我國人身保險銷售的道德風(fēng)險研究
發(fā)布時間:2018-07-29 13:32
【摘要】:自從1982年恢復(fù)以來,中國人身保險業(yè)一直保持著迅猛的增長勢頭,中國國內(nèi)人身保險業(yè)務(wù)保費(fèi)收入從1982年的159萬元增長到2010年的10632億元,年均增長率為61.38%,成為國民經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展最快的行業(yè)之一。但在蓬勃發(fā)展的背后存在著隱憂:隨著個人代理和銀行代理兩種重要銷售渠道的迅速擴(kuò)張,人身保險銷售的道德風(fēng)險也日漸暴露,成為近年來倍受關(guān)注的重要風(fēng)險之一。它不僅是保險消費(fèi)者投訴的熱點(diǎn),也是近幾年來中國保監(jiān)會整頓和規(guī)范保險市場的重點(diǎn)。據(jù)筆者了解,以往的研究重點(diǎn)多在保險消費(fèi)者的道德風(fēng)險方面,對保險公司及保險銷售人員的道德風(fēng)險進(jìn)行的研究不多。因此,本文將有重點(diǎn)地研究我國人身保險銷售的道德風(fēng)險問題。 何為道德風(fēng)險?人身保險銷售中存在哪些道德風(fēng)險?表現(xiàn)形式如何?有哪些特點(diǎn)和成因?筆者帶著這些問題,嘗試用學(xué)術(shù)的方法來解決實(shí)務(wù)的問題。本文介紹了道德風(fēng)險的理論,闡述了我國人身保險業(yè)經(jīng)營和銷售的特點(diǎn),分析了目前我國人身保險銷售的道德風(fēng)險現(xiàn)狀、表現(xiàn)形式及特點(diǎn),對我國人身保險銷售道德風(fēng)險的成因進(jìn)行了初步的探討,重點(diǎn)提出銷售誤導(dǎo)是業(yè)內(nèi)普遍存在的道德風(fēng)險、保險公司對銀行的商業(yè)賄賂是近年來新興的具代表性的道德風(fēng)險這一觀點(diǎn),為我國人身保險銷售的道德風(fēng)險研究提供了新的視角。在文章的最后部分,筆者基于上述分析并結(jié)合實(shí)務(wù),從五個方面提出了具體的防范措施和建議,包括樹立風(fēng)險意識、加強(qiáng)內(nèi)控制度、改進(jìn)現(xiàn)行代理制度、加強(qiáng)銷售渠道建設(shè)、借助IT新技術(shù)等,這些措施和建議具有較強(qiáng)的可操作性,筆者也希望借此推動我國人身保險業(yè)健康、有序地發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:Since its recovery in 1982, China's personal insurance industry has maintained a rapid growth momentum. The premium income of China's domestic personal insurance business has increased from 1.59 million yuan in 1982 to 1.0632 trillion yuan in 2010. The average annual growth rate is 61.38, becoming one of the fastest-growing industries in the national economy. But behind the vigorous development, there are hidden worries: with the rapid expansion of two important sales channels, personal agent and bank agent, the moral hazard of personal insurance sales has been exposed day by day, which has become one of the important risks that have attracted much attention in recent years. It is not only the hot spot of consumer insurance complaints, but also the focus of the CIRC to rectify and standardize the insurance market in recent years. According to my understanding, the previous research focuses on the moral hazard of insurance consumers, and the research on the moral hazard of insurance companies and insurance salespeople is not much. Therefore, this paper will focus on the issue of moral hazard of personal insurance sales in China. What is moral hazard? What are the moral risks in personal insurance sales? What is the form of expression? What are the characteristics and causes? With these problems, the author tries to solve the practical problems with academic methods. This paper introduces the theory of moral hazard, expounds the characteristics of management and sale of personal insurance in China, and analyzes the present situation, forms and characteristics of moral hazard of personal insurance sales in China. This paper makes a preliminary discussion on the causes of moral hazard of personal insurance sales in our country, and points out that misdirection of sales is a common moral hazard in the industry. The view that commercial bribery of banks by insurance companies is a representative moral hazard in recent years provides a new perspective for the study of moral hazard of personal insurance sales in China. In the last part of the article, based on the above analysis and the practice, the author puts forward the concrete preventive measures and suggestions from five aspects, including establishing the risk consciousness, strengthening the internal control system, improving the current agency system, and strengthening the sales channel construction. With the help of new IT technology, these measures and suggestions have strong maneuverability. The author also hopes to promote the healthy and orderly development of China's personal insurance industry.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:華東理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2013
【分類號】:F842
本文編號:2152831
[Abstract]:Since its recovery in 1982, China's personal insurance industry has maintained a rapid growth momentum. The premium income of China's domestic personal insurance business has increased from 1.59 million yuan in 1982 to 1.0632 trillion yuan in 2010. The average annual growth rate is 61.38, becoming one of the fastest-growing industries in the national economy. But behind the vigorous development, there are hidden worries: with the rapid expansion of two important sales channels, personal agent and bank agent, the moral hazard of personal insurance sales has been exposed day by day, which has become one of the important risks that have attracted much attention in recent years. It is not only the hot spot of consumer insurance complaints, but also the focus of the CIRC to rectify and standardize the insurance market in recent years. According to my understanding, the previous research focuses on the moral hazard of insurance consumers, and the research on the moral hazard of insurance companies and insurance salespeople is not much. Therefore, this paper will focus on the issue of moral hazard of personal insurance sales in China. What is moral hazard? What are the moral risks in personal insurance sales? What is the form of expression? What are the characteristics and causes? With these problems, the author tries to solve the practical problems with academic methods. This paper introduces the theory of moral hazard, expounds the characteristics of management and sale of personal insurance in China, and analyzes the present situation, forms and characteristics of moral hazard of personal insurance sales in China. This paper makes a preliminary discussion on the causes of moral hazard of personal insurance sales in our country, and points out that misdirection of sales is a common moral hazard in the industry. The view that commercial bribery of banks by insurance companies is a representative moral hazard in recent years provides a new perspective for the study of moral hazard of personal insurance sales in China. In the last part of the article, based on the above analysis and the practice, the author puts forward the concrete preventive measures and suggestions from five aspects, including establishing the risk consciousness, strengthening the internal control system, improving the current agency system, and strengthening the sales channel construction. With the help of new IT technology, these measures and suggestions have strong maneuverability. The author also hopes to promote the healthy and orderly development of China's personal insurance industry.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:華東理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2013
【分類號】:F842
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