本文關(guān)鍵詞： 機(jī)構(gòu)投資者 過(guò)度投資 實(shí)證研究　出處：《西南大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：我國(guó)的固定資產(chǎn)投資率一直偏高,為了應(yīng)對(duì)全球危機(jī),2007-2011年間我國(guó)的固定資產(chǎn)投資率從50%上升到了66%的水平。投資對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)具有重要的拉動(dòng)作用,但過(guò)度的投資造成資本價(jià)格過(guò)于便宜、資產(chǎn)價(jià)格上漲、重復(fù)建設(shè)、資源浪費(fèi)等。宏觀層面的過(guò)度投資影響到微觀上市公司,尤其是我國(guó)大多上市公司國(guó)有股缺位的特殊性,公司管理層更容易為了自己的私利,盲目投資以擴(kuò)大公司規(guī)模,損害公司股東的利益。 20世紀(jì)70年代以來(lái),發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家資本市場(chǎng)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者快速發(fā)展,持股比例逐漸提高,股東積極主義開(kāi)始盛行。近年來(lái),我國(guó)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者在資本市場(chǎng)逐漸發(fā)展和政策的推動(dòng)下,也呈現(xiàn)了較快的發(fā)展趨勢(shì)。在這種背景下,我國(guó)的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者逐漸改變投資理念,轉(zhuǎn)向價(jià)值投資,開(kāi)始利用自己的信息、技術(shù)等優(yōu)勢(shì)監(jiān)督上市公司管理層,提高上市公司投資決策的效率。 本文首先介紹了我國(guó)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的現(xiàn)狀,從理論上分析了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與上市公司治理的內(nèi)外部機(jī)制對(duì)公司管理層進(jìn)行監(jiān)督,從而影響管理層投資決策、提高公司投資效率的機(jī)理。以我國(guó)A股上市公司2009-2011年的數(shù)據(jù)為研究樣本,從機(jī)構(gòu)投資者總體持股、不同類型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股與上市公司過(guò)度投資水平的相關(guān)角度出發(fā),實(shí)證分析我國(guó)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對(duì)上市公司過(guò)度投資行為的影響效果。 根據(jù)前人經(jīng)驗(yàn)和我國(guó)的實(shí)際情況構(gòu)建相應(yīng)模型來(lái)研究我國(guó)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者與上市公司過(guò)度投資行為的關(guān)系,實(shí)證結(jié)果表明：(1)我國(guó)上市公司普遍存在非效率投資問(wèn)題,與投資不足相比,過(guò)度投資程度更嚴(yán)重。(2)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例與上市公司過(guò)度投資水平呈顯著負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例越高,監(jiān)督上市公司投資決策的積極性越強(qiáng),公司的投資效率也就越好。(3)對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者分類分析發(fā)現(xiàn),獨(dú)立型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者由于與被投資公司不存在其他的業(yè)務(wù)聯(lián)系,從而更積極執(zhí)行股東監(jiān)督者的角色,而非獨(dú)立型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者由于與被投資公司存在業(yè)務(wù)上的關(guān)聯(lián)性,對(duì)被投資公司管理層進(jìn)行監(jiān)督會(huì)對(duì)自身的業(yè)務(wù)產(chǎn)生影響,所以難以對(duì)被投資公司管理層進(jìn)行監(jiān)督。 根據(jù)實(shí)證結(jié)果,本文提出了以下建議：(1)完善資本市場(chǎng)基礎(chǔ)制度,為機(jī)構(gòu)投資者創(chuàng)造良好的市場(chǎng)環(huán)境；(2)完善上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu),鼓勵(lì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者參與公司治理；(3)促進(jìn)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者多元化發(fā)展,完善機(jī)構(gòu)投資者結(jié)構(gòu)。
[Abstract]:China's fixed asset investment rate has been high, in order to cope with the global crisis. From 2007 to 2011, the fixed asset investment rate in China rose from 50% to 66%. Investment plays an important role in economic growth, but excessive investment results in too low capital price. The overinvestment at the macro level affects the particularity of the microcosmic listed companies, especially the absence of state-owned shares in most of the listed companies in China. It is easier for managers to invest blindly to expand the size of the company and harm the interests of shareholders. Since 1970s, the capital market institutional investors in developed countries have developed rapidly, the proportion of shares has gradually increased, and shareholder activism has begun to prevail in recent years. With the gradual development of the capital market and the promotion of policies, the institutional investors in our country have also shown a rapid development trend. Under this background, the institutional investors in our country have gradually changed their investment ideas and turned to value investment. Begin to use their own information, technology and other advantages to supervise the management of listed companies, improve the efficiency of investment decisions of listed companies. This paper first introduces the current situation of institutional investors in China, and theoretically analyzes the internal and external mechanism of institutional investors participating in the governance of listed companies to supervise the management of the company, thus affecting the management investment decisions. Based on the data of China A-share listed companies from 2009-2011, the author studies the mechanism of improving the efficiency of corporate investment and holds shares from institutional investors as a whole. Based on the correlation between different types of institutional investors' shareholding and the level of overinvestment of listed companies, this paper empirically analyzes the effect of institutional investors on the overinvestment behavior of listed companies. According to the previous experience and the actual situation of our country to build the corresponding model to study the relationship between institutional investors and overinvestment behavior of listed companies. The empirical results show that China's listed companies generally have the problem of inefficient investment, compared with insufficient investment. The degree of overinvestment is more serious. 2) the proportion of institutional investors holding shares is negatively correlated with the level of overinvestment of listed companies. The higher the proportion of institutional investors is, the higher the proportion of institutional investors is. The stronger the enthusiasm of supervising the investment decision of listed company, the better the investment efficiency of the company is. Independent institutional investors are more active in the role of shareholder supervisors because they have no other business links with the invested company. But the non-independent institutional investor has the business relevance with the invested company, the supervision to the management of the invested company will have the influence on their own business. Therefore, it is difficult to supervise the management of the invested company. According to the empirical results, this paper puts forward the following suggestions: 1) perfecting the basic system of capital market to create a good market environment for institutional investors; (2) perfecting the governance structure of listed companies and encouraging institutional investors to participate in corporate governance; Third, promote the diversification of institutional investors and improve the structure of institutional investors.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.48

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