本文選題：陽光私募基金 + 契約理論�。� 參考：《蘭州大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：由于陽光私募基金管理人擁有較為集中的基金管理權(quán)力和較少的信息披露義務(wù),所以在陽光私募基金行業(yè)中,擁有信息優(yōu)勢(shì)的基金管理人會(huì)在追求自身利益最大化的情況下偏離投資人目標(biāo),與投資人形成激勵(lì)沖突。激勵(lì)沖突依發(fā)生在投資人與管理人簽約前后而分為“逆向選擇”與“道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”。在現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中,研究這兩類激勵(lì)沖突問題主要考慮契約理論,即信息不對(duì)稱下,委托人通過對(duì)簽約契約進(jìn)行設(shè)計(jì),以構(gòu)建一種激勵(lì)機(jī)制,從而避免代理人可能的對(duì)委托人目標(biāo)的偏離。同時(shí),目前我國陽光私募基金產(chǎn)品主要分為“結(jié)構(gòu)化”與“非結(jié)構(gòu)化”兩種,這兩種私募基金產(chǎn)品正是因收益分配機(jī)制設(shè)置的不同,形成了兩套相異的契約設(shè)計(jì)。本文通過結(jié)合契約理論的相關(guān)研究成果,利用數(shù)理模型,分別從“逆向選擇”與“道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”兩個(gè)角度,比較與剖析兩類陽光私募基金產(chǎn)品契約設(shè)計(jì)中的激勵(lì)機(jī)理,并推導(dǎo)出具體的契約激勵(lì)特征。進(jìn)一步的,利用契約理論和獲得的相應(yīng)結(jié)論,為我國陽光私募基金激勵(lì)機(jī)制的優(yōu)化提供參考建議。
[Abstract]:Because sunshine private equity managers have more centralized fund management powers and less disclosure obligations, so in the sunshine private equity fund industry,Fund managers with information advantages will deviate from investors' goals in the pursuit of maximizing their own interests and form incentive conflicts with investors.Incentive conflict is divided into adverse selection and moral hazard according to the investor and manager before and after signing the contract.In modern economics, the study of these two kinds of incentive conflicts mainly considers the contract theory, that is, under the asymmetric information, the client designs the contract to construct an incentive mechanism.In order to avoid the agent may deviate from the principal target.At the same time, at present, the products of sunshine private equity fund in China are mainly divided into two kinds: structured and unstructured. These two kinds of private equity fund products form two sets of different contract designs because of the difference of income distribution mechanism.By combining the relevant research results of contract theory and mathematical model, this paper compares and analyzes the incentive mechanism in the product contract design of two kinds of sunshine private equity funds from the angles of "adverse selection" and "moral hazard", respectively.The specific characteristics of contract incentive are deduced.Furthermore, by using the contract theory and the corresponding conclusions, this paper provides some suggestions for the optimization of the incentive mechanism of the sunshine private equity fund in China.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：蘭州大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51

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