本文關(guān)鍵詞： 企業(yè)特征 董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn) 投資政策　出處：《天津商業(yè)大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)作為一種專(zhuān)門(mén)的責(zé)任風(fēng)險(xiǎn)分散與權(quán)益保障機(jī)制，于20世紀(jì)30年代發(fā)端于美國(guó)，經(jīng)過(guò)幾十年的發(fā)展，如今在歐美等西方國(guó)家得到了廣泛的應(yīng)用，高達(dá)90%的上市公司為其董事及高管購(gòu)買(mǎi)了董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)。而在我國(guó)，董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)的發(fā)展還處于初級(jí)階段，上市公司的投保率只達(dá)到5%左右。 國(guó)內(nèi)外巨大的發(fā)展差距引起了國(guó)內(nèi)學(xué)者的關(guān)注，人們注意到，在投保率僅為5%的上市企業(yè)中，一般都是資金非常雄厚的、或國(guó)有或海外上市的大公司。然而，什么樣的企業(yè)對(duì)董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)更有需求，以及董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)在我國(guó)能否真正起到其應(yīng)有的作用，理論界并沒(méi)有給出明確的答案。 由于我國(guó)當(dāng)前相關(guān)法律法規(guī)并不健全，董事和高管面臨的責(zé)任風(fēng)險(xiǎn)并不大，其遭遇訴訟賠償?shù)膸茁噬跷�，而且保險(xiǎn)不是免費(fèi)的商品，企業(yè)購(gòu)買(mǎi)董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)的行為就顯得難以理解。是什么樣的企業(yè)購(gòu)買(mǎi)了董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)？購(gòu)買(mǎi)了董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)之后能否對(duì)企業(yè)的經(jīng)營(yíng)決策起作用？這就是本文將要研究的主要問(wèn)題。 本文首先研究了具有哪些特征的企業(yè)會(huì)購(gòu)買(mǎi)董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)，在此基礎(chǔ)上，從投資決策的視角來(lái)探討：對(duì)于購(gòu)買(mǎi)了董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)的企業(yè)，董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)能否真正發(fā)揮作用而影響企業(yè)的投資決策，據(jù)此來(lái)檢驗(yàn)董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)在我國(guó)是否流于形式。本文以2005—2011年我國(guó)滬深兩市上市公司的數(shù)據(jù)為樣本，先從企業(yè)規(guī)模、最終控制人類(lèi)型、是否海外上市等幾個(gè)維度來(lái)考察企業(yè)特征對(duì)董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)需求的影響；然后進(jìn)一步，探討企業(yè)購(gòu)買(mǎi)了董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)之后，其投資水平是否發(fā)生顯著變化。 通過(guò)研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，企業(yè)特征對(duì)董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)需求有一定的影響。實(shí)證的結(jié)果表明，企業(yè)的規(guī)模及海外背景等特征對(duì)企業(yè)的董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)需求的影響顯著正相關(guān)，企業(yè)的盈利能力和管理層持股等特征與董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)的需求負(fù)相關(guān)，實(shí)證的結(jié)果和我們預(yù)期的符號(hào)一致；同時(shí)，董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)對(duì)企業(yè)投資水平的研究結(jié)果顯示：企業(yè)購(gòu)買(mǎi)董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)之后,其投資水平?jīng)]有發(fā)生顯著變更，支持了我們的假設(shè)，，同時(shí)也在一定程度上說(shuō)明，現(xiàn)階段，董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)在我國(guó)只是流于形式，并未發(fā)揮其應(yīng)有的作用。 本文的貢獻(xiàn)主要在于：在我國(guó)企業(yè)股權(quán)相對(duì)集中，國(guó)有股權(quán)一股獨(dú)大,法律體系不健全等特殊社會(huì)背景下，研究企業(yè)特征、董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)和投資政策三者之間的關(guān)系，不僅對(duì)國(guó)外發(fā)展成熟的董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)在中國(guó)的需求及適用性進(jìn)行了檢驗(yàn)，更揭示了董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)在我國(guó)流于形式的現(xiàn)狀。這對(duì)于我們加快完善董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)相關(guān)立法，早日建立同國(guó)外一樣成熟完備的董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)體制，推動(dòng)董事責(zé)任保險(xiǎn)在我國(guó)的健康發(fā)展有重要作用。
[Abstract]:Director liability insurance as a special liability risk dispersion and rights and interests protection mechanism, started in 1930s in the United States, after decades of development, now in Europe and the United States and other Western countries have been widely used. Up to 90% of the listed companies have taken out directors' liability insurance for their directors and executives, but in China, the development of directors' liability insurance is still in the initial stage, and the insured rate of listed companies is only about 5%. The huge development gap at home and abroad has attracted the attention of domestic scholars, people noted that in the insured rate of only 5% listed enterprises, generally are very strong funds. However, what kind of enterprises have more demand for directors' liability insurance, and whether directors' liability insurance can really play its due role in our country. The theorists have not given a clear answer. Because the relevant laws and regulations of our country are not perfect, the liability risk of directors and executives is not big, the probability of its encounter lawsuit compensation is very little, and insurance is not free commodity. It is difficult to understand the behavior of buying director's liability insurance. What kind of enterprise bought director's liability insurance? After purchasing director's liability insurance, can it play an important role in the business decision of the enterprise? This is the main problem to be studied in this paper. First of all, this paper studies what characteristics of enterprises will buy director liability insurance, on the basis of this, from the perspective of investment decision-making: for the purchase of directors liability insurance enterprises. Whether directors' liability insurance can really play a role in the investment decisions of enterprises. This paper takes the data of the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2005 to 2011 as a sample, first of all, from the scale of the enterprise, and finally controls the type of person. Whether or not to list overseas to examine the impact of corporate characteristics on directors' liability insurance demand; Then, the paper discusses whether the investment level of directors' liability insurance has changed significantly. The empirical results show that the size and overseas background of enterprises have a significant positive correlation with the demand of directors' liability insurance. The characteristics of corporate profitability and management ownership are negatively correlated with the demand for directors' liability insurance. The empirical results are consistent with our expectations. At the same time, the research results of directors' liability insurance on the investment level of enterprises show that the investment level of directors' liability insurance has not changed significantly, which supports our hypothesis. At the same time, to some extent, the director's liability insurance in our country is just a mere formality, and does not play its due role. The main contributions of this paper are as follows: under the special social background, such as the relative concentration of stock right of Chinese enterprises, the dominance of state-owned equity, the imperfect legal system, and so on, the characteristics of enterprises are studied. The relationship between director liability insurance and investment policy not only tests the demand and applicability of foreign developed directors liability insurance in China. It also reveals the status quo of directors' liability insurance in China, which is helpful to us to improve the relevant legislation of directors' liability insurance and to establish as mature and complete director liability insurance system as foreign countries. Promoting director liability insurance plays an important role in the healthy development of our country.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津商業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F276.6;F224;F832.48

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