本文選題：CEO薪酬 + 公司業(yè)績　； 參考：《復(fù)旦大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：自CEO薪酬改革實(shí)行以來,上市公司尤其是國有控股上市公司CEO高薪現(xiàn)象引起了學(xué)術(shù)界和業(yè)界的多方討論,但沒有統(tǒng)一的結(jié)論。近年來不受高管控制但會(huì)影響公司業(yè)績的外部經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境、行業(yè)政策等客觀因素在高管薪酬決定機(jī)制中的作用逐漸引起學(xué)者的關(guān)注,并提出了“幸運(yùn)支付”概念,從一個(gè)新的角度挖掘高管薪酬制訂的內(nèi)在規(guī)律。以“幸運(yùn)支付”為突破口,研究客觀因素在我國高管薪酬制訂中所起的作用,具有重要的現(xiàn)實(shí)意義和理論價(jià)值。 在系統(tǒng)梳理現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)的基礎(chǔ)上,本文以“幸運(yùn)支付假說”為依托,結(jié)合我國獨(dú)特的轉(zhuǎn)型經(jīng)濟(jì)背景,研究“幸運(yùn)”因素對(duì)我國CEO薪酬的影響。首先,為直觀地體現(xiàn)CEO薪酬制訂中“幸運(yùn)”業(yè)績的作用,本文以案例分析的形式從定性和定量兩個(gè)方面研究了火力發(fā)電行業(yè)CEO薪酬的“幸運(yùn)”支付。接著,本文將研究對(duì)象進(jìn)一步擴(kuò)大至所有行業(yè),采用二階段回歸(2sls)對(duì)全行業(yè)下CEO薪酬的“幸運(yùn)支付”進(jìn)行了實(shí)證研究。同時(shí),考慮到國有企業(yè)有別于私營企業(yè)的虛擬代理人、行政壟斷等特征,企業(yè)性質(zhì)可能對(duì)“幸運(yùn)”支付現(xiàn)象的程度產(chǎn)生影響。為此,本文又區(qū)分了企業(yè)性質(zhì),進(jìn)一步考察國有控股上市公司CEO薪酬“幸運(yùn)”支付現(xiàn)象與私營上市公司是否存在顯著的不同。 通過火電行業(yè)的案例分析及進(jìn)一步對(duì)我國A股市場所有行業(yè)1608家公司共8159個(gè)年份-薪酬非平衡數(shù)據(jù)的考察發(fā)現(xiàn)：(1)我國上市公司CEO薪酬存在顯著的“幸運(yùn)支付”現(xiàn)象,這與國際上的研究結(jié)論相同,支持了“幸運(yùn)”支付假說；(2)無論是會(huì)計(jì)業(yè)績還是市場業(yè)績,CEO薪酬對(duì)“幸運(yùn)業(yè)績”的敏感性與其對(duì)傳統(tǒng)的公司業(yè)績的敏感性相同,當(dāng)會(huì)計(jì)業(yè)績指標(biāo)替換時(shí)前者甚至超過了后者：(3)在區(qū)分企業(yè)性質(zhì)的情形下,對(duì)同樣增幅的“幸運(yùn)”業(yè)績,國有控股上市公司CEO的薪酬漲幅遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)高于非國有控股上市公司CEO,國有控股上市公司高管薪酬制定中存在更為嚴(yán)重的“幸運(yùn)”支付現(xiàn)象。 依據(jù)委托－代理理論,將CEO薪酬與不受CEO控制的公司業(yè)績掛鉤實(shí)質(zhì)是股東的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)轉(zhuǎn)嫁行為。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)厭惡的CEO在面臨更大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)時(shí)會(huì)要求股東給予更多的補(bǔ)償。這樣的制度設(shè)置也有可能激勵(lì)CEO冒險(xiǎn)預(yù)測“幸運(yùn)”因素的走向,使企業(yè)面臨更多的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。我國企業(yè)尤其是國有企業(yè)CEO薪酬的“幸運(yùn)支付”現(xiàn)象為國有企業(yè)CEO薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制的進(jìn)一步改革提供了政策依據(jù)。在未來,CEO薪酬激勵(lì)機(jī)制應(yīng)更加完善以努力區(qū)分CEO的真實(shí)努力和“幸運(yùn)”業(yè)績部分,避免企‘業(yè)承擔(dān)不必要的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
[Abstract]:Since the implementation of CEO compensation reform, the phenomenon of high CEO salary in listed companies, especially in state-owned holding listed companies, has caused many discussions in academia and industry, but there is no uniform conclusion. In recent years, the external economic environment which is not controlled by senior executives but will affect the performance of the company, the role of objective factors such as industry policy in the executive compensation decision mechanism has gradually attracted the attention of scholars, and put forward the concept of "lucky payment". From a new perspective to explore the executive compensation formulation of the internal law. Taking "lucky payment" as the breakthrough point, it is of great practical significance and theoretical value to study the role of objective factors in the formulation of executive compensation in China. On the basis of systematically combing the existing literature, this paper studies the influence of "lucky" factors on CEO compensation in China on the basis of "Lucky payment hypothesis" and combined with our country's unique transition economic background. Firstly, in order to intuitively reflect the role of "lucky" performance in CEO compensation making, this paper studies the "lucky" payment of CEO compensation in thermal power industry from qualitative and quantitative aspects in the form of case study. Then, this paper extends the research object to all industries, and makes an empirical study on the "lucky payment" of CEO compensation in the whole industry by using two-stage regression (2sls). At the same time, considering the characteristics of virtual agent and administrative monopoly of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, the nature of enterprises may have an impact on the degree of "lucky" payment. Therefore, this paper also distinguishes the nature of the enterprise, and further studies whether there is a significant difference between the "lucky" payment of CEO compensation of the state-owned holding listed company and that of the private listed company. Through the case analysis of thermal power industry and the further investigation of 1608 companies in all industries in A-share market in China, the results show that: (1) there is a significant "lucky payment" phenomenon in CEO compensation of listed companies in China. This is consistent with international studies and supports the "lucky" payment hypothesis. (2) both accounting performance and market performance CEO compensation are as sensitive to "lucky performance" as they are to traditional corporate performance. When the accounting performance indicators are replaced, the former even outperforms the latter: (3) for the "lucky" performance of the same increase in the nature of the enterprise, The pay increase for CEOs of state-owned listed companies is far higher than that for non-state-owned listed companies, and there is a more serious phenomenon of "lucky" payment in the development of executive compensation for state-owned listed companies. According to the principal-agent theory, linking the CEO compensation to the performance of the company that is not controlled by the CEO is essentially the risk transfer behavior of the shareholders. Risk-averse CEOs demand more compensation from shareholders when faced with greater risk. Such a system may also encourage CEOs to take risks and predict the direction of "lucky" factors, making companies more exposed to risks. The phenomenon of "lucky payment" of CEO compensation in Chinese enterprises, especially in state-owned enterprises, provides a policy basis for the further reform of CEO compensation incentive mechanism in state-owned enterprises. In the future, CEO compensation incentives should be improved to distinguish between CEO's real effort and "lucky" performance, and avoid unnecessary risks to the industry.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F832.51

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本文編號(hào)：2079300