本文關(guān)鍵詞： 全流通 關(guān)聯(lián)交易 股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu) 機(jī)構(gòu)投資者　出處：《西南政法大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：我國2005年開始實(shí)行的股權(quán)分置改革是對我國資本市場的重大變革，理論界和實(shí)務(wù)界都認(rèn)為通過股權(quán)分置改革，，可以改善我國上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)，從而解決由于我國上市公司特殊的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)所帶來的各種問題，這其中就包括關(guān)聯(lián)交易。但是，在實(shí)行股權(quán)分置改革之后，我國上市公司進(jìn)行關(guān)聯(lián)交易的現(xiàn)象并沒有顯著減少，反而呈現(xiàn)出關(guān)聯(lián)交易的規(guī)模越來越龐大、交易的過程越來越復(fù)雜的現(xiàn)象，股權(quán)分置改革并沒有像預(yù)期的那樣有效地抑制關(guān)聯(lián)交易的發(fā)生。 本文從股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)這一影響公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)的基礎(chǔ)性機(jī)制入手，在參考前人研究的基礎(chǔ)上，結(jié)合當(dāng)前我國證券市場逐步邁入全流通的時代背景，來分析當(dāng)前我國上市公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與關(guān)聯(lián)交易之間的關(guān)系，并分析我國施行股權(quán)分置改革的作用是否得到了體現(xiàn)。在結(jié)合前人的研究和當(dāng)前的制度背景之后，提出本文的四個研究假設(shè)。 本文選取2009年至2011年滬深A(yù)股制造業(yè)中已經(jīng)實(shí)現(xiàn)全流通的上市公司為初始樣本，通過一定的篩選得到最終410個研究樣本，通過對樣本的實(shí)證分析來驗(yàn)證本文提出是研究假設(shè)，最終得出以下四個結(jié)論：第一大股東對公司擁有絕對控制權(quán)時，隨著第一大股東持股比例的增加，關(guān)聯(lián)交易的規(guī)模會越來越��；當(dāng)上市公司股權(quán)高度集中時，隨著公司股權(quán)集中度的增加，關(guān)聯(lián)交易的規(guī)模會越來越��；股權(quán)制衡對關(guān)聯(lián)交易有明顯的抑制作用；當(dāng)?shù)谝淮蠊蓶|對上市公司擁有絕對控制權(quán)或上市公司的股權(quán)高度集中時，機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的持股比例越高，對上市公司關(guān)聯(lián)交易的抑制作用更明顯。最后，在結(jié)合本文研究結(jié)果的基礎(chǔ)上提出有關(guān)的政策建議，包括：進(jìn)一步優(yōu)化我國上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、大力發(fā)展機(jī)構(gòu)投資者以及完善我國關(guān)聯(lián)交易的信息披露制度，以便更好地規(guī)范我國上市公司的關(guān)聯(lián)交易行為，完善我國的公司治理機(jī)制。
[Abstract]:In 2005, China began to implement the split share structure reform is a major change in China's capital market, the theoretical and practical circles believe that through the reform of equity separation, can improve the ownership structure of listed companies in China. In order to solve the problems caused by the special ownership structure of listed companies in China, including related party transactions. However, after the implementation of the split share structure reform. The phenomenon of related party transactions of listed companies in China has not been significantly reduced, on the contrary, the scale of related party transactions is becoming larger and larger, and the process of transactions is becoming more and more complex. The split-share structure reform has not been as effective as expected to curb the occurrence of related party transactions. This paper starts with the ownership structure, the basic mechanism that affects the internal governance structure of the company, on the basis of referring to the previous studies, and combines the background of the current securities market of our country step by step into the full circulation of the times. To analyze the relationship between the ownership structure and related party transactions of listed companies in our country, and to analyze whether the effect of the split share structure reform in our country has been reflected. After combining the previous research and the current institutional background. Four hypotheses of this paper are put forward. From 2009 to 2011, this paper selects all listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A share manufacturing industry as the initial sample, and obtains 410 research samples through certain screening. Through the empirical analysis of the sample to verify that this paper is a research hypothesis, and finally draw the following four conclusions: the first shareholder has absolute control of the company, with the increase of the proportion of the largest shareholder. The scale of related party transactions will be smaller and smaller; When the listed companies are highly concentrated, the scale of related party transactions will be smaller and smaller with the increase of the degree of equity concentration. Equity checks and balances have obvious inhibitory effect on related party transactions; When the largest shareholder has absolute control over the listed company or the stock ownership of the listed company is highly concentrated, the higher the proportion of institutional investors holding, the more obvious inhibition to the related party transactions of listed companies. Finally. On the basis of the research results of this paper, this paper puts forward some policy recommendations, including: further optimizing the equity structure of listed companies in China, vigorously developing institutional investors and perfecting the information disclosure system of related party transactions in China. In order to better regulate China's listed companies related transactions, improve our corporate governance mechanism.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F832.51

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