發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-03-20 10:10

  本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì)　切入點(diǎn)：在職消費(fèi)　出處：《石河子大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：國(guó)內(nèi)外對(duì)公司治理的研究由來已久，學(xué)者們從不同視角、利用各種理論進(jìn)行分析，深入探討了公司治理問題，認(rèn)為解決代理問題的關(guān)鍵在于在企業(yè)股東和經(jīng)理人之間建立完備的契約。在我國(guó)企業(yè)管理者的薪酬激勵(lì)體制中，貨幣薪酬、股權(quán)激勵(lì)和在職消費(fèi)是三個(gè)重要的組成部分。其中，貨幣薪酬、股權(quán)激勵(lì)這兩部分信息公開，統(tǒng)計(jì)起來較為便利，但是在職消費(fèi)的費(fèi)用常常歸屬于企業(yè)“經(jīng)營(yíng)費(fèi)用”和“管理費(fèi)用”項(xiàng)目中，具有一定的隱蔽性，故貨幣薪酬和股權(quán)激勵(lì)通常被稱為顯性薪酬，而在職消費(fèi)通常被視為隱性薪酬�，F(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)多研究的是貨幣薪酬與企業(yè)績(jī)效，且爭(zhēng)議較多，出現(xiàn)這種情況的原因很可能是由于拋開了股權(quán)激勵(lì)的研究，而且并沒有和視為隱性激勵(lì)的在職消費(fèi)聯(lián)系起來，即有關(guān)薪酬對(duì)上市企業(yè)績(jī)效影響的研究中，將顯性薪酬和隱性薪酬兩方面結(jié)合起來分析討論二者共同對(duì)企業(yè)績(jī)效影響的，并不多見。本文正是從這點(diǎn)出發(fā)，把在職消費(fèi)——代表隱性薪酬與股權(quán)激勵(lì)一起作為變量，來分析股權(quán)激勵(lì)和在職消費(fèi)是如何對(duì)企業(yè)績(jī)效產(chǎn)生影響效用的。本文通過對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)、在職消費(fèi)對(duì)企業(yè)績(jī)效的影響進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究，發(fā)現(xiàn)了存在在職消費(fèi)的情況下，股權(quán)激勵(lì)是如何影響上市企業(yè)績(jī)效的，從而對(duì)我國(guó)的企業(yè)實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)、制定完備的薪酬激勵(lì)制度、減少代理成本、改善企業(yè)績(jī)效提供一點(diǎn)參考。 本文以我國(guó)特殊的經(jīng)濟(jì)體制與政治制度為研究背景，以代理理論和激勵(lì)理論為理論基礎(chǔ)，參考了大量有關(guān)于股權(quán)激勵(lì)與企業(yè)績(jī)效、在職消費(fèi)與企業(yè)績(jī)效的文獻(xiàn)，建立了以企業(yè)績(jī)效為因變量，以股權(quán)激勵(lì)、在職消費(fèi)和產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)為自變量，以企業(yè)規(guī)模、資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率、股權(quán)集中程度、企業(yè)成長(zhǎng)性、行業(yè)和年度為控制變量的研究模型，并以2006-2010年度我國(guó)滬深股票交易市場(chǎng)A股所有上市公司5283個(gè)數(shù)據(jù)（其中國(guó)有上市企業(yè)2888個(gè)，非國(guó)有上市企業(yè)2395個(gè)）為樣本，應(yīng)用Stata11.0和Excel2003對(duì)本文的數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行處理，并進(jìn)行了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。本文研究結(jié)果表明，在國(guó)有上市企業(yè)中股權(quán)激勵(lì)與企業(yè)績(jī)效不顯著，在職消費(fèi)與企業(yè)績(jī)效正相關(guān)，對(duì)企業(yè)績(jī)效的影響作用，股權(quán)激勵(lì)與在職消費(fèi)呈替代關(guān)系；在非國(guó)有上市公司中，股權(quán)激勵(lì)與企業(yè)績(jī)效正相關(guān)，股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)高管人員的激勵(lì)作用明顯，在職消費(fèi)與企業(yè)績(jī)效負(fù)相關(guān)，股權(quán)激勵(lì)能夠改善在職消費(fèi)對(duì)企業(yè)績(jī)效的負(fù)面作用。
[Abstract]:Domestic and foreign research on corporate governance has a long history, scholars from different perspectives, using a variety of theories to analyze, in-depth discussion of corporate governance, It is considered that the key to solve the agency problem lies in establishing a complete contract between the shareholders and managers of the enterprise. In the salary incentive system of the managers in our country, the monetary compensation, the equity incentive and the on-the-job consumption are three important parts. Monetary compensation and equity incentive are two parts of information disclosure, which is convenient to statistics, but the cost of in-service consumption is often attributed to the enterprise "operating expenses" and "management costs" projects, with a certain degree of concealment. Therefore, monetary compensation and equity incentive are usually called explicit compensation, while in-service consumption is usually regarded as implicit compensation. The reason for this is probably due to the fact that the research on equity incentive has not been associated with the in-service consumption, which is regarded as implicit incentive, that is, the research on the effect of compensation on the performance of listed enterprises. It is rare to analyze and discuss the influence of explicit compensation and implicit compensation on corporate performance. From this point of view, this paper takes the in-service consumption-representing implicit compensation and equity incentive as variables. This paper analyzes how equity incentive and on-the-job consumption affect enterprise performance. Through empirical research on the impact of equity incentive and in-service consumption on enterprise performance, we find that there is a case of in-service consumption. How does equity incentive affect the performance of listed enterprises, so as to provide some reference for the implementation of equity incentive, the establishment of a complete compensation incentive system, the reduction of agency costs and the improvement of enterprise performance. This paper takes the special economic and political system as the research background, the agency theory and the incentive theory as the theoretical basis, referring to a large number of literature on equity incentive and enterprise performance, on the job consumption and corporate performance. This paper establishes a research model which takes enterprise performance as dependent variable, equity incentive, in-service consumption and property right as independent variables, enterprise size, asset-liability ratio, equity concentration degree, enterprise growth, industry and year as control variables. Taking 5283 data of all A-share listed companies in China's Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2006-2010 (2888 state-owned listed enterprises and 2395 non-state-owned listed enterprises) as samples, Stata11.0 and Excel2003 are used to process the data in this paper. The empirical results show that the equity incentive and corporate performance are not significant in state-owned listed enterprises, while in-service consumption is positively related to corporate performance, and the impact on corporate performance. In non-state-owned listed companies, equity incentive has a positive correlation with enterprise performance, equity incentive has a significant incentive effect on executives, while in-service consumption has negative correlation with corporate performance. Equity incentive can improve the negative effect of on-job consumption on enterprise performance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：石河子大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

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