發(fā)布時間：2018-03-09 23:04

  本文選題：房地產(chǎn)調(diào)控　切入點(diǎn)：治理　出處：《中南大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：我國的房地產(chǎn)市場在近些年的發(fā)展中取得了驚人成就,也出現(xiàn)了一系列亟待解決的問題。中央政府的房地產(chǎn)調(diào)控隨市場環(huán)境的變換而不斷完善,呈現(xiàn)出目標(biāo)多維化、工具多樣化、政策力度日益加大的趨勢。2011年以前,房價甚至在房地產(chǎn)調(diào)控力度加大的情況下持續(xù)上漲,2011年下半年以來,雖然調(diào)控取得了一定效果,但其持續(xù)性和穩(wěn)定性有待加強(qiáng)。我國房地產(chǎn)調(diào)控存在的主要問題在于政策執(zhí)行過程中的失效,而不在于政策供給或者調(diào)控力度的不足。所以,解決調(diào)控政策執(zhí)行中存在的失效問題才是從根本上解決房地產(chǎn)市場諸多問題的當(dāng)務(wù)之急。 從尋找調(diào)控失效的根源出發(fā),將我國房地產(chǎn)調(diào)控政策執(zhí)行過程中所涉及的主要利益群體置于利益機(jī)制之下進(jìn)行分析,探索各個利益群體在房地產(chǎn)調(diào)控中所處的環(huán)境和地位,以及各自的角色和行為,并對主體在不同約束條件下的行為特征,以及這些行為特征對調(diào)控效果的影響進(jìn)行分析。分析認(rèn)為,地方政府在激勵監(jiān)督機(jī)制不完善和分權(quán)體制下與中央政府因利益沖突而產(chǎn)生的利益博弈；開發(fā)商在市場信息不對稱下對地方政府的尋租及與消費(fèi)者的房價博弈；以及在非理性預(yù)期下,消費(fèi)者之間的購房博弈是導(dǎo)致我國房地產(chǎn)調(diào)控失效的主要原因。 針對我國房地產(chǎn)調(diào)控失效的三個主要原因,分別運(yùn)用經(jīng)典博弈、期權(quán)博弈和行為博弈的理論工具,建立不同約束條件下的博弈治理模型,從博弈模型的建立和均衡分析來看,如何對地方政府進(jìn)行有效的激勵和約束,對開發(fā)商進(jìn)行有效監(jiān)督,對消費(fèi)者進(jìn)行合理引導(dǎo),是治理由主體行為導(dǎo)致調(diào)控失效的重點(diǎn)。最后從模型分析的結(jié)論出發(fā),尋求加強(qiáng)房地產(chǎn)調(diào)控效果的主體行為治理對策,認(rèn)為只有制定行之有效的激勵約束機(jī)制,健全監(jiān)督機(jī)制,完善房地產(chǎn)市場機(jī)制,并對消費(fèi)者進(jìn)行有效引導(dǎo),才能在一定程度上規(guī)避房地產(chǎn)調(diào)控的失效,從而促進(jìn)房地產(chǎn)市場的健康發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:The real estate market of our country has made remarkable achievements in recent years, and a series of problems need to be solved urgently. The real estate regulation and control of the central government has been improved with the change of the market environment. The trend of diversification of tools and increasing policy intensity. Before 2011, house prices continued to rise even under the condition of increased real estate regulation and control. Since the second half of 2011, although the control has achieved certain results, However, its sustainability and stability need to be strengthened. The main problem of real estate regulation in China lies in the failure of the policy implementation process, not in the insufficient supply or regulation of the policy. It is urgent to solve many problems in real estate market to solve the problem of failure in the implementation of regulation and control policy. In order to find out the root of the regulation and control failure, this paper analyzes the main interest groups involved in the implementation of the real estate regulation and control policy in our country under the interest mechanism, and explores the environment and status of the various interest groups in the real estate regulation and control. And their respective roles and behaviors, and the behavior characteristics of the subject under different constraint conditions, as well as the influence of these behavioral characteristics on the regulatory effect. The interest game between the local government and the central government under the imperfect mechanism of incentive and supervision and the decentralization system, the rent-seeking of the local government under the asymmetric market information and the game between the local government and the consumer's house price, and the interest conflict between the local government and the central government under the system of incentive supervision and decentralization; And under the irrational expectation, the main reason of the failure of real estate regulation and control in our country is the game of buying house among consumers. Aiming at the three main reasons of the invalidation of real estate regulation in our country, we use the theory tools of classical game, option game and behavior game respectively to establish the game governance model under different constraint conditions, and from the point of view of the establishment and equilibrium analysis of the game model. How to effectively encourage and restrain the local government, supervise the developers effectively, and guide the consumers reasonably is the key point of governance, which leads to the failure of regulation and control by the subject behavior. Finally, the conclusion of the model analysis begins with the conclusion of the model analysis. In order to improve the effect of real estate regulation and control, we should establish effective incentive and restraint mechanism, perfect supervision mechanism, perfect real estate market mechanism, and guide consumers effectively. In order to avoid the failure of real estate regulation to a certain extent, thus promoting the healthy development of the real estate market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F299.23;F224.32

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