本文關(guān)鍵詞：上市公司信息披露的行為選擇——基于上市公司與監(jiān)管部門(mén)的博弈　出處：《會(huì)計(jì)之友》2014年21期 　論文類(lèi)型：期刊論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 上市公司 信息披露 監(jiān)管

【摘要】：上市公司信息披露行為由主動(dòng)自愿披露到強(qiáng)制披露,在這個(gè)過(guò)程中體現(xiàn)了各利益方的要求,也體現(xiàn)了各方在資本市場(chǎng)的博弈。上市公司本身的行為選擇決定了資本市場(chǎng)信息的質(zhì)量,文章研究上市公司與監(jiān)管方的行為博弈,目的是為市場(chǎng)的公允、為監(jiān)管提供理論支撐,研究認(rèn)為:在逐漸成熟、公允競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的資本市場(chǎng),上市公司信息披露行為趨向于真實(shí)披露信息,監(jiān)管概率降低,主要依靠市場(chǎng)以及上市公司自律。
[Abstract]:Information disclosure behavior of listed companies from voluntary disclosure to mandatory disclosure, in the process of reflecting the requirements of the various stakeholders. It also reflects the game of each party in the capital market. The behavior choice of the listed company itself determines the quality of the capital market information. This article studies the behavior game between the listed company and the supervisor in order to be fair to the market. For regulation to provide theoretical support, the study believes: in the capital market, fair competition, information disclosure behavior of listed companies tend to the true disclosure of information, the probability of regulation is reduced. Mainly rely on the market and listed companies self-discipline.
【作者單位】： 中央民族大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F224;F233;F832.51
【正文快照】： 一、引言從證券市場(chǎng)形成初期至今,我國(guó)對(duì)信息披露的監(jiān)督管理及規(guī)范就沒(méi)有放松過(guò)。目前對(duì)上市公司信息披露進(jìn)行監(jiān)管的部門(mén)主要是證監(jiān)會(huì)、滬深兩個(gè)交易所和中國(guó)注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師協(xié)會(huì),其中,證監(jiān)會(huì)是最權(quán)威的監(jiān)管者。近年來(lái),證監(jiān)會(huì)對(duì)上市公司信息披露監(jiān)管的力度不斷加大,2012年3月,證監(jiān)，

本文編號(hào)：1397996