本文關(guān)鍵詞： 房地產(chǎn)政策 地方政府 政策執(zhí)行　出處：《廣東海洋大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：房地產(chǎn)產(chǎn)業(yè)是我國(guó)國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)的重要產(chǎn)業(yè)，也是地方經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)和財(cái)政收入增加的重要來(lái)源，隨著商品經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展和城市化進(jìn)程的加快，商品房逐漸成為城市居民住宅供應(yīng)的基本形式，，房?jī)r(jià)過(guò)高會(huì)抑制公民的房屋消費(fèi)，影響公民的幸福指數(shù)，與政府的公共服務(wù)理念相背離。2004年起，我國(guó)政府出臺(tái)了一系列的調(diào)控房地產(chǎn)業(yè)的政策，以抑制房?jī)r(jià)過(guò)高和房產(chǎn)投機(jī)行為、促進(jìn)房地產(chǎn)業(yè)的健康發(fā)展。伴隨著中央向地方的縱向權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu)的調(diào)整和房地產(chǎn)產(chǎn)業(yè)利益多元化格局的形成,房地產(chǎn)政策在執(zhí)行過(guò)程中的問(wèn)題也越來(lái)越多，在房地產(chǎn)執(zhí)行過(guò)程中常出現(xiàn)政策偏差、執(zhí)行效率低下等問(wèn)題，地方政府非合作博弈現(xiàn)象明顯。 本文創(chuàng)新性地以地方政府在房地產(chǎn)政策執(zhí)行過(guò)程中的非合作博弈行為為研究對(duì)象，從公共政策學(xué)、新制度經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和地方政府學(xué)的視角，通過(guò)文獻(xiàn)分析法、實(shí)證分析法和綜合分析法的綜合應(yīng)用，在總結(jié)房地產(chǎn)政策執(zhí)行過(guò)程中互動(dòng)理論模型的基礎(chǔ)上，對(duì)地方政府的政策執(zhí)行行為進(jìn)行動(dòng)態(tài)分析，力求構(gòu)造一個(gè)相對(duì)系統(tǒng)的分析維度來(lái)探尋地方政府房地產(chǎn)政策執(zhí)行過(guò)程中非理性博弈的原因所在，歸納出一個(gè)有助于規(guī)范地方政府房地產(chǎn)政策執(zhí)行行為的有效路徑。 通過(guò)理論分析與實(shí)證分析的結(jié)合，可以看出，地方政府在房地產(chǎn)政策執(zhí)行過(guò)程中的諸多執(zhí)行困境和非理性博弈行為，除了源于縱向府際間的利益沖突情境下地方政府的應(yīng)付，還受橫向地方政府間競(jìng)爭(zhēng)情境下創(chuàng)新性政策執(zhí)行行為的影響，進(jìn)而系統(tǒng)分析兩種府際關(guān)系下，地方政府非合作博弈行為特征、表現(xiàn)形式和制度原因。并從房地產(chǎn)業(yè)調(diào)控體系、地方政府政策執(zhí)行力和規(guī)范政策執(zhí)行行為的制度建設(shè)等方面提出規(guī)范地方政府執(zhí)行房地產(chǎn)公共政策行為的對(duì)策。 本文主要包括6個(gè)部分：第一章導(dǎo)論部分，主要闡釋選題目的和意義、國(guó)內(nèi)外相關(guān)研究綜述及本文研究的研究方法。第二章，將對(duì)房地產(chǎn)公共政策的基本概念和特征進(jìn)行界定，并從房地產(chǎn)政策的變遷的視角，簡(jiǎn)要分析房地產(chǎn)政策的執(zhí)行困境。第三章著重分析房地產(chǎn)公共政策執(zhí)行過(guò)程中的利益相關(guān)者，并構(gòu)建當(dāng)代中國(guó)地方政府房地產(chǎn)政策執(zhí)行行為的理論模型。第四章和第五章將從博弈論的視角，結(jié)合案例對(duì)利益沖突情境和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)情境下地方政府的房地產(chǎn)政策執(zhí)行行為的特點(diǎn)、表現(xiàn)形式和深層制度原因等方面的影響進(jìn)行分析。第六章以優(yōu)化地方政府政策執(zhí)行力為宗旨，提出規(guī)范房地產(chǎn)政策實(shí)施過(guò)程中地方政府執(zhí)行行為的主要策略，從而提升地方政府的政策執(zhí)行力，促進(jìn)我國(guó)房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)的健康、持續(xù)發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:Real estate industry is an important industry of our national economy, and also an important source of local economic growth and fiscal revenue increase. With the development of commodity economy and the acceleration of urbanization process. Commercial housing has gradually become the basic form of housing supply for urban residents. Excessive housing prices will restrain citizens' housing consumption, affect citizens' happiness index, and deviate from the government's concept of public service. 2004. Our government has issued a series of policies to control the real estate industry in order to curb the excessive housing prices and property speculation. Promote the healthy development of real estate industry. With the adjustment of vertical power structure from central to local and the formation of diversification of real estate industry interests, real estate policy in the process of implementation of more and more problems. In the process of real estate implementation, there are often some problems, such as policy deviation and inefficient execution, and local governments' non-cooperative game phenomenon is obvious. This paper takes the non-cooperative game behavior of local government in the process of real estate policy implementation as the research object, from the perspective of public policy, new institutional economics and local government, through the literature analysis. The comprehensive application of empirical analysis and comprehensive analysis, on the basis of summarizing the interactive theoretical model in the process of real estate policy implementation, the dynamic analysis of the policy implementation behavior of local governments is carried out. Try to construct a relatively systematic analysis dimension to explore the local government real estate policy implementation process of irrational game reasons. To sum up an effective path to standardize the implementation of local government real estate policy. Through the combination of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis, we can see that the local government in the implementation of real estate policy implementation of a lot of difficulties and irrational game behavior. In addition to the vertical inter-government conflict of interest situation local government coping, but also by horizontal local government competition in the context of innovative policy implementation behavior, and then systematic analysis of the two types of inter-government relations. Local government non-cooperative game behavior characteristics, manifestations and institutional reasons, and from the real estate control system. This paper puts forward the countermeasures of standardizing the public policy behavior of real estate in the aspects of the local government's policy enforcement ability and the system construction of standardizing the policy enforcement behavior. This paper mainly includes six parts: the first chapter of the introduction, mainly explains the purpose and significance of the topic, domestic and foreign related research review and research methods of this paper. Chapter two. It will define the basic concept and characteristics of the real estate public policy, and from the perspective of the change of the real estate policy. The third chapter focuses on the analysis of the stakeholders in the process of the implementation of public real estate policies. And build the contemporary Chinese local government real estate policy implementation of the theoretical model. 4th and 5th chapters from the perspective of game theory. Combined with the case of conflict of interest situation and competition situation of the local government's real estate policy implementation behavior characteristics. Chapter 6th aims at optimizing the executive power of local government policies and puts forward the main strategies of standardizing the implementation of real estate policies. In order to enhance the local government's policy implementation, promote the healthy and sustainable development of our real estate market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：廣東海洋大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F299.23;D630

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本文編號(hào)：1481983