的趨向。其次，分析房地產(chǎn)監(jiān)管中的主體、客體的行為特征以及主客體之間的博弈行為，基于博弈論的思想探討我國房地產(chǎn)市場監(jiān)管困境。最后，從加強(qiáng)房地產(chǎn)市場監(jiān)管的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理機(jī)制建設(shè)，優(yōu)化房地產(chǎn)監(jiān)管政策與監(jiān)管環(huán)境，推進(jìn)房地產(chǎn)市場監(jiān)管體制改革，構(gòu)建房地產(chǎn)市場監(jiān)管問責(zé)的基本制度，加強(qiáng)房地產(chǎn)監(jiān)管信息平臺(tái)建設(shè)，進(jìn)行房地產(chǎn)市場監(jiān)管的績效評(píng)估等方面，提出了對(duì)策措施，并形成完善房地產(chǎn)市場監(jiān)管的實(shí)施路線圖。
[Abstract]:The direct foundation of real estate supervision is market failure. With the development of free market economy, there are natural monopoly, artificial monopoly, external effect, information asymmetry and so on. To prove that the market is invisible is not a panacea, it needs the government as the representative of the public interest to correct the market failure. Strengthening the supervision of the real estate market can solve the problem of information asymmetry and negative externality in the real estate market, break the monopoly of the real estate market, realize the expected effect of the real estate regulation and control policy, and safeguard social fairness. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to make up for the imperfections of the law. On the basis of summarizing the theories of real estate supervision and risk management, this paper studies the problem of real estate supervision from the perspective of risk management. First of all, the real estate supervision mechanism of our country is summarized, and the value of real estate market supervision is analyzed. This paper uses similarity method to evaluate the effect of real estate market supervision, selects some representative evaluation indexes of real estate supervision effect as the yardstick, gives the evaluation standard value of each index, and applies the fuzzy comprehensive evaluation principle. The similarity between the supervision index and the standard in a certain stage is obtained to judge the effect of supervision in that stage. The result shows that the effect of real estate supervision in our country is still very poor on the whole, the effect of real estate supervision has not reached the expected goal, but from the trend, it shows the trend of development and progress year by year. Secondly, it analyzes the behavior characteristics of the subject and object in the real estate supervision and the game behavior between the subject and the object, and discusses the dilemma of the supervision of the real estate market in our country based on the thought of game theory. Finally, from strengthening the risk management mechanism construction of the real estate market supervision, optimizing the real estate supervision policy and regulatory environment, promoting the real estate market supervision system reform, constructing the basic system of the real estate market supervision and accountability. Strengthening the construction of real estate supervision information platform and evaluating the performance of real estate market supervision, this paper puts forward some countermeasures, and forms a road map to perfect the real estate market supervision.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：武漢科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F299.23

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