本文選題：新型內(nèi)部人控制　切入點：股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)　出處：《鄭州大學》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：本文將股權(quán)分散背景下產(chǎn)生的內(nèi)部人控制稱為“傳統(tǒng)內(nèi)部人控制”,而將我國上市公司股權(quán)高度集中背景下產(chǎn)生的控股股東侵占公司和小股東利益的現(xiàn)象定義為“新型內(nèi)部人控制”,控股股東合法掌握上市公司的剩余控制權(quán)和剩余索取權(quán),成為“新型內(nèi)部人”。股權(quán)高度集中、國有企業(yè)改革的路徑依賴、股權(quán)屬性以及外部治理機制不足是形成新型內(nèi)部人控制的主要原因。本文將首先對國內(nèi)外關(guān)于上市公司內(nèi)部人控制和大股東利益侵占的文獻進行簡要綜述,通過評述此前的研究文獻,分析二者存在的聯(lián)系,在此基礎上提出“新型內(nèi)部人控制”的概念。理論研究部分,首先界定“新型內(nèi)部人”這一概念,然后從股權(quán)高度集中、國企改革的路徑依賴、股權(quán)屬性和外部治理四個方面分析新型內(nèi)部人控制產(chǎn)生的原因,最后對新型內(nèi)部人控制的運作方式進行理論探析。實證研究部分主要驗證股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與新型內(nèi)部人控制的關(guān)系、新型內(nèi)部人控制的運作方式及其對上市公司業(yè)績的影響。最后根據(jù)本文理論分析和實證研究的結(jié)論,對治理新型內(nèi)部人控制提出建議。 實證結(jié)果表明：新型內(nèi)部人控制權(quán)的提高會加劇上市公司的兩權(quán)分離度,控制權(quán)和兩權(quán)分離度之間存在倒U型的非線性關(guān)系,當新型內(nèi)部人的控制權(quán)達到一定程度后,會減少對上市公司的兩權(quán)分離�？刂茩�(quán)比例與利益侵占在總體樣本和非國有上市公司都顯著正相關(guān),但是非國有上市公司的兩權(quán)分離度與利益侵占相關(guān)性并不顯著,說明非國有上市公司的新型內(nèi)部人更傾向于通過控制權(quán)直接侵占上市公司利益。由于國有上市公司的新型內(nèi)部人受到政府約束較多,兩權(quán)分離的政治違規(guī)成本較高,所以國有上市公司的兩權(quán)分離程度小于非國有上市公司,且控制國有上市公司的政府層級越高,兩權(quán)分離程度越小,但是利益侵占程度越高。 與通過控制權(quán)直接侵占相比,建立金字塔股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)能夠較好地掩飾侵占程度和侵占主體的真實身份,所以國有上市公司的新型內(nèi)部人更傾向于通過兩權(quán)分離侵占上市公司利益。非國有上市公司的新型內(nèi)部人為降低侵占成本,并通過建立公司內(nèi)部資本市場解決關(guān)聯(lián)企業(yè)的融資問題也會構(gòu)建金字塔股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)侵占公司和小股東利益。新型內(nèi)部人直接參與公司治理或與管理層合謀侵占上市公司利益會使內(nèi)部治理機制失靈,降低公司業(yè)績。
[Abstract]:In this paper, the insider control under the background of decentralized equity is called "traditional insider control", and the phenomenon of controlling shareholders encroaching on the interests of the company and minority shareholders under the background of highly concentrated equity of listed companies in China is defined as " "A new type of insider control", in which the controlling shareholder legally grasps the residual control rights and residual claims of the listed company, Becoming a "new type of insider". The ownership is highly concentrated, and the path to reform of state-owned enterprises is dependent, The main reasons for the formation of the new type of insider control are the ownership attributes and the insufficient external governance mechanism. Firstly, this paper will briefly summarize the literature on insider control and the expropriation of the interests of large shareholders in listed companies at home and abroad. By reviewing the previous research documents, analyzing the relationship between them, the paper puts forward the concept of "new type insider control". In the theoretical research part, it defines the concept of "new insider" first, and then concentrates on it from the perspective of equity ownership. This paper analyzes the causes of the new type of insider control in four aspects: path dependence, ownership attributes and external governance of SOE reform. Finally, the paper makes a theoretical analysis of the operation mode of the new type of insider control. The empirical study mainly verifies the relationship between the ownership structure and the new type of insider control. Finally, according to the theoretical analysis and the conclusion of the empirical research, the paper puts forward some suggestions on the governance of the new type of insider control. The empirical results show that the improvement of the control right of the new insider will aggravate the separation degree of the two rights of the listed company, and there is a negative U type nonlinear relationship between the control right and the separation degree of the two rights, when the control right of the new type of insider reaches a certain degree. The proportion of control right and interest encroachment are positively correlated with the total sample and the non-state-owned listed company, but the degree of separation of the two rights of the non-state-owned listed company is not significantly related to the interest encroachment. It shows that the new type of insiders of non-state-owned listed companies tend to directly encroach on the interests of listed companies through control. Because the new type of insiders of state-owned listed companies are more restrained by the government, the cost of political violation of the separation of the two rights is higher. Therefore, the degree of separation of the two rights of the state-owned listed companies is smaller than that of the non-state-owned listed companies, and the higher the level of government to control the state-owned listed companies, the smaller the degree of separation of the two rights, but the higher the degree of interest encroachment. Compared with direct usurpation of control rights, the establishment of pyramid ownership structure can better cover up the degree of encroachment and the real identity of the subject. Therefore, the new type of insiders of the state-owned listed companies tend to encroach on the interests of the listed companies through the separation of two rights. The new type of insiders of the non-state-owned listed companies artificially reduce the cost of embezzlement. And to solve the financing problem of affiliated enterprises by establishing the internal capital market of the company will also construct a pyramid equity structure to encroach on the interests of the company and minority shareholders. The new type of insiders participate directly in corporate governance or collude with the management to encroach on the listing. The interests of the company will make the internal governance mechanism out of order, Reduce company performance.
【學位授予單位】：鄭州大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F272;F832.51

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